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Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become 
intimately involved in trying to strengthen weak and failed states.  External actors, 
both multilaterally and unilaterally, have intervened in Europe, Asia, and Africa to 
bring internally conflicted parties together and to change the domestic authority 
structures of these countries.  This dissertation explains how external actors can 
successfully contribute to the development of domestic authority structures in conflict-
torn or post-conflict countries. 
Conventional state-building theories follow the Weberian conception of the 
modern state as an entity that maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of violent 
coercion.  Further, standard approaches to ending civil conflict recommend the use of 
population-centric strategies to achieve stability.  These prevailing assumptions are 
problematic as they ignore a credible commitment problem that exists in conflict-torn 
societies: elites within the government and opposition have no incentive to disarm due 
to the rational fear that once they do so they will be taken advantage of by the 
opposing elites.  This dissertation proposes a theory of self-enforcing stability to 
explain, from a rational-choice perspective, how it is possible to overcome this 
credible commitment problem.  
The theory contains four testable hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that an 
elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to greater success in 
establishing stability in conflict-torn states.  Second, external actors contribute to the 
establishment of stability more successfully when they help nations establish limited 
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access orders created by elite pacts rather than encouraging the creation of liberal 
democracies, or open access orders.  Third, external actors must help internal actors 
overcome their underlying credible commitment problems by guaranteeing elite pacts.  
The final hypothesis is that the decentralization, or oligopolization, of violent means 
and rent-seeking opportunities balances power amongst elites, ensuring that competing 
elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening each other 
with overwhelming force. 
This dissertation finds support for the proposed theory’s hypotheses in its 
examination of two cases: the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960, and the 
stabilization effort in Iraq between 2006-2008, which includes the “Awakening 
Movement” and the “Surge.  Both cases demonstrate how an external actor can 
contribute to developing enduring stability in conflict-torn societies by breaking from 
the standard Weberian conception of the state and population-centric focus.  This 
dissertation concludes with a discussion of policy implications, based on the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1. Introduction 
This dissertation explains how external actors can successfully contribute to 
the development of domestic authority structures in conflict-torn or post-conflict 
countries.  Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become 
intimately involved in trying to strengthen weak and failed states.  External actors, 
both multilaterally and unilaterally, have intervened in Europe, Asia, and Africa to 
bring internally conflicted parties together and to change the domestic authority 
structures of these countries.  For instance, in 1995, the Dayton Accords ended the 
civil conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and established an ad hoc international 
organization, the Office of the High Representative, to oversee the state-building 
efforts in Bosnia and to guarantee the agreement made between the formerly warring 
factions.  Since 1999, the United Nations has overseen efforts to build the state of East 
Timor and keep conflict between the government and opposition from destabilizing 
this nascent country.  NATO has expanded its role in trying to stabilize Afghanistan 
since 2003, but has still not been able to get the government and insurgents to see the 
collective benefits that they could gain from a stable state.   
The above examples of international intervention efforts follow the standard 
conceptions of achieving peace.  The standard models follow from the Weberian 
conceptions of the state, where the modern state is one that maintains a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of coercion by violence (Weber 1919 [2004]; 1978, 314).  This 
prevailing assumption is problematic, because in failed or fragile states, a credible 
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commitment problem exists between conflicting internal actors.  To solve this 
credibility problem, this dissertation argues that it is necessary to diversify the 
legitimate use of force in order to create a balance of power in the failed or fragile 
state.  Further, standard approaches to ending conflict recommend population-centric 
strategies, where this dissertation argues that an elite-centric approach is also 
necessary to solve this credible commitment problem.   
This dissertation examines two cases to show how an external actor can 
contribute to stability in conflict-torn societies by breaking from the standard 
Weberian conception of the state and population-centric focus:  (1) the Malayan 
Emergency from 1948 to 1960; and (2) the stabilization effort in Iraq between 2006-
2008 that included the “Awakening Movement”, the tribal movement that began in 
2006 to end the Sunni insurgency against Iraqi and coalition forces in order to counter 
the influence of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the “Surge”, the increase in American resources 
provided to Iraq in 2007.  
 
1.2. Research Question 
 This dissertation focuses on the general topic of state-building.  This is a broad 
and emerging area within the field of political science.  Despite years of interest in the 
topic, only a nascent literature on state-building exists (Krasner 2009).  Due to the 
breadth of the topic, the narrowed research focus of the dissertation is to examine the 
emergence of self-enforcing stability in conflict-torn states.  This dissertation is 
motivated by the following question:  what is the appropriate social order external 
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actors should help nations attain in order for successful state-building to take place, 
and what incentives can external actors provide to set host nations on this path? 
With this focus on the establishment of enduring security, this dissertation 
views counterinsurgency efforts as an element of the state-building process.  Through 
a game theoretic approach and case analyses, this dissertation refutes the prevailing 
“hearts and minds” (HAM) theory both logically and empirically.  The general HAM 
argument is that counterinsurgents achieve victory by using largely non-military 
means to win over the loyalty of the population, severing insurgents from their base of 
support.  The dissertation provides an alternative theory, and evidentiary support, that 
explains how external actors should adopt an elite-centric, rather than population-
centric, approach that appeals to the rational self-interest of the opposing internal elites 
to stabilize conflict.  Elites are won by providing them with incentives to reduce 
violence and allow governance, economic, and social development to take place that 
make the elites better off in the long-run. 
The starting point for the theory development in this dissertation is the 
rational-choice framework established by North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW) 
(2009a) that conceptualizes the relationship between violence and social order.  While 
NWW focus on how order develops in societies based on the interaction of internal 
actors, this dissertation adds to their framework by exploring the role of external 
actors in contributing to the development of social order in fragile states.    
 Before proceeding, it is necessary to define several terms, which are 
fundamental to the research question, and will be used repeatedly throughout the 
course of the dissertation.  State-building refers to the construction of self-enforcing 
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governance structures that establish stability in the state and allow for economic, 
political, and social development to take place.  Following Greif (2006), strategic 
situations are defined as self-enforcing if each actor “finds it best to follow the 
institutionalized [or expected] behavior that reproduces the institution,” or solidifies an 
agreement between actors, and that the “implied behavior confirms the associated 
beliefs and regenerates the associated norms” of the institution or agreement (15-16).  
This dissertation defines stability as the reduction of violence to a manageable level.  
Manageable is the point where violence does not inhibit the governance, economic, 
and social development components of state-building to take place.  Finally, this 
dissertation uses social order, following NWW’s (2009a) discussion of open versus 
closed access societies, to highlight the societal basis of governance structures rather 
than regime type, which is the more common way to examine stability in the literature 
(Lipset 1959; O'Donnell 1971; Przeworski et al. 2000).  The analysis of social order 
progression, as opposed to level of democracy, keeps this dissertation focused on 
stability rather than a specific form of government. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 This dissertation adopts a rational-choice perspective, and follows an analytical 
narratives approach to develop a theory of self-enforcing stability and to test the 
theory empirically.  This approach combines game theoretic analytical tools with 
narratives that explore historical events and the context of the events.  The approach 
focuses on the choices and decisions between strategic actors in order to delineate 
specific mechanisms that contribute to observed outcomes (Bates et al. 1998, 10-13).  
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By adopting this problem driven approach to understanding the conditions under 
which self-enforcing stability emerges as a result of the involvement of external actors 
in conflict-torn states, this dissertation begins to develop a more general theory of self-
enforcing stability.   
 
1.4. Hypotheses 
The theory of self-enforcing stability developed in this dissertation contains 
four main hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that an elite-centric, rather than 
population-centric, strategy will lead to greater success in establishing stability in 
conflict-torn states.  The causal logic for this argument is that the government and 
external actor have limited resources with which to counter the civil conflict, so rather 
than spreading those resources thinly and directly to the population, distribution 
through elites allows the elites to maintain power and have a stake in the future of the 
nation.  This logic is supported by Christia’s (2008, Forthcoming) findings that meso-
level elites control the behavior of the population under their influence through the 
provision of security and rents.  When the meso-level elites fail to provide either, then 
the population is more prone to support national-level conflicts.  Recent empirical 
work supports this view that citizens follow the lead of elites.  Berinsky (2007) found 
that patterns of elite conflict, rather than individual citizen cost-benefit calculations, 
shape the opinion of the American public in their support for military conflict.  
Blaydes and Linzer (2010) similarly found that anti-Americanism amongst the “Arab 
Street” is driven by elite-competition between Islamist and Arab-secular elites. 
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The second hypothesis is that external actors contribute to the establishment of 
stability more successfully when they help nations establish limited access orders 
(LAOs) rather than open access orders (OAOs).  Everything in limited access orders is 
personal and driven by elites through patron-client relationships.  These relationships 
tie elites into dominant coalitions that spread the benefits they receive across the 
coalition, while limiting access to the privileges only to the members.  The creation 
and manipulation of interests in LAOs ensures social order (North et al. 2009a, 38).  
Over time, some countries develop into open access orders, which are essentially 
highly developed and consolidated, liberal and market-based democracies. 
The lack of effective governance institutions in conflict-torn states creates the 
conditions for extensive rent-seeking—or what some may view as endemic 
corruption—and actors resort automatically to violence to solve conflicts.  Moving too 
quickly to open political and economic competition in such a society may cause elites 
to return to what they know, corruption and violence, to achieve and maintain power.  
Helping establish a limited access order—while not democratization per, the formation 
of an LAO may contain some democratic mechanisms—allows stability to form and 
the gradual extension of rule of law to more members of society and the development 
of institutions that can enforce the extension of rule of law. 
This dissertation’s third hypothesis is that the external actor must help internal 
actors overcome their underlying credible commitment problems in order to put them 
on the path towards self-enforcing stability.  The external actor solves this problem by 
guaranteeing a pact between a dominant coalition of elites.  The external actor uses 
credibility mechanisms—personnel, money, equipment, time, elections, institutional 
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development, and public statements of intent—that enable the external actor to punish 
the transgressor of the pact.  Preliminary support for this hypothesis comes from 
Walter’s (2002) argument that combatants pursue and credibly commit to peace 
settlements when third parties safeguard each combatant’s role in the post-war 
government and minimize the risk of post-treaty exploitation.  Further, Fortna (2008) 
found that peacekeeping only works when peacekeepers shape the choices of the 
combatants to choose peace over war.  The mechanisms available to the external actor 
that this dissertation describes highlight how the external actor can shape the 
incentives, and, hence, the behavior of the combatants. 
The final hypothesis counters the Weberian assumption that states must 
maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in order to maintain order 
(Weber 1919 [2004]).  Drawing from the insights of NWW (2009a) about the role of 
elite pacts in creating social order in limited access orders, this dissertation 
hypothesizes that the decentralization, or oligopolization, of violent means amongst 
competing elites allows stability to develop in conflict-torn societies.  This 
oligopolization of force creates a balance of power amongst elites, ensuring that 
competing elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening 
one another with overwhelming force.  The logic of this hypothesis finds support from 
De Figueiredo and Weingast’s (1999) rationality of fear argument, as well as from 
recent empirical research on Columbia by Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2010) 
who argue that non-state armed groups can help governments implement policies the 
government would otherwise be unable to do. 
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1.5. Existing Literature 
The dissertation’s focus on the establishment of security during the state-
building process leads to the exploration of several areas of literature within political 
science: civil war, state-building, counterinsurgency, and international peacekeeping.  
Insight into the topic at hand can be drawn from the existing literature.  The civil war 
literature gives an understanding about the reasons behind the outbreak of civil 
conflict, while the other three areas provide insight into how to resolve civil conflict.  
However, an examination of the extant literature also illuminates some gaps in this 
literature; it is these gaps that this dissertation indents to fill through the development 
of a theory of self-enforcing stability.   
 
1.5.1.  Conflict Outbreak 
1.5.1.1. Civil War Literature 
One literature that this dissertation builds upon is the civil war literature.  Civil 
war and counterinsurgency are closely related, but the civil war literature is more 
developed theoretically.  Yet, political scientists still have difficulty distinguishing the 
difference between civil war and insurgency empirically.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
obscure this difference by saying that insurgency is a tactic of war, but they and others 
(Gompert and Gordon 2008) use the terms interchangeably and use the same 
conventional measurement of battle deaths to empirically define both civil war and 
insurgency (Small and Singer 1982).  In explaining the incidence of civil war, the 
literature has three primary causal arguments that one can transfer to explain the 
outbreak of insurgency.  First is the grievance approach.  According to Gurr (1970), 
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without a responsive government, “relative deprivation” will solve a societal collective 
action problem and lead the population to support a rebellion.  Without those 
grievances, the insurgents will fail to gain support from the population.  Micro-level 
research by Kalyvas (2006) demonstrates that local grievances about inequality can 
lead to marco-level civil conflicts.   
A second explanation of civil conflict is based on greed.  According to this 
argument by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) and Weinstein (2006), nations with an 
abundance of lootable natural resources or large illegal or informal sector-based 
economies provide the incentives for rebels to seek control of the state.  The resources 
reduce the rebel’s dependence on the population for support.   
The final approach to understanding civil conflict is based on the premise that 
civil conflict occurs when there is sufficient opportunity.  Fearon and Latin (2003) 
argue that rough terrain and state strength, proxied by GDP per capita, predict civil 
war onset, because they determine the ability of the government to defeat 
insurgencies.  A weakness of their finding though is that GDP per capita may capture 
poverty, which is a grievance rather than proxy for state strength.  Collier, Hoeffler, 
and Rohner (2009) also argue that the financial and military feasibility of rebellion is 
an important factor in determining the outbreak of civil conflict. 
 
1.5.2.  Conflict Resolution 
1.5.2.1. State-building Literature 
In the area of state-building, several approaches attempt to explain how the 
process occurs, yet no overarching theory exists to explain how external actors can 
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contribute to the development of stability in conflict-ridden states.  Modernization 
theory argues that economic development needs to occur for governance improvement 
to take place (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000).  This theory does not account for 
the role of security in setting the conditions for development to occur.  The political 
institutionalization approach argues that to achieve stability, states must first build the 
institutional capacity necessary for effective governance (Huntington 1965, 1968; 
Fukuyama 2004).  The implication is that the state must centralize control and prevent 
political mobilization from exceeding state capacity.  Finally, the rational-choice 
institutionalism approach argues that the incentives of the key actors must be aligned 
for state-building to take place (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; North et al. 2009a).   
The key gap in the state-building literature is that all of the approaches treat 
external actors as exogenous shocks to the process.  As an exogenous shock, the 
external actor may impact a process, but the process is assumed to have no influence 
on the external actor.  So, in this case, the external actor does not incorporate strategic 
considerations (a decision based on the expectations of another’s actions) into its 
behavior or role in the state-building process.  This dissertation argues that when 
external actors take part in a state-building process, they are endogenous to the 
development of the host state.  In other words, while the external actor’s preferences 
and behavior directly affect the development of stability and the success or failure of 
state-building, the actions of the host-nation participants to the state-building process 
influence the external actor, so the external actor may behave strategically.  As the 
external actor is endogenous to state-building, the external actor has at its disposal 
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various mechanisms that it can exploit to shape the outcome of the state-building 
process depending on the strategies of other actors in the strategic situation.  
 
1.5.2.2. Counterinsurgency Literature 
Within the counterinsurgency literature, the prevailing paradigm argues that 
counterinsurgents—the government and the supporting external actors—must adopt a 
population-centric strategy to win the “hearts and minds” (HAM) of the populace.  
Counterinsurgents undermine the insurgents and win the “hearts and minds” of the 
population through the provision of public goods and services, demonstrating the 
legitimacy of the government.  Further, according to this theory, counterinsurgents 
must use minimal force against the population, and have adaptive leaders and 
organizations to develop and implement HAM policies (Galula 1964 [2006]; 
Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971; Nagl 2005 [2002]; Department of the Army 2006; 
Kilcullen 2009).  This population-centric theory, or “hearts and minds” approach, 
however, ignores the role of elites and their incentives.  This dissertation develops an 
elite-centric theory to better understand the role of elites in the development of 
stability and their impact on state-building success or failure.    
 
1.5.2.3. International Peacekeeping Literature 
Finally, this dissertation uses the knowledge developed in the international 
peacekeeping literature to fill some of the gaps in the literatures discussed above.  
Walter (2002) argues that the implementation stage is the most important stage of the 
civil conflict resolution process.  She found that combatants pursue and credibly 
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commit to peace settlements when third parties verify and enforce demobilization and 
safeguard each combatant’s role in the post-war government.  The third-party 
guarantees are vital to the combatants’ credible commitment due to the enormous risks 
of post-treaty exploitation.   
Fortna (2008) examined both the role of the peacekeepers and the peacekept 
(the combatants).  She found that peacekeeping only works when peacekeepers shape 
the choices of the combatants to choose peace over war.  She argued that four 
pathways contributed to the continuation of violence: “aggression, fear and mistrust, 
accident …, and political exclusion” (175).  Fortna then explains that peacekeepers 
can block these pathways by changing incentives to favor peace over war, reduce the 
security dilemma between the parties, prevent or control the impact of accidents, and 
dissuade the parties from excluding the other from the political process.  This 
dissertation applies Walter’s and Fortna’s findings about the importance of external 
actors in solving credible commitments between combatants in civil conflict to how 
external actors can help achieve a level of stability that allows state-building to occur. 
 
1.6.  The Dissertation’s Contribution 
Building on the rational-choice framework, this dissertation fills the gap in the 
nascent state-building literature by incorporating external actors as components of the 
process.  The dissertation also reevaluates conventional approaches in the 
counterinsurgency literature by focusing on elites rather than the population as the unit 
of analysis, and focusing on aligning incentives of these actors instead of trying to 
directly win “hearts and minds.”  Further, it contributes to the literature by formalizing 
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the population-centric “hearts and minds” theory in an extended-form game model, 
and developing an alternative theory to explain how external actors can contribute to 
the establishment of stability in conflict-torn states.   
It is important to analyze quintessential counterinsurgency cases to see if there 
exists empirical support for the theoretical argument.  The lessons learned from these 
cases have policy implications for the role of external actors in modern state-building 
during civil conflict.  Conventional HAM proponents argue that host governments 
need outside “experts” to help solve the legitimacy problems that led to the outbreak 
of insurgency.  HAM and its state-building emphasis have the potential to develop into 
the 21st century version of the “White Man’s Burden” (Kipling 1899).  Yet, data on the 
ability of external actors to help governments defeat insurgents warns that this is a 
burden that must be taken on very cautiously.   
Table 1.1 shows that external actors have supported governments in 34% of all 
completed insurgencies since 1945.  Yet, the success rate for governments defeating 
insurgencies is lower with the help of external actors.  The government won when they 
had direct external actor support and indirect support in only 23.5% and 25% of the 
cases, respectively.  This is compared to the government losing when external actors 
provided direct and indirect support to governments 29.4% and 50% of the time, 
respectively.  This may be because external actors only help in the toughest cases.  
Regardless of the reason an external actor helps to defeat an insurgency, Table 1.1 
shows that defeating an insurgency is a real hard problem.  Further, while the data 
does not differentiate HAM from other COIN efforts, the data does raise questions 
about the “expertise” of external actors in fighting counterinsurgency campaigns.  This 
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data clarifies why would-be counterinsurgents must do a better job in learning what 
mechanisms and under what conditions an external actor’s involvement has the 
greatest correlation with success in defeating an insurgency. 
Table 1.1.  Completed Insurgencies, 1945-2009 (Gompert and Gordon 2008, 
Appendix A) 
 
This dissertation seeks to identify how external actor’s can best contribute to 
ending insurgencies and developing long-lasting stability.  Through the formalization 
of the population-centric “hearts and minds” theory and the development of an elite-
centric theory of self-enforcing stability, this dissertation reevaluates the purported 
HAM success stories during the Malaya Emergency, 1948-1960, and the “Surge” in 
Iraq, 2006-2008.  In the case analyses of both the Malayan Emergency and the 
“Surge”, this dissertation found that neither case follows the expected logic described 
by the formal HAM model.  The formalization of the population-centric theory also 
shows that the theory, at least rhetorically, focuses more on winning the population’s 
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“hearts” and ignores their “minds”.  Additionally, the data on each of the cases 
suggests that means other than those proposed by the HAM narratives were used to 
change the behavior of the population.  In both Malaya and Iraq, the counterinsurgents 
relied more on coercive than persuasive means to change the behavior of the 
population.   
After analyzing the HAM model and narrative against the data from the 
Malayan Emergency and the “Surge”, the dissertation tests the theoretical logic and 
empirical arguments of the theory of self-enforcing stability.  The theory held up to the 
analysis of both cases, suggesting that the four main arguments of the theory may be 
more generalizable.  In both Malaya and Iraq, the external actor pursued elite-centric 
strategies to help the host government and opposition overcome their credible 
commitment problems, which were the main cause of violence in both cases.   
As the competing elites were the source of the credible commitment problems 
that blocked Malaya and Iraq from achieving stability, the external actors recognized, 
in practice though not rhetoric, the need to focus directly on elites, rather than the 
population.  The external actor in both cases used different credibility mechanisms to 
guarantee pacts between dominant coalitions of elites.  These mechanisms included a 
combination of the provision of resources—in the form of personnel, money, 
equipment, and time, as well as elections, institutional development, and public 
statements of intent.  
In both Malaya and Iraq, the external actors diversified power between the 
government and opposition, rather than centralizing power within the government.  
They diversified power through the oligopolization of violent means and distribution 
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of rent-seeking between government and opposition elites who agreed to join an elite 
pact.  In Malaya, the British established over 450,000-armed local Chinese personnel 
to provide self-protection and to punish the members of their community who did not 
abide by the pact.  In Iraq, the coalition did the same with the Sunni population during 
the “Awakening Movement”, supporting over 95,000 local self-defense forces (the 
Sons of Iraq).  The external actor also distributed resources through local leaders in 
both cases.  The reductions in violence in both Malaya and Iraq allowed the elites to 
increase their prosperity, and showed the elites they are all better off in the long-run 
through cooperation.  
 Additionally, in both Malaya and Iraq, the external actors established limited 
access orders (LAOs) rather than democracies.  The British supported governance 
structures in Malaya that limited access to the benefits of governance to members of a 
pact established between the Chinese and Malay elites.  The same happened in Iraq, 
where the coalition limited the provision of benefits, authorized security forces, and 
rent-seeking opportunities to just certain Sunni and Shi’a elites.  In both cases, the 
limitation of access and use of the external actors’ credibility mechanisms enabled and 
supported the ability of the elites to punish any transgressors of the agreements.  In 
Malaya, the pact become self-enforcing, while in Iraq, the external actor set the 
conditions for the possibility of the pact to become self-enforcing.   
In summation, this dissertation contributes to the literature by providing an 
alternative to the conventional population-centric and Weberian approaches to ending 
conflict in failed states.  The standard approach seeks to have external actors solve the 
problem of violence by winning over the affection of the population through the 
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provision of public goods and services and by forcing the opposition to lay down its 
arms and grant the government a monopoly over violence.  The theory developed and 
tested in this dissertation shows that the Weberian approach leads the opposition to 
fear government abuse, providing no incentive to stop fighting.  To end violence, the 
external actor has to focus on aligning the incentives of the elites rather than winning 
the affection of the population.  The standard approaches fail to recognize this 
incentive problem, therefore, misdiagnosing the problem and providing inadequate 
solutions.  This dissertation identifies the problem as the failure of the government and 
opposition elites to provide credible commitments to one another, and argues the 
solution is the diversification of power within a limited access order among a 
dominant coalition of government and opposition elites. 
 
1.7.  Dissertation Outline 
 The dissertation consists of several components.  Chapter 2 critically analyzes 
the existing literature.  The chapter emphasizes the counterinsurgency literature, as 
this dissertation focuses largely on the security development aspect of state-building in 
conflict-torn states.  This chapter critiques the prevailing population-centric “hearts 
and minds” theory logically and empirically.  The chapter uses an extended form game 
to explain flaws in the underlying logic of the HAM theory.  The chapter shows 
empirically that the actions taken by nations who have claimed to follow a HAM 
approach do not match the rhetoric of HAM theory’s proponents or doctrine. 
 Chapter 3 develops an alternative to HAM theory—a theory of self-enforcing 
stability.  Again, the dissertation uses game theory to explain the logic of this 
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argument.  The theory incorporates and contains detailed explanations of the four 
hypotheses of the theory stated in Section 1.4.  Chapter 3 contains two extended form 
models to explain this theory of self-enforcing stability.  The first model examines the 
role of an intervening external actor who enters the host nation during or following 
hostilities between internal actors to help establish self-enforcing stability.  The 
second model explores the role that an external actor who is already stationed inside 
the host nation prior to hostilities may have in helping establish self-enforcing 
stability. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 consist of two analytical narratives that test the validity of the 
competing theories presented in Chapters 2 and 3: the “hearts and minds” theory and 
the theory of self-enforcing stability.  Chapter 4 reexamines the Malayan Emergency 
from 1948 to 1960.  This case is the “most-likely” case (George and Bennett 2005, 
120-123) for examining the strength of HAM, because proponents of HAM regularly 
use Malaya as its example of success.  By first reexaming the Malaya case with the 
formal model of HAM (derived in Chapter 2), the case analysis shows that the 
outcome does not follow the logic of the population-centric HAM approach.  The 
chapter then analyzes Malaya through the logic of the theory of self-enforcing 
stability.  This analysis finds that the outcome in Malaya more closely follows the 
logic of the elite-centric “post-colonial model” defined in the Chapter 3. 
 Chapter 5 again tests the HAM logic derived in the model in Chapter 2; this 
time, though, against the case of the stabilization that took place in Iraq between 2006 
and 2008.  Again, the outcome does not follow the HAM logic, and more closely 
follows the logic of the elite-centric “Podesta model” of self-enforcing stability 
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derived in Chapter 3.  Finally, the dissertation concludes in Chapter 6 with a 
discussion of the implications of the findings from the analytical narratives, as well as 
the generalizability of the theory of self-enforcing stability, and paths for further 
research and testing of the theory. 
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Chapter 2: Critical Analysis of Conventional Counterinsurgency Theory 
“[Rebellion] must have…a population…sympathetic to the point of not betraying 
rebel movements to the enemy.  Rebellion can be made by two percent active in a 
striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic.” – T.E. Lawrence (1929 [2010]) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 At the start of the 21st century, as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
counterinsurgency has reemerged as an en vogue military term.  Students and scholars 
who have argued that the United States lost in Vietnam because military leaders failed 
to recognize that the United States faced an insurgency (Krepinevich 1986) and that 
the military did not shift to counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam because the Army 
lacked a learning culture (Nagl 2005 [2002]) have influenced the strategic direction of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The reigning conventional wisdom, that to defeat 
these ongoing insurgencies by winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghan 
people, has dominated current US and British military doctrine (Department of the 
Army 2006; British Army 2009) and policy decisions by Presidents Bush and Obama.  
The overarching principles of the “Petraeus Doctrine”, codified in FM 3-24: 
Counterinsurgency, provided the basis for the “Surge” ordered by President Bush in 
Iraq (Bush 2007b), as well as the revised Afghanistan strategy approved by President 
Obama (Obama 2009). 
 The conventional wisdom actually is fairly simple rhetorically.  It starts with 
the assumption that insurgencies are mass social phenomena (Mao 1961 [2000]; Taber 
1965 [2002]; Department of the Army 2006, 1-1--1-19); therefore an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy must be population-centric.   The counterinsurgents must 
compete with insurgents for control of and influence over the population.  So, the 
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counterinsurgents should implement a “hearts and minds” strategy that protects the 
population and improves the effectiveness and legitimacy of the central government, 
winning the affection and loyalty of the population.  But executing this strategy is 
quite complex, and why its proponents self-approvingly call it the “graduate level of 
war” (Department of the Army 2006, 1-1).  COIN proponents have operationalized 
this strategy through the concept of “clear, hold, and build” (National Security Council 
2005, 18-22; Packer 2006; Frontline 2007).  This “graduate level” characterization, 
however, implies that conventional warfare is the “undergraduate level of war” and is 
simpler to conduct.   
The propagation of the counterinsurgency conventional wisdom has occurred 
with little debate about the theoretical underpinnings of “hearts and minds” or the 
“lessons learned” about previous counterinsurgency1 experiences.  The proponents of 
this view of counterinsurgency have developed the moniker “COINdinistas” (Ricks 
2009a), implying their rebelliousness against the dominance of conventional warfare 
in thinking about how to conduct war.  Yet, as one of the contemporary patron saints 
of the conventional wisdom states, “The world community of specialists in these 
issues is small and tightly knit” (Kilcullen 2009, xv).  Unfortunately, this tightly knit 
community has mostly promulgated an uncritical groupthink about COIN theory.  
Twenty-first century COIN proponents have largely adopted the ideas of a few authors 
                                                
1 The theory and lessons learned described in this chapter are about what today is commonly referred to 
as counterinsurgency, but at different times have been referred to as guerrilla warfare, small wars, 
imperial policing, irregular warfare, or asymmetric warfare.  This dissertation treats these terms 
interchangeably.   
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from the 1960s (Galula 1964 [2006]; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971)2, making modern 
proponents the protectors of the COIN orthodoxy rather than the self-promoted rebels 
of military thinking.  This younger generation has merely displaced the older 
generations’ convention that “no more Vietnams” meant fighting wars with 
overwhelming force3 with the view that “no more Vietnams” means preparation for 
counterinsurgency warfare should take precedence over preparation for interstate 
conventional warfare (Van Creveld 1991; Boot 2005).4   
 “Hearts and minds”, a term attributed to General Sir Gerard Templer after his 
use of the phrase in Malaya, conjures the image of benign activity and intent by the 
counterinsurgents to gain the affection and loyalty of the population.  HAM makes a 
good bumper-sticker slogan, but there has been limited critical analysis of the logical 
and empirical basis for the theory5.  This chapter proceeds by examining the prevailing 
counterinsurgency literature.  First, the chapter explores the history of 
counterinsurgency warfare, literature that influences counterinsurgency thinking, and 
                                                
2 The primary theories and lessons learned come from the experience of the British in Malaya 
(Thompson and Kitson) or the French in Algeria (Galula).  The three main authors from which other 
heavily cited works derive their ideas from are Sir Robert Thompson (1966), Sir Frank Kitson (1960, 
1971), and David Galula (1964 [2006]).   
 
3 The desire to prevent future Vietnams was codified in the “Weinberger/Powell Doctrine” (Weinberger 
1984).   
 
4 While the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Department of Defense 2010) says that the 
United States must be able to face “two capable nation-state aggressors” (vi), the QDR excludes that 
from the six key missions of the Department of Defense.  These are: 1) “Defend the United States and 
support civil authorities at home”; 2) “Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism 
operations”; 3) “Build the security capacity of partner states”; 4) “Deter and defeat aggression in anti-
access environments”; 5) “Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction”; and 6) 
“Operate effectively in cyberspace” (2).   
 
5 Some critical analysis of the theory’s logic occurred at the RAND Corporation in the 1970s by Leites 
and Wolfe (1970), and there has been an emerging empirical revisionist critique of the lessons learned 
in Malaya (Purcell 1954; Hack 1999, 2009; Dixon 2009; Bennett 2009). 
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then the leading counterinsurgency theories.  Second, the chapter explains the causal 
logic of counterinsurgency’s population-centric “hearts and minds” theory and its 
underlying assumptions that come from the state development literature.  A game 
theory model helps further clarify the theory and depicts what one should expect if the 
logic of the HAM theory holds.  Third, the chapter provides a logical critique of the 
population-centric theory, showing how missing components in the theory’s logic 
prevent HAM from satisfactorily explaining the outcome of counterinsurgency 
warfare.  Finally, the chapter empirically critiques the population-centric theory, 
demonstrating that the policy implementation of the theory does not match the 
romanticized image of HAM.   
 
2.2.  Brief History of Counterinsurgency Warfare 
2.2.1.  Asymmetry is Not a New Phenomenon 
While insurgency is a term of the late 20th century, the underlying concepts 
about internal war and the use of unconventional means are not new.  Many different 
words have been used to describe similar strategies and tactics, despite differences in 
technology, throughout history.  Asymmetric warfare has existed since nearly the first 
wars.  The idea behind asymmetric warfare is that the weaker side uses tactics outside 
of the “norms” of warfare to attack or exploit weaknesses in a stronger force.  The 
Scythians of Central Asia used hit-and-run tactics between the 5th and 3rd centuries 
B.C.E. against the Persian armies of Darius the Great, and later against the 
Greek/Macedonian armies of Alexander the Great.  The Romans broke the “norms” of 
warfare at the time to use assassinations and raiding parties against Hannibal 
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following several disastrous defeats.  And, the Romans faced asymmetric resistance 
against their forces, such as the struggle led by Judas Macabee.  The Continental 
Army also used such strategies and tactics to exploit the weaknesses of the stronger 
British forces during the American Revolution. 
The same elements of asymmetric warfare existed in the development of 
guerilla warfare, or “little war”, by the Spanish in the 18th century.  This period 
solidified warfare of armed civilians against a nation-state using tactics outside of the 
“norms” of war among nation-states at the time, such as ambushes, sabotage, snipers, 
and hit-and-run tactics.  By the 18th century, nation-states fought wars by standing and 
facing each other in battle.  The word guerilla was coined to describe a band of 
fighters, separate from the Spanish Army, who fought Napoleon’s army as part of the 
Peninsular War after Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808.  The guerrillas’ principal 
function was to disrupt the supply and communication lines of the French army by 
intercepting messages and by seizing convoys of supplies, arms, and money.  Guerilla 
warfare followed this pattern through the turn of the 20th century with the Philippine 
Insurrection against US forces in the Philippines following the Spanish-American war.   
Guerrilla warfare evolved into the “People’s War,” developed by Mao Tse-
Tung, at the start of the 20th century.  Mao recognized the impossibility of 
overthrowing the ruling Chinese regime without developing a large base of support, 
and that it would be suicide to attack the Chinese nationalist forces directly in battle at 
the opening stages of war.  Mao (1961 [2000]) identified three stages to the “People’s 
War”.  The first (strategic defense) is devoted to organization, consolidation, and 
preservation of regional base areas.  Cadres train and indoctrinate volunteers, while 
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agitators and propagandists go out and “persuade” or “convince” surrounding 
populations to support the rebels.  Sympathizers willing to supply food, recruits, and 
information form the base of support.  The rebels limit military operations during this 
phase, which is conspiratorial, clandestine, methodical, and progressive, to lay the 
foundation for the next two phases.   
Acts of sabotage and terrorism dominate the second phase (strategic 
stalemate), and the rebels liquidate collaborators and “reactionary elements”.  The 
“asymmetric” attacks target vulnerable military and police outposts, in order to 
procure arms, ammunition, and other essential supplies (communications equipment 
and medical supplies).  This phase also helps solidify and strengthen support amongst 
the base by showing the strength of the guerrillas and by “liberating” more territory.  
During this period, the guerrillas form “militias” to protect the base areas from the 
government, as well as to recruit and inspire subversives or collaborators within the 
community.  This phase is not focused on winning over the minds of the population; it 
is more about controlling the population.  The guerrillas shift to the offensive as a 
conventional army to face and defeat the enemy forces during the final phase (strategic 
counteroffensive). 
This long history of asymmetric warfare and Mao’s articulation of “People’s 
War” in On Guerrilla Warfare (1961 [2000]) became the basis for most efforts of 
modern insurgency.  Fidel Castro advocated very similar ideas during the Cuban 
Revolution, which Che Guevara exported into Latin America and Africa under the 
banner of foco theory.  The central principal of this theory is that a small vanguard of 
cadres should lead highly-mobile paramilitary groups that provide a focus for popular 
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discontent with the ruling regime, ultimately leading the people to a general 
insurrection (Guevara 1961 [1998]).  Variations of these ideas also spread throughout 
most of the former colonies of the European empires that dissolved after WWII during 
the wars of independence.  Some argue that insurgency has again evolved in the 21st 
century from the rural nature that typified insurgencies throughout much of the 20th 
century to an urban basis due to globalization (Gompert and Gordon 2008).  Further, 
colonial powers developed the current COIN practices at a time when they attempted 
to retain their colonies.  Today, however, foreign actors involved in COIN are actually 
trying to set conditions for themselves to leave, rather than to stay (Hussain 2010).  
 
2.2.2. Defining the Topic 
The literature lacks a single, clear, agreed upon definition of insurgency or 
counterinsurgency (COIN), yet there are some common components and a distinction 
between theoretical and empirical definitions.  It is best to start by defining an 
insurgency, since COIN is a response to an insurgency.  That is one of the problems 
with modern COIN theory; it is reactive rather than proactive.  In other words, modern 
COIN responds to an insurgency after it has broken out, rather than providing a theory 
about how to address the underlying conditions that enable insurgencies and/or 
prevent insurgencies from starting in the first place. 
For the theoretical definition of insurgency, this dissertation uses the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s (Undated) definition, which states: 
Protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the 
resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political 
organizations.  Insurgent activity … is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy 
while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. [Italics added for emphasis] 
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The distinction between insurgency and civil war is unclear in the theoretical 
literature.  Jim Fearon (2007) defines a civil war as “a violent conflict within a country 
fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to 
change government policies” (4) [italics added for emphasis], which is very similar to 
the CIA’s definition of insurgency.  Ultimately, insurgency, civil war, and guerrilla 
warfare all describe an opposition that raises arms against a government in order to 
seize control of some or all power from the ruling regime. 
The same lack of clarity, or interchangeability, exists in the empirical 
literature.  Political scientists commonly use the threshold of more than 1,000 
battledeaths in conflict to define a civil war, though variation exists within the 
literature.  Some researchers use 1,000 combat-deaths per year, with at least 5% on 
each side, as the criteria for defining a civil war (Small and Singer 1982; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004), while others use an average of at least 100 battledeaths per year of 
conflict, and at least 100 total battledeaths on each side (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003).   
The nascent empirical literature on insurgency has borrowed from civil war 
data sets to test relationships.  But to maintain focus on insurgencies, the analysts have 
removed a few internal war events—coups, countercoups, and spontaneous 
insurrections—from the data sets (Gompert and Gordon 2008).  Some scholars define 
insurgency merely as a tactic or technology of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
This nuanced distinction allows scholars to avoid having to paraphrase Justice Potter 
Stewart and say, “I know [the difference between a civil war and insurgency] when I 
28 
see it.”  While, undoubtedly, certain tactics are more common in intrastate wars than 
in conventional conflicts, tactics are just one point on a continuum that leads one actor 
to compel the will of another.  Insurgents and counterinsurgents, just like conventional 
interstate combatants, employ grand strategy and strategy, as well as tactics.  Grand 
strategy is the actor’s use of all elements of power6 to achieve the actor’s desired 
objectives.  Strategy7 in war is how an actor plans to use armed force to achieve 
military or political objectives.  Finally, tactics define how armed units employ 
weaponry and fight battles (Arreguin-Toft 2001). 
The counterinsurgency literature also largely focuses on tactics and strategy 
rather than on a theory of COIN.  Since counterinsurgency is generally treated as a 
reaction to an insurgency, this dissertation uses the Army’s counterinsurgency 
manual’s (2006) definition that states:  
“The primary objective of [counterinsurgency] is to foster development of effective 
governance by a legitimate government.  Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the 
balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means” [italics added for emphasis] (1-
21).   
 
The purpose of the COIN manual is to provide guidance for developing COIN 
strategy and tactics.  The above definition incorporates modern beliefs in liberal 
governance into COIN.  The manual implies in its definition of legitimate that only 
governments that rule primarily through the voluntary consent of the governed are 
                                                
6 The U.S. military defines the elements of national power as diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic power (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996, I-5; 2007 [2009], x).  Diplomatic in this definition 
subsumes political or governance power.  This paper removes the word national, because non-state 
actors, such as insurgents, also have the potential for these elements of power. 
 
7 This is different than the definition of strategy used in game theory to describe the interaction between 
actors.  This analysis in this chapter and the rest of this dissertation uses the game theory definition of 
strategy. 
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legitimate.  The manual builds on the tradition and lessons of previous 
counterinsurgents, such as T.E. Lawrence, Dave Galula, Sir Robert Thompson, and Sir 
Frank Kitson, who originally developed most of the “best practice” strategy and tactics 
in the Army’s COIN manual.  This chapter, though, does not examine the strategy or 
tactics of internal war; rather this chapter focuses on the theory of counterinsurgency. 
 
2.3.  Influences on the Counterinsurgency Literature 
 Before turning to the primary arguments in the counterinsurgency (COIN) 
literature, it is useful to understand where some of the ideas in the COIN literature 
originated.  This section briefly examines the influence of the civil war, international 
peacekeeping, and state-building literatures on thoughts about counterinsurgency. 
 
2.3.1.  Civil War Literature 
The civil war literature largely influences the theoretical component that 
explains the outbreak of insurgencies.  Three primary causal arguments explain the 
incidence of civil war in this literature.  One can transfer these three explanations to 
explain the outbreak of insurgency.  First, the grievance approach argues that without 
a responsive government, “relative deprivation” will solve a societal collective action 
problem and lead the population to support a rebellion (Gurr 1970).  Without those 
grievances, the insurgents will fail to gain support from the population.  Second, the 
greed hypothesis argues that nations with an abundance of lootable natural resources 
or large illegal or informal sector-based economies provide the incentives for rebels to 
seek control of the state.  The resources reduce the rebel’s dependence on the 
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population for support (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Weinstein 2006).  The final 
approach argues that civil conflict occurs based on opportunity.  Fearon and Latin 
(2003) argue that rough terrain and state strength, proxied by GDP per capita, predict 
civil war onset, because they determine the ability of the government to defeat 
insurgencies.  A weakness of their finding, though, is that GDP per capita may capture 
poverty, which is a grievance rather than proxy for state strength.  Collier, Hoeffler, 
and Rohner (Collier et al. 2009) also argue that the financial and military feasibility of 
rebellion is an important factor in determining the outbreak of civil conflict. 
While the civil war literature helps develop a theoretical foundation for the 
outbreak of insurgencies, it also provides initial thoughts for how to counter an 
insurgency.  Some lessons for the government include responsively solving the 
grievances of the population, limiting access of insurgents to economic resources, or 
reducing the opportunity for insurgencies to start a rebellion in the first place.   
 
2.3.2.  International Peacekeeping Literature 
 While the civil war literature provides some insight to explain the outbreak of 
internal war and the role of governments, the international peacekeeping literature 
contributes to an analysis of COIN by examining the role of external actors in ending 
civil conflict.  This dissertation also builds upon the knowledge developed in this 
literature about external actors helping solve credible commitment problems in other 
states.  Walter (2002) argues that the implementation stage is the most important stage 
of the civil conflict resolution process.  She found that combatants pursue and credibly 
commit to peace settlements when third parties verify and enforce demobilization, and 
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safeguard each combatant’s role in the post-war government.  The third-party 
guarantees are vital to the combatants’ credible commitment due to the enormous risks 
of post-treaty exploitation.   
Fortna (2008) examined both the role of the peacekeepers and the peacekept 
(the combatants).  She found that peacekeeping only works when peacekeepers shape 
the choices of the combatants to choose peace over war.  She argued that four 
pathways contributed to the continuation of violence: “aggression, fear and mistrust, 
accident …, and political exclusion” (175).  Fortna then explains that peacekeepers 
can block these pathways by changing incentives to favor peace over war, reduce the 
security dilemma between the parties, prevent or control the impact of accidents, and 
dissuade the parties from excluding the other from the political process.  The 
international peacekeeping literature provides insights into methods counterinsurgents 
can use to solve credible commitment problems between the actors involved in 
fighting and countering an insurgency.  Despite these lessons, the prevailing 
population-centric counterinsurgency paradigm, discussed below, ignores these 
credible commitment challenges in explaining how to defeat an insurgency.  Chapter 3 
proposes an elite-centric theory that incorporates knowledge about peacekeeping. 
 
2.3.3.  State-building Literature 
While the civil war literature provides insight into causes of insurgency and the 
international peacekeeping literature explains possible roles for external actors in 
ending internal conflict, the state-building literature explains ideas for how 
counterinsurgents may overcome the causes that led to the outbreak of insurgency.  
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This section provides a brief overview of the state-building literature, while the 
dissertation discusses these state-building theories in more depth in Section 2.4.2 and 
in Chapter 3.   
Underlying COIN theory is the assumption that COIN contributes to state-
building (Gompert and Gordon 2008; Nagl and Burton 2009; Fick and Lockhart 
2010), since the objective of COIN is to reestablish government legitimacy.  There are 
three main approaches to draw upon in the state-building literature: modernization, 
institutional capacity, and rational-choice institutionalism (Krasner 2009).  First, 
modernization theory argues that economic growth and social change, through 
industrialization, urbanization, and education that develops a middle class who 
demand political participation, leads to political and social transformation and 
democratization (Lipset 1959).  Alternatively, some argue that economic development 
does not impact regime transitions, but does have a positive relationship with 
democratic consolidation (Przeworski et al. 2000).  
The theory of institutional capacity arose as an alternative to modernization 
theory.  Huntington (1968) challenged the logic that institutional development 
occurred as a result of economic change.  Instead, he argued that the institutional 
capacity of the government determined the level of economic growth and political 
order in a country.  Institutionalization had to develop ahead of political mobilization 
to maintain order.  If mobilization outpaced institutionalization, decay and political 
disorder would result.  Fukuyama (2004) refocused the state-building literature back 
toward institutional capacity theory in his argument that states fail when the scope of 
government outpaces its strength, meaning institutional capacity.  Institutional 
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capacity theory ultimately argues that effective central state institutions are the key to 
state-building.  As states modeled themselves on other nations, they adopted the 
institutional structures of the world’s major nations, what Meyer (1997) has called a 
world society model, without assessing the need for those institutions or the capacity 
to perform the functions.  While modern COIN thinkers argue for political 
institutionalization, in practice they advocate for transplanting western-style 
bureaucracies into developing states plagued by insurgencies (National Security 
Council 2005; Obama 2009). 
The third approach in the state-building literature is rational-choice 
institutionalism.  This approach focuses on the alignment of incentives to overcome 
commitment problems among key actors who behave strategically in pursuit of their 
own economic self-interest, enabling the development of political institutions, or state-
building.  Other than in an earlier work by Leites and Wolf (1970), and a developing 
research agenda (Berman et al. 2008), the counterinsurgency literature has made 
limited use of rational-choice insights.  The next section discusses the primary theories 
within the counterinsurgency literature. 
  
2.4.  Development of Counterinsurgency Literature 
The modern counterinsurgency literature, especially the dominant “hearts and 
minds” (HAM) paradigm, is more an explanation of strategies and tactics intended to 
guide practitioners than a theory per se.  Additionally, most of the tactical (Kitson 
1960, 1971; Galula 1964 [2006]) and strategic (Thompson 1966) prescriptions for how 
to conduct COIN operationally (Department of the Army 2006; British Army 2009) 
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are based on a few experiences, particularly Kenya, Malaya, Indochina, Algeria, and 
Vietnam.  Yet, it is important to test the validity of this approach as if the population-
centric HAM is a complete theory because of its prevalence in current policy 
implementation to counter on-going insurgencies around the world.  Before 
developing a model to show the logic of the population-centric theory, it is necessary 
to explain the two main approaches to COIN.   
 
2.4.1.  Coercion or Cost-Benefit Theory 
2.4.1.1.  Enemy-Centric Variant 
Coercion, or attrition, is an enemy-centric theory that seeks to destroy the 
insurgents.  This approach argues for the use of population control measures to 
separate the population from the insurgents, isolating the rebels in order to capture, 
kill, or neutralize the insurgents through their surrender.  The counterinsurgents will 
use force to make the population compliant and defeat the insurgency with brute force.  
The emphasis in this approach is on the primacy of military over civilian operations, 
including the use of what some call counter-terror tactics.  Coercion proponents argue 
for the need to control the population through food rationing, ghettoizing the populace 
with controlled entry and exit points to separate insurgents from a base of support, 
conducting a mass census, issuing identification cards to and collecting biometric data 
from the populace, conducting counter-terror operations, and using torture to gather 
intelligence from insurgents (Trinquier 1961 [1964]).  While the population may feel 
the brunt of some of the coercion methods, the primary target is the enemy.  The 
French generally followed this approach during the Battle of Algiers in Algeria.   
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2.4.1.2.  Population-Centric Variant   
Cost-benefit theory is a rational choice approach that forces the population to 
maximize its utility as a rational, self-interested actor.   The population must make its 
own cost-benefit analysis with regards to its support of the insurgency.  The 
counterinsurgents use carrots and sticks—the provision or deprivation of material 
benefits—to obtain cooperation and support from the population and to turn them 
against the insurgents.  The goal within this theory is to change the behavior of the 
population.  While the approach may use some of the same tactics as the coercion 
approach, the difference is that under the cost-benefit approach, the center of gravity is 
the population, rather than the enemy as in a coercion strategy.  
 To appeal to the rational self-interest of the masses and defeat the insurgents, 
the counterinsurgents dispense public services conditionally.  The conditionality 
rewards pro-government behavior while punishing pro-insurgency behavior.  The 
government uses a combination of military and civilian operations to appeal to the 
population’s rational self-interest to change their behavior.  The logic behind changing 
the behavior of the population is that cutting off support to insurgents leads to an 
increase in the cost of fighting to the insurgents.  The cost-benefit approach assumes 
the opportunity and feasibility arguments of the civil war literature, so by increasing 
the cost to fight an insurgency, it reduces the opportunity of the insurgents to sustain 
the rebellion.  And to further counter the insurgents’ opportunities to fight, cost-
benefit proponents argue for the need to increase the protection of the population 
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through hardening local physical security and expanding local security forces (Leites 
and Wolf 1970, 28-47). 
 While the cost-benefit approach requires improved institutions to provide 
services and improve local security force capacity, institutional change is a means to 
the end—defeating the insurgents—rather than an end in itself.  The transformation 
variant of the “hearts and minds” theory, though, argues it is not possible to win the 
loyalty and hearts and minds of the population without political institutionalization 
that gives the masses a voice in the governance of the nation.  The next section of this 
chapter discusses the “hearts and minds” theory. 
 
2.4.2.  “Hearts and Minds” Theory 
Like the cost-benefit theory, “hearts and minds” is a population-centric theory 
that views the population, rather than the enemy, as the center of gravity8 that must be 
the primary target of operations, especially non-kinetic operations—the use of non-
lethal force or activities.  Much of HAM theory is a mirror-image of the principles that 
Mao enunciated in his ideas about “People’s War”.   
Mao identified the importance of maintaining control of the population by the 
guerillas/insurgents.  Mao famously stated that guerrillas had to swim as fish in a sea 
of the peasants.  Insurgents have to rely on the people to survive, just as fish have to 
rely on the sea.  So, as a reaction to the insurgent focus on the population, 
                                                
8 Clausewitz (1943 [2000]) originally defined the concept of center of gravity analysis.  The U.S. 
military defines the center of gravity (COG) as “the source of power that provides moral or physical 
strength, freedom of action, or will to act” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001 [2008], 142).  This is the decisive 
element that determines the ability of a military to accomplish its mission. 
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counterinsurgents have also ostensibly directed their efforts toward the people.  COIN 
theorists vary, though, in their assessments of how to approach the population.  Even 
the enemy-centric coercion strategy that focuses on destroying the enemy accepts a 
central role for the population, which is why coercive means are used to separate the 
population from the insurgents.  HAM, today’s most famous and prevailing 
counterinsurgency theory, explicitly assumes that the population is the key to 
overcoming the insurgency, as the insurgents have to rely on the population for 
survival. 
The supposedly quintessential case of HAM success is the British effort 
against a communist insurgency in Malaya (now Malaysia) at the end of WWII.  The 
Malayan Emergency lasted from 1948-1960.  The essence of the “hearts and minds” 
theory is that by the government providing public goods and services that improve the 
population’s lot in life, the people will give their loyalty to the government.  The 
ability to deliver goods and services increases the faith the population has in the ability 
of the government to continue delivering the goods and services to the population.  As 
lives improve, the people have a greater stake in the stability of the government and 
see the insurgents as those who will destroy their increased prosperity.   
HAM relies on population-centric strategies and tactics to defeat the insurgents 
by winning the support and allegiance of the masses.  These strategies and tactics 
include using minimal force to provide security for the population and cause the least 
amount of “collateral damage” possible.  Further, HAM argues for the need to 
persuade the population, make political concessions to ameliorate grievances of the 
population, increase social provisions, and maintain unity of effort for 
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counterinsurgency operations under civilian control.  A mantra of HAM proponents is 
that there is no military solution for defeating insurgents; the solution is political.  If 
HAM works, the population does not have to make any cost-benefit calculations about 
each action they take, because with their faith in the government, the population can 
behave reflexively.    
As counterinsurgency is a sub-component of state-building, in that COIN lays 
the security foundation for political, economic, and social development to take place, 
“hearts and minds” theory largely draws implicitly from state-building’s 
modernization and institutional capacity theories.  Modernization was the predominant 
development theory following Lipset’s (1959) seminal article, “Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy”.  Modernization theory was very influential at the time that 
COIN theory emerged during and after Malaya, Indochina, Algeria, and Vietnam, as 
well as other post-colonial conflicts.  The crux of modernization theory was that 
economic growth would lead to democracy, although the argument is more nuanced 
than that simple statement.   
Lipset provided a causal chain to explain the logic of modernization theory 
(see Figure 2.1).  He defined economic development (modernization) as consisting of 
several components (wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education).  The 
independent variable of the argument is economic development, the dependent 
variable is democracy, and the causal logic is that modernization leads to the creation 
of a middle class, which demands political representation and participation.  The 
process of modernization consists of the accumulation of wealth and the transition 
from agrarianism to industrialization, creating greater wealth for the society.  With 
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industrialization, comes urbanization.  As economies industrialize and urbanize, there 
is a greater need for a more educated, skilled population.  Greater education combined 
with wealth leads to the development of a middle class.  Ultimately, the middle class 
demands political representation and participation, leading to democracy.
Figure 2.1: Causal Diagram of Modernization Theory 
COIN literature, around the time of Lipset’s publication, co-opted 
modernization theory without using the term, yet described all of the components of 
Lipset’s theory (Taber 1965 [2002], 187-189).  It made sense for COIN proponents to 
incorporate modernization thinking, since during the Cold War many insurgencies 
were ideological proxies—at least rhetorically—over the type of government that 
should rule—democratic or communist regimes.  Later COIN proponents, from the 
1980s till today, have further combined the modernization argument with democratic 
peace theory.  Democratic peace theory holds that democracies should be less likely to 
fight one another (Doyle 1986; O'Neal and Russett 1999), so this strengthened the 
belief that modernization would help end insurgent threats against Western interests.  
The original HAM theorists, influenced by modernization theory and assuming 
that insurgents can only survive with the population’s support, had a clear solution to 
defeating the insurgents.  By modernizing societies to compete for and win the 
population’s hearts and minds, the counterinsurgents would remove the population’s 
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grievances by improving their life opportunities, thus taking away the insurgents’ 
raison d’être.  HAM theory has borrowed from modernization theory’s emphasis on 
development, but has seen political institutionalization as the means to achieve 
development, and has ignored modernization theory’s focus on development as the 
path to social change.  This has contributed to HAM’s view that development is a key 
prescription for winning COIN, because it improves standards of living, increases 
political rights, and reduces corruption and abuse of government power. 
Some COIN research, however, has actually found that development may 
actually exacerbate the conditions for insurgency.  Leites and Wolf (1970) argue that 
development makes the pain that accompanies inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth, income, education, and opportunity more acute since the masses can more 
clearly see the level of societal inequality that exists, and this can lead to greater 
resentment (30).  Yet leading modern COIN proponents who have influenced the 
Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan continue to make the development 
argument to explain how the United States can win the hearts and minds of the Afghan 
population.  Fick and Lockhart (2010) argue, “The [American COIN] strategy [in 
Afghanistan] depends on successful efforts to foster economic development in an 
impoverished and war-weary country with poor-infrastructure, low literacy rates, and 
little recent economic integration with the rest of the world” (1).  Such a policy, 
according to Fick and Lockhart, will “demonstrate progress to U.S. voters, U.S. allies, 
the enemy, and—most importantly—the Afghan people” (8).  This argument implies 
that such a policy will win the Afghanis’ hearts and minds. 
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 Modern proponents of HAM theory have also incorporated elements of state 
building’s political institutionalization theory.  This variant of HAM theory, 
transformation, follows the development community’s shifting focus on the need for 
good governance to reduce poverty.  The transformation HAM proponents argue that 
governments will gain legitimacy and the support of the population through the 
development of good governance and institutions that can deliver public goods and 
services effectively to the people (Gompert and Gordon 2008; Department of Defense 
2010, 26-30; Obama 2010a, 26-27). 
 Transformation deals directly with the legitimacy part of the insurgency and 
counterinsurgency definitions in Section 2.2.2 above.  COIN theorists argue that 
governments lose legitimacy when they are not representative of the people.  So, 
counterinsurgents have to make governments representative of the populace through 
liberal political institutionalization.  The liberalism part of this argument, though, 
moves beyond political institutionalization’s focus on the appropriate alignment of 
state scope and state strength.  Through the incorporation of representation with 
improved governance that makes it possible to effectively deliver goods and services 
to the population, HAM proponents argue that the government will engender the 
population’s loyalty.  Earlier works on COIN implicitly incorporated the political 
institutionalization argument, sans the liberalism component (Galula 1964 [2006]; 
Thompson 1966).  Contemporary iterations of HAM, however, explicitly argue for 
liberal political transformation (National Security Council 2005; Department of the 
Army 2006; Obama 2009).   
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The transformation variant of HAM remains a population-centric argument.  In 
order to defeat insurgents by improving governance and social services, 
counterinsurgents should adopt several ambitious strategies.  There are two interacting 
paths to political institutionalization: one that is internally driven by the host 
government, and the second that is driven by an external actor.  The role of the 
external actor dominates the transformation argument since the government is already 
ineffective and the outsiders are supposed to be the experts. 
Contemporary population-centric proponents argue, first, that 
counterinsurgents, especially external actors, need to adopt a long-term perspective 
given the historical length of insurgencies and the challenges in reforming governance 
institutions.  Second, governance reform must develop fair and efficient rule of law 
systems (e.g., police, courts, judges, and prisons).  Third, states should implement 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs that include targeted 
job training and placement for ex-fighters that fit into the nation’s economic 
development goals.  Lastly, proponents argue for the expansion of primary-level 
educational capacity for the broader populace, which is also tied along with the DDR 
process to the host government’s modernization process (Gompert and Gordon 2008).  
To understand the transformation argument, it is necessary to turn back to the 
state-building literature.  As an alternative to the modernization argument, Samuel 
Huntington (1965, 1968) developed an argument about the role of institutionalization 
leading to order in changing societies.  He argued that in order to achieve stability in 
societies, the institutions of the state had to stay ahead of political mobilization.  If 
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mobilization outpaced institutionalization, social disorder (i.e., rebellion or 
insurgencies) would occur. 
Fukuyama (2004) updated Huntington’s argument, but focused on the scope 
versus strength of state governance institutions.  The argument has policy implications 
for COIN, because of the dominant role of external actors in the transformation theory 
of COIN thinking.  Again, the basic transformation argument is that all the external 
actor and host government have to do to defeat the insurgents is build efficient 
government institutions capable of delivering public goods and services to the 
population.  The U.S. Department of Defense has officially adopted this institutional 
capacity argument in the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense 
2010) that has made strengthening partner institutions a key mission for the military. 
Figure 2.2, adopted from Fukuyama (2004, 11), displays different outcomes 
based on varying relationships between the scope and strength of government.  
Quadrant I represents the economic efficiency argument where the state possesses 
great strength in executing its accepted functions, which keeps the scope to a 
minimum.  Quadrant II represents a broad scope of government that takes on many of 
the intermediate as well as activist functions of a state, but also maintains a strong 
state that can continue to effectively execute these added functions.  Quadrant IV is 
the location where most insurgencies take place.  These states often lack legitimacy, 
and are the most inefficient nations.  Developing nations often end up in Quadrant IV, 
because they try to have the scope of the states in Quadrant II, but do not have the 
strength to execute even the minimal functions of the state.  In COIN, external actors 
try to improve the strength of the state to match the scope of state functions.  
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According to the transformation argument, external actors should help improve state 
strength to provide public goods provision, enabling the host government to achieve 
legitimacy.  Yet, the transformation proponents try to move to Quadrant II from IV 
without first going through Quadrant III.  By limiting the scope of the state to minimal 
functions, even with limited strength, these states will become more effective at 
providing the basic public goods and services necessary to overcome the grievances of 
the population and regain legitimacy.  So, Quadrant III is place where the 
counterinsurgents can set the conditions to defeat insurgents and eventually try to 
move to Quadrant IV.  
The learning organization variant of HAM furthers the externally-driven nature 
of the institutionalization argument made by the transformation variant.  The 
organizational variant argues that to defeat insurgencies, adaptive, learning 
organizations must implement strategies with “hearts and minds” principles through 
doctrine and training by experts, as well as adopt unified command structures 
(Krepinevich 1986; Nagl 2005 [2002]; Krepinevich 2005).  This argument was 
developed by examining the role of external actors as counterinsurgents and argues 
that host governments need outside experts to get on the right path to defeat the 
insurgents.  Another variant focused on the role of outside experts argues that 
command of the civilian and military chains of command must reside with a single, 
focused, and enlightened individual who can lift the morale of the people and the 
government (Stubbs 1989; Ramakrishna 2001; Smith 2001). 
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Figure 2.2.  Political Institutionalization Outcomes  
The next section further illustrates the general logic of population-centric 
theory.  The section first reveals the elements of the causal logic that explains how 
counterinsurgents defeat insurgencies.  Then, Sections 2.5.2-2.5.5 develop a game 
theory model to draw out the expected outcomes of HAM based on the strategic 
preferences and choices that actors should have—and those they actually make—
according to this population-centric theory. 
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2.5.  Logic of “Hearts and Minds” Theory 
2.5.1.  Causal Logic 
As explained above, “hearts and minds” theory implicitly draws from theories 
within state-building.  Section 2.4 described a number of HAM variants, and this 
section intends to capture the core elements of this population-centric theory across 
the variants.  First, the section diagrams the causal logic of HAM.  Then, the section 
defines some of HAM’s propositions and assumptions.  Finally, the section develops 
an extended-form game to illustrate the strategic choices facing the actors in an 
insurgency and the expected outcomes based on the different actors’ preferences. 
The basic premise behind HAM theory is that the government has lost the 
support of the population, which is now given, at least tacitly, to the insurgents.  To 
defeat the insurgency, the government must recapture the sympathy and support of the 
population.  The essential elements of this approach, regardless of variant, are that 
counterinsurgents (an equal partnership between the government and external actor) 
must regain legitimacy, use minimal military force, provide goods and services to the 
population, and create institutions to support service provision.  Figure 2.3 below 
illustrates the causal logic of the hearts and minds theory that has evolved from the 
1960s through today. 
The conditions exist for insurgency to take place once the government loses its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population.  Government legitimacy exists when the 
population recognizes and reflexively responds to government authority.  The people 
do not have to think about their actions before they take them, because they know the 
outcome in advance.  When the government lacks legitimacy, the insurgents can then 
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exploit the grievances of the population through material or ideological support.  The 
insurgents require this popular support in order to conduct successful operations 
against the government (Leites and Wolf 1970, 8).   
After the outbreak of the insurgency, government must separate the insurgents 
from the population in order to deny support obtained by the insurgents.  Additionally, 
population security protects the population from exploitation by the insurgents, 
displays the strength of the government, and increases the ability of the government to 
gather information and intelligence about the insurgent organization.  By establishing 
physical security—primarily through law and order, rather than military, operations to 
clear the area of insurgents—the government sets the conditions for follow-on civil 
operations (Galula 1964 [2006]; National Security Council 2005; Department of the 
Army 2006).  
Figure 2.3.  “Hearts and Minds” Causal Logic 
The next part of the causal chain that leads to counterinsurgency success 
according to HAM theory is development.  This is the building part of the HAM 
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process.  In part, the government loses its legitimacy with the people because of its 
inability to provide public goods and services.  The insurgents take advantage of the 
grievances among the population that arise from poverty and economic inequality 
within the society (Leites and Wolf 1970, 16).  The counterinsurgents must conduct 
civil operations focused on reducing poverty and inequality, which include expanding 
economic development, education, and health care.   
Additionally, to ensure the long-term ability of the government to continue 
delivering these public goods, external actors must help the host government establish 
non-corrupt, political institutions that represent the people.  The factors that contribute 
to the insurgency primarily exist internally to the country (Leites and Wolf 1970, 21), 
but external assistance is required to overcome the internal challenges and to restore 
legitimacy.  While enabling civil operations and development, the external actors 
should train the host nation’s security forces.  External actors can best train police and 
counterinsurgency forces who will gain the confidence of the people by establishing 
law and order while respecting human rights.  The local security forces can then hold 
the areas cleared with the help of the external actors and further allow the building 
process to take place. 
Expanding institutional capacity coupled with development restores the 
legitimacy of the government by overcoming the population’s grievances and 
restoring a host government that can maintain the population’s loyalty.  Once the 
government has won the population’s hearts and minds, the counterinsurgents will 
defeat the insurgency, because the insurgents will have lost the population’s support, 
which is required for any insurgency to exist. 
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2.5.2.  Extended Form Game Model of “Hearts and Minds” Theory 
 The extended form game developed in this section explains the underlying 
logic of HAM theory and the expected outcome from the strategic interaction between 
the primary actors involved in insurgencies.  This model, as with all models, is a 
stylization intended to crudely represent a real situation.  Real world insurgencies are 
too complex and contain too many variables to incorporate into a complete model, so 
the stylized version provides us with insights about the broader issues of 
counterinsurgency.   
 The extended form game in Figure 2.4 below represents a stylized model of the 
prevailing “hearts and minds” theory that has evolved over the past 50 years (Galula 
1964 [2006]; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971; Krepinevich 1986; Mockaitis 1990; Nagl 
2005 [2002]; Department of the Army 2006; British Army 2009).  The model includes 
three different actors: 1) counterinsurgent forces (C)—made up of the government and 
external actor supporting the government; 2) the opposition (O)—or, the insurgents; 
and 3) the population (P).  Rather than single individuals, the strategic actors represent 
unified groups; this assumes everyone in the group has the same preferences.   
 This model combines the government and external actor into one unitary actor, 
the counterinsurgent force, because both have the same goal of defeating the 
insurgents and restoring the legitimacy of the government.  While the government and 
external actor may have policy differences in the real world, the two must have the 
same overarching objective; otherwise, they would not work together.  HAM theory 
does not discuss an exit strategy for the external actor.  An implicit assumption is that 
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once C defeats the insurgents, then the external actor can leave.  So, up until the defeat 
of the insurgents, the government (G) and external actor (EA) have aligned 
preferences, allowing for the treatment of G and EA as a single unitary actor, C.   
While the opposition may have varying factions who compete with each other 
in reality, this stylized model treats all insurgent groups as a unified actor, O.  Despite 
real-world differences between insurgent groups, all insurgent groups have the 
common desire to reduce the legitimacy of the government and establish control over 
state resources.  By treating O as a unified actor, it allows the model to focus on the 
general strategic preferences and choices made by the different groups.  The same 
holds for the population.  Despite differences between segments of the population, 
HAM theory depends upon to whom the population provides its sympathy, loyalty, 
and support.  So, treating the population as a unitary, rational actor allows us to better 
understand the strategic interaction between the different actors involved in an 
insurgency. 
Further, the model contains several assumptions derived from the causal logic 
of HAM described in Section 2.4.1.  First, the population is the determining factor that 
leads to the success or failure of an insurgency.  Second, an insurgency cannot sustain 
itself without the support of the population.  Third, grievances based on poverty and/or 
inequality, ineffective distribution of public goods and services, and lack of popular 
representation lead to the government’s loss of legitimacy.  Fourth, it is possible to 
regain the sympathy, loyalty, and support of the population after they have supported 
the insurgents.   
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Additionally, the probability of success for the insurgents against the 
counterinsurgent forces equals p.  The population changes the probability of success 
by a factor of !—if they support the insurgents, the probability of insurgent success 
becomes p+!.  Finally, C’s policy choice impacts the insurgent’s probability of 
success by a factor of ".  HAM proponents argue that C has a dichotomous choice 
between population-centric (e.g., HAM) and enemy-centric (e.g., a preponderance of 
military force) strategies to defeat an insurgency, and that dominating military power 
is counterproductive since COIN is primarily a political battle (Nagl and Burton 2009, 
93).  So, " represents a change in probability that increases the insurgent’s probability 
of success, p+", when the government chooses overwhelming military force (violent 
coercion) as its policy to defeat the insurgents.  " represents the increase in population 
members who shift from passive and material support to more active support of the 
opposition due to the collateral damage from overwhelming military force by C.  This 
captures the HAM assumption that policies based primarily on violent coercion create 
more insurgents than these operations kill or capture. 
 
2.5.3.  Order of the Game 
 In the game in Figure 2.4, the population is the first mover.  The game starts 
with the assumption that an insurgency has just begun.  In the first move, the 
population chooses either to support or not support the opposition.  This choice 
initiates one of two sub-games where either C or O moves next. 
 In the sub-game in the upper half of Figure 2.4 the counterinsurgents moves 
next, choosing either to implement either a “hearts and minds” or “coercion” policy to 
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defeat the opposition.  The HAM policy includes population security, modernization, 
and political institutionalization efforts, while coercion is ostensibly an enemy-centric 
policy that inflicts heavy collateral damage.  Thus, coercion is a de-facto population 
centric strategy that is similar to the cost-benefit approach.  The population moves in 
the next stage, regardless of the policy choice, choosing either to support or not 
support the opposition.  If the population supports the opposition at this stage, nature 
will determine whether O or C prevails.  If C implemented a HAM policy, then the 
insurgents have a probability of p+! of success, but if C implemented a coercion 
policy, the probability of success increases to p+"+!.  If the population does not 
support the opposition, then O must choose to either continue or end the insurgency.  
If O continues the insurgency, O’s probability of success is p if C chooses HAM, or 
the probability of success is p+" if C chooses coercion.   
 In the sub-game in the lower half of Figure 2.4, the opposition makes the next 
move following the population’s initial choice not to support the insurgency.  O can 
choose to either continue or end the insurgency.  If O chooses to end the insurgency, 
the game ends.  If O chooses to continue the insurgency, then this sub-game follows 
the sub-game in the upper half of Figure 2.4, where C chooses either a HAM or 
coercion policy.  The rest of the moves follow in sequence as described above. 
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Figure 2.4.  Model of Population-Centric Theory 
 
2.5.4.  Actor Preferences 
 The counterinsurgent forces first prefer that the insurgency come to a quick 
end.  For this to happen, the counterinsurgents want the population not to support the 
opposition and for the opposition to choose to end the insurgency, M.  Next, the 
counterinsurgents prefer to maintain the support of the population.  The 
counterinsurgents will prefer to implement a HAM policy while maintaining 
population support, leading the opposition to end the insurgency, C or I.  The next best 
preference for the counterinsurgents is maintaining popular support while using 
physical coercion to force the opposition to end the insurgency, F or L.  The 
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counterinsurgents prefer to implement HAM versus coercion, because of the 
possibility that non-minimal violence may cause more members of the population to 
actively support the insurgents. 
 If nature will ultimately decide the outcome of the insurgency, the 
counterinsurgents prefer to implement HAM and for the population not to support the 
insurgent, B or H.  This gives the counterinsurgents their greatest probability of 
defeating the insurgents, 1-p.  Next, the counterinsurgents prefer E or K, where the 
population does not support the opposition even after the implementation of a coercion 
policy.  The counterinsurgents will then have a probability of 1-p-" of defeating the 
opposition.  If the population continues to support the insurgents after the 
counterinsurgents choose a COIN policy, the counterinsurgents still prefer to 
implement a HAM policy, A or G, over a coercion policy, D or J.  HAM will give the 
counterinsurgents the greater probability of defeating the opposition, 1-p-!, compared 
to a probability of 1-p-"-! if the counterinsurgents use violent force.  
 The opposition maintains different preferences.  Once the opposition chooses 
to start an insurgency they want to further undermine the legitimacy of the 
government, defeat the counterinsurgents, and take control of the national resources.  
So, the opposition prefers to shape the conditions that increase the opposition’s 
probability of success when nature determines the outcome of the insurgency.  The 
opposition’s first preference is for the counterinsurgents to try to use overwhelming 
violent means, provoking the population into supporting the opposition, D or J, giving 
the opposition a success probability of p+"+!.  Next the opposition prefers A or G, 
continued population support after the counterinsurgents implement a HAM policy, 
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giving the opposition a p+! probability of success.  Third, the opposition prefers E or 
K, no population support but a counterinsurgent policy of coercion, because the 
opposition’s probability of success would be p+".  Then, the opposition prefers p, the 
probability of success that comes with continuing the insurgency after losing popular 
support due to the counterinsurgents implementing a HAM policy, B or H. 
 Of the options where the opposition will choose to end the insurgency, they 
prefer to minimize the costs of the insurgency to the opposition members and 
organization.  So, they would next prefer to end the insurgency after initially failing to 
receive popular support, M.  Then, the opposition would prefer to end the insurgency 
after failing to garner public support once the counterinsurgents implement a policy of 
coercion, F or L.  Finally, the opposition prefers C or I, where the opposition ends the 
insurgency following a lack of support from the population after the government 
implements a HAM policy. 
 The population also maintains different preferences from both the 
counterinsurgents and the opposition.  Ultimately, under HAM theory, the population 
ranks its preferences based on who—counterinsurgents or opposition— can provide 
the population with public goods and services, security, and representation.  First, the 
population prefers C or I, because the counterinsurgent’s implementation of a HAM 
policy will solve the population’s grievances, and ending the insurgency will minimize 
the costs inflicted upon the population of fighting.  Next, the population prefers to 
maintain the status quo by not supporting the opposition and the opposition ending the 
insurgency, M, because this minimizes the losses and costs inflicted upon the 
population when they are caught between the two sides.  The population’s third 
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preference is for the counterinsurgents to defeat the opposition with probability 1-p 
after the counterinsurgents implement a HAM policy and the population does not 
support the opposition, B or H.  This outcome leads to the provision of some public 
goods and political institutionalization while maximizing the counterinsurgents 
probability of defeating the opposition.  Fourth, the population prefers A or G, because 
while they prefer for the insurgents to win, they also want the counterinsurgents to 
implement a HAM policy to gain the benefits of development and institutionalization. 
 
Table 2.1.  Summary of Actors’ Preferences in “Hearts and Minds” Model  
A policy of coercion will push the population’s preference closer to the 
opposition’s due to the likelihood of collateral damage inflicted.  So next, the 
population prefers to support the opposition, increasing the insurgency’s probability of 
success to p+"+!, after the counterinsurgents choose a coercion policy, D or J.  The 
population’s sixth preference is for the opposition to end the insurgency if the 
population withholds support of the opposition after the counterinsurgents implement 
a policy of coercion, F or L.  This will minimize the cost of fighting inflicted upon the 
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population.  Finally, the population prefers E or K, where the counterinsurgent’s 
probability of defeating the insurgents is 1-p-" following the opposition’s decision to 
continue the insurgency after the population withholds support following a 
counterinsurgent policy decision of coercion. 
 
2.5.5.  Solving the Game 
 Solving the game in Figure 2.4 through backwards induction shows how, 
according to the population-centric theory, the counterinsurgent’s decision to 
implement a HAM policy leads to a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) 
whose outcome, C, is the end of the insurgency.  In the last stage of each branch of the 
game, following a decision by the population not to support the opposition, the 
opposition must decide to continue or end the insurgency.   According to HAM theory, 
the population is the critical factor in determining the success of an insurgency.  
Knowing that, the opposition will choose to end the insurgency since the opposition 
will have its lowest probabilities of success, either p or p+".   
In the prior stage, the population must choose either to support the 
counterinsurgents or the population.  In accordance with the population’s preferences, 
the population’s choice will depend upon which side has the greatest probability of 
success and will distribute the most public goods and services.  When the insurgency’s 
probability of success becomes p+"+!, the population will support the opposition, but 
if the insurgency’s probability of success remains below p+"+! the population will 
support the counterinsurgents.  The factor of "+! becomes a tipping point that pushes 
the population into active support of the opposition. 
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Before the population has to choose to support or not support the opposition 
for the second time, the counterinsurgents have to choose between a policy of HAM or 
coercion.  Knowing that the population will decide whether or not to support the 
opposition based on the likelihood of opposition success, the government will choose 
to implement a HAM policy.  This policy will prevent " from becoming a factor that 
can tip the odds in favor of the insurgency.   
If the participants end up in the lower half of the game, continuing to work 
backwards, the opposition must choose to continue or end the insurgency.  Knowing 
that the government will implement a HAM policy and that the population will not 
support the opposition, the opposition will choose to end the insurgency at this stage.  
This aligns with the opposition’s preference to minimize its costs if nature will not 
determine the outcome. 
This leads back to the first move of the game, which the population makes.  
The population has to decide to support the opposition or not after the initial outbreak 
of an insurgency.  Under population-centric COIN theory, an insurgency occurs when 
the government of a nation has lost part or all of its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.  The population wants improved public goods and services provision, as 
well as representation, to return legitimacy to the government.  The population does 
not want to maintain the status quo, and the opposition serves as a mechanism for the 
population to force the government to recognize and rectify the population’s 
grievances.  The population will initially choose to support the opposition knowing 
that this is the only way to get the government to implement the development and 
political institutionalization programs that come with a HAM policy. 
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2.6. Empirical Critique of “Hearts and Minds” 
 Despite the population-centric theory’s logic described in the previous section, 
the theory has limited empirical support.  This section first discusses the findings of 
two recent empirical studies of insurgencies.  Finally, the section raises doubt about 
the conventional wisdom derived from two cases held up as HAM successes. 
 
2.6.1.  Recent Empirical Studies 
 With the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, interest has grown in the field 
of political science to conduct empirical studies on insurgency.  One such study 
looked at micro-level data in Iraq to test whether or not hearts and minds are won or 
bought.  Another study examined macro-level data to explain why counterinsurgents 
routinely defeated insurgents in the 19th century, but have had less success in the 20th 
century. 
 In the first study, Berman et al. (2008) developed a model to test the 
economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq.  Their findings support a rational-choice 
explanation for counterinsurgency successes, undermining HAM’s argument about 
winning the allegiance of the population after restoring legitimacy.  Berman et al. 
found that public goods provision has a violence-reducing effect.  But, the effect arises 
with relatively high volumes of public goods provision, because the population makes 
a rational choice.  The government and insurgents compete with each other for 
information from the population.  Both sides use positive and negative inducements to 
extract information.  Berman et al. found that the population only provided 
information to the government when the benefits outweighed the costs of sharing 
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information.  This echoes Leites and Wolf’s (1970) point about denunciation and 
information.  This most likely occurs in areas with initially the poorest endogenous 
service conditions and the largest boosts in exogenously provide public goods. 
 Lyall and Wilson (2009) explored the puzzle of why counterinsurgents 
routinely defeated insurgents in the 19th century, but routinely lost in the 20th century.  
This raises a more puzzling question.  If HAM dominated late 20th century COIN 
policy and counterinsurgents have routinely lost during this period, why does HAM 
maintain pride of place in COIN thinking?  Lyall and Wilson found that the increased 
mechanization of counterinsurgents after World War I inhibited the collection of 
information from the population.  During the 19th century, the counterinsurgents had to 
forage among the population for resources, so they got to know the population.  Lyall 
and Wilson found that proximity to the population allowed counterinsurgents to sift 
through the population for insurgents and learn what rewards and punishments to 
selectively apply to gain information from the people.  These findings undermine 
modern HAM proponents’ argument that counterinsurgents win the loyalty and 
affection of the people by living among them.  Rather, living amongst the population 
allows the counterinsurgents to glean information that allows the counterinsurgents to 
choose the most effective carrots and sticks.  The resulting counterinsurgent policies 




2.6.2.  HAM Successes? 
 HAM proponents hold up the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, and the 
“Surge” in Iraq, 2006-2007, as quintessential successes for HAM theory.  Yet, 
analysis of both cases shows the HAM logic described in Section 2.5 cannot explain 
the outcomes in either Malaya or Iraq.  The literature on Malaya paints “hearts and 
minds” as the British way of conducting counterinsurgency.  According to the 
conventional story, the British were losing the war against Chinese communist 
insurgents between 1948 and 1951.  During this timeframe, the British employed a 
policy of coercion, marked by counter-terror tactics.  According to the HAM story, 
these policies led to the alienation of the population and a stalemate between the 
British and the Chinese. 
 Then, at the end of 1951, the British reassessed their policy and appointed 
Lieutenant General Sir Gerard Templer to take over operations in Malaya, combining 
the civil and military efforts under his leadership.  HAM proponents argue that 
Templer understood that victory lay with the support of the population.  Templer 
provided the leadership to change the organizational behavior of the 
counterinsurgents, shifting focus to civil operations that would improve the lives of 
the Chinese and win their affection away from the communists (Short 1975; Stubbs 
1989; Ramakrishna 2001, 2002b).   
This narrative, however, masks the continuation of many of the earlier coercive 
British policies, such as the forced move of over half a million Chinese civilians from 
their homes into resettlement camps.  This story also ignores the selective use of 
rewards and punishments by Templer to coerce desired behavior from the Chinese 
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people (Hack 1999; Smith 2001; Hack 2009; Dixon 2009).  Chapter 4 provides a 
deeper analysis of the HAM story in Malaya and the chapter also describes an 
alternative explanation for the British counterinsurgency success in Malaya. 
 A conventional wisdom narrative has also developed about how HAM theory 
led to the success of the Iraq “Surge” in 2007.  HAM proponents argue that the 
increase in American troops allowed the coalition forces to implement a “clear, hold, 
and build” strategy as described in Section 2.4.2.  The story describes how the 
coalition was able to provide physical security for the Iraqi people by clearing 
population centers of insurgents.  Then, American soldiers, along with newly 
American-trained Iraqi Security Forces moved in to hold the areas cleared of the 
insurgents.  By living among the population, the population got to know and develop a 
relationship with the counterinsurgents.  Once the Coalition and Iraqi Government 
began rebuilding the population centers and providing public goods and services the 
counterinsurgents earned the affection and loyalty of the Iraqi people.  This led to 
decreased support for the insurgents and lower levels of violence (Packer 2006; Biddle 
et al. 2008; Boot and Simon 2008).  
 Just like the Malaya narrative, this story masks other things happening at the 
same time.  As Berman et al. showed, the population in Iraq made cost-benefit choices 
in providing information, rather than choices based on affection for the 
counterinsurgents.  Further, this HAM story of the “Surge” downplays the importance 
of the “Awakening Movement” that began in the summer of 2006, well before the start 
and implementation of the “Surge”.  The “Awakening” began as a Sunni tribal revolt 
against Al-Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly spread around the country amongst both the 
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Shi’a and Sunni populations.  Essentially, the Coalition co-opted local level elites by 
distributing rent-seeking opportunities and decentralizing violent means to these elites, 
strengthening each of the elite’s local power bases.  And, at the same time, Coalition 
and Iraqi Forces continued counter-terror operations that targeted the insurgents.  
Chapter 5 discusses the conventional wisdom about Iraq in greater depth, and also 
provides an alternative model and supporting analytical narrative that draws different 
lessons from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq than the HAM story. 
 
2.7.  Conclusion 
“Hearts and minds” may make sense from a public opinion perspective but it is 
less useful from a theoretical or policy implementation perspective.  While HAM 
proponents may describe a list of the right actions for counterinsurgents to take, these 
proponents explain how these tactics work for the wrong reasons.  This chapter has 
explained the causal logic of the “hearts and minds” theory and developed a game 
theoretic model to show the expected strategic behavior of the actors in the HAM 
story.  Further, the chapter has highlighted some problems with HAM theory.   
The COINdinistas (Ricks 2009a) have dominated the current debate about how 
to fight an insurgency.  This dominance has limited debate, preventing the discovery 
of successful mechanisms for counterinsurgents to employ.  HAM’s public relations 
rhetoric about winning affection and loyalty has obscured the fact that defeating an 
insurgency does not happen merely through the provision of carrots to the people.  
Previous rational-choice research about cost-benefit choices and balancing the use of 
carrots and sticks has largely been dismissed till now. 
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The next chapter develops an alternative theory to explain what mechanisms 
external actors can use to limit the impact of internal conflict on state-building.  The 
theory shifts from the prevailing population-centric focus in both the theoretical and 
empirical literature on counterinsurgency to an elite-centric perspective.  Further, the 
proposed theory of self-enforcing stability in Chapter 3 fills the missing credible 




Chapter 3: Towards a Theory of Self-Enforcing Stability 
“The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is 
the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a 
military force for the projects of ambition. … It [is] necessary now to disprove the 
reality of this danger. … The United States [would not have] an army of more than 
twenty-five or thirty thousand men.  To these would be opposed a militia amounting to 
nearly half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen 
from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted 
by governments possessing their affections and confidence.  … [This militia] forms a 
barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a 
simple government of any form can admit of.”  – James Madison, “The Federalist No. 
46” (Hamilton et al. 1788 [2000], 304-305) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter proposes a new theory to explain the conditions under which it is 
possible for an external actor to successfully help post-conflict societies get on the 
path towards self-enforcing stability.  The previous chapter described logical and 
empirical flaws of the prevailing counterinsurgency theory, “hearts and minds 
(HAM),” that purportedly underlies the current United States’ and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategies for state-building in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The theory in this chapter provides an alternative that overcomes HAM’s flaws by 
building upon the rational-choice institutionalism framework in the nascent state-
building literature.    
HAM theory has two primary logical flaws.  First is the theory’s failure to 
address the credible commitment problem that exists between the counterinsurgents 
and the opposition.  Second, HAM’s population-centric focus identifies the wrong key 
actors necessary to end conflict.  Hence, HAM fails to recognize the importance of 
aligning incentives between the appropriate key actors.  This chapter provides an 
alternative theory that avoids HAM’s flaws.   
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To develop an alternative theory, this dissertation started with two broad 
research questions:  What conditions lead to successful state-building, and what is the 
role of external actors in this process?  This dissertation defines state-building as the 
construction of self-enforcing governance structures that establish stability in the state 
and allow for economic, political, and social development to take place.   An 
institution is self-enforcing when all actors behave in a manner that enables, guides, 
and motivates others to follow the institutionalized norms that reproduce or continue 
the institutions that led to the initial behavior to begin with (Greif 2006, 15-16).  This 
dissertation focuses on the toughest situations for state-building—those rebuilding 
after civil conflict.  Thus, a narrower research question can be defined: how can 
external actors help societies torn by civil conflict get on the path towards self-
enforcing stability?   
Using a rational-choice framework to overcome the logical flaws of the “hearts 
and minds” theory, this chapter shifts from the population to the elites as the unit of 
analysis, and focuses on how to align the incentives of the elites to overcome credible 
commitment problems.  The theory in this chapter incorporates the role of incentives 
to further address the above question by identifying the attainable social order in the 
host society, because of the dissertation’s focus on stability as the measure of 
successful state-building.  I emphasize social order, rather than regime-type, in order 
to highlight the societal basis of governance structures.  Therefore, this dissertation 
seeks to answer an even more focused question: what is the appropriate social order 
external actors should help host nations attain in order for successful state-building to 
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take place, and what incentives can external actors provide to get host nations on this 
path?  
Four hypotheses underlie the theory of self-enforcing stability developed in 
this chapter and tested in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation.  First, the theory in this 
paper shifts from the prevailing population-centric focus of the counterinsurgency 
literature to an elite-focus.  As the competing elites are the source of the credible 
commitment problem that prevents the failed or fragile state from achieving stability, 
external actors should focus on solving that problem.  Rather than focusing on the 
initial incentive for the external actor to intervene, this dissertation focuses on the 
efficacy of the external actor’s intervention, i.e., what makes the external actor’s 
guarantees credible. 
H1: An elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to 
greater success in establishing stability in conflict-torn states. 
 
Second, external actors should focus on helping failed or fragile societies 
become limited access orders (LAOs), rather than on democratization.  LAOs solve 
the problem of violence by limiting access to benefits by identifying privileges, 
creating rents, and providing credibility to personal relationships (North et al. 2009a, 
38).  Failed and fragile societies face credible commitment problems between 
competing factions that prevent these states from establishing stability.  Consequently, 
it is an unrealistic objective for external actors to try building sustainable democracies 
in these states.  
H2: External actors contribute to the establishment of stability more 
successfully when they help nations establish limited access orders rather than 
open access order (liberal democracies). 
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Third, external actors should work to help internal actors overcome these 
underlying credible commitment problems, and put the internal actors on the path 
towards self-enforcing stability.  The external actor can use different credibility 
mechanisms to guarantee pacts between a dominant coalition of elites, such as the 
provision of resources in the form of personnel, money, equipment, and time, as well 
as holding elections, developing institutions, and public statements of intent and 
commitment.  These mechanisms enable and support the offended party in punishing 
the transgressor of the agreement, and allowing time for the pact to become self-
enforcing.   
H3: An external actor is usually needed for internal actors to overcome their 
underlying credible commitment problems in order to put them on the path 
towards self-enforcing stability. 
 
Finally, counter to the Weberian concept of the state maintaining a monopoly 
of force, the theory in this chapter argues that the diversification of power helps 
internal actors overcome the credible commitment problem, has the potential to reduce 
levels of violence, and helps set the conditions for self-enforcing stability.  
Diversification of power is achieved in two ways: 1) enabling multiple elites to 
maintain violent means, and 2) sharing rent-seeking opportunities that allow elites to 
increase their wealth.  These diversifications enable elites who join the pact to 
maximize their wealth and influence over the long-run while retaining protection from 
other elites who may seek to limit their power. 
H4: The oligopolization of violent means amongst competing elites allows 
stability to develop in conflict-torn societies. 
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In summation, this chapter provides an alternative to the standard Weberian 
approach to ending conflict in failed states that seeks to have external actors solve the 
problem of violence by forcing the opposition to lay down its arms and grant the 
government a monopoly over violence.  The theory will show that a Weberian 
approach typically leads the government to abuse the opposition, so the opposition has 
no incentive to stop fighting.  The standard approaches fail to recognize this incentive 
problem and therefore both misdiagnose the problem and provide inadequate 
solutions.  This chapter identifies the problem as the failure of the government and 
opposition to provide credible commitments, and argues the solution is the 
diversification of power amongst a dominant coalition of government and opposition 
elites.  This is an elite-centric theory, as opposed to the population-centric theory 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, the chapter describes elements in the 
reigning literatures that the theory in this chapter draws upon, as well as discusses 
some challenges in the literature that help motivate this dissertation.  Second, the 
chapter builds progressive models that incorporate the role of external actors in the 
state-building process, and proposes a theory of self-enforcing stability.  The chapter 
then discusses how this proposed theory contributes to the literature.  Finally, the 
chapter concludes by explaining how this dissertation will test the implications of this 
theory in subsequent chapters.   
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3.2.  Informing Literatures 
 The international relations and comparative politics literatures provide some, 
but limited, insight into how external actors can contribute to the development of 
stability in conflict-ridden states.  This section briefly addresses some insights and 
challenges that the civil war, international peacekeeping, state-building, and 
counterinsurgency literatures provide for this dissertation.  
The civil war literature has yet to reach a consensus regarding the factor 
driving the outbreak of civil wars.  The main debate is between those who say civil 
wars are caused by grievances (Gurr 1970; Kalyvas 2006) versus those who attribute 
their outbreak to greed (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Weinstein 2006) or 
opportunity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2009).  This literature generally 
provides little exploration about the role external actors can have, if any, in ending 
civil conflict.  Further, the civil war literature, particularly Kalyvas’s (2006) story 
focuses on a single interaction between the actors, or a one-shot game, rather than 
repeated interaction. 
The international peacekeeping literature discusses the role of external actors 
in overcoming credible commitment problems during the implementation phase 
following a peace agreement (Walter 2002), and when the peacekeepers shape the 
choices of the former combatants to prevent post-treaty exploitation (Fortna 2008).  
This literature provides a foundation for introducing the role of external actors in 
helping prevent conflict from recurring, and discusses successful mechanisms used by 
external actors to help maintain stability in post-conflict states.  Yet, this literature 
does not discuss how external actor presence and resources can adjust incentives and 
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overcome the commitment problems during the combat phase of conflict.  Nor does 
the literature fully describe how the peace enforced by external actors becomes self-
enforcing, ultimately allowing the external actors to leave the host-nations. 
The state-building literature provides different theories to explain the state-
building process; yet, no comprehensive explanation predicts the conditions under 
which an external actor can contribute to successful state-building.  The three main 
approaches (Krasner 2009) to state-building are modernization theory (Lipset 1959, 
1960; Przeworski et al. 2000), political institutionalization (Huntington 1965, 1968; 
Fukuyama 2004), and rational-choice institutionalism (North et al. 2009a; North and 
Weingast 1989; Weingast 1997; Greif 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  Chapter 
2 explained the causal logic of both modernization theory and political 
institutionalization, and how those two theories provide an unstated foundation for 
counterinsurgency theory.  The rational-choice institutionalism approach focuses on 
the alignment of incentives amongst key actors to enable state-building.  Each of these 
theories has compelling elements, but the theories ultimately focus on the domestic 
processes that lead to state-building.  The theories that do consider external actors treat 
them as exogenous shocks to the process, or uncontrollable structural phenomena that 
occur like events in nature.  This leaves room to improve upon the literature by 
treating external actors as controllable, or manipulable, factors that affect governance 
systems of states in which they intervene.  In other words, examining the endogenous 
role of the external actors can make a contribution.   
In the rational choice tradition, North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW) (2009) 
provide a conceptual framework for understanding violence and social orders by 
72 
describing two societies: limited access orders (LAOs), or natural states, and open 
access orders (OAOs).  Natural states are defined by the creation and manipulation of 
interests to ensure social order.  Everything in these states is personal and driven by 
elites through patron-client relationships.  These personal relationships also tie elites 
into dominant coalitions that spread the benefits they receive across the coalition, 
creating more benefits for the members.  These natural states limit access to benefits 
by identifying privileges, creating rents, and providing credibility to personal 
relationships (North et al. 2009a, 38). 
Over time, some countries develop into open access orders, which are 
essentially highly developed and consolidated, liberal and market-based democracies.  
To move from limited to open access orders, states must achieve three doorstep 
conditions that establish impersonal relations amongst elites—1) rule of law for elites, 
2) perpetually lived public and private elite organizations (i.e., organizations that 
survive beyond the existence of specific individuals or groups), and 3) the state’s 
monopolization of force (North et al. 2009a, 26).  Elites in these societies create pacts 
to develop a dominant coalition that allows the elites to limit access to certain benefits 
in society.  The importance of elite pacts also serves as the basis of the dominant 
theory that explains the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the 1970s 
and 1980s (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1993). 
Yet, because social order has broken down, weak or failed states, such as those 
undergoing civil strife, do not fit into NWW’s framework or the transitology literature.  
Additionally, NWW do not explicitly address the role of external actors as a part of 
the process in helping establish these social orders.  As such, a realistic goal is to help 
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those societies develop into limited access orders.  The transitology literature also did 
not address the role of external actors in helping states establish democracies, but does 
provide another point for thinking about the role of sequencing in establishing stability 
in unstable states.  Rustow (1970) described a model with national unity as a 
background condition for a sequence of struggle, compromise, and habituation leading 
to the establishment of democracy.  The democratic rules that Rustow argued that 
needed to come into being during the compromise phase and their habituation supports 
the idea of the role of rules in limited access orders.  Those rules according to NWW 
may eventually expand beyond the initial elite-pact members and ultimately reach the 
doorstep conditions necessary for a society to develop into an open access order.   
Using NWW’s framework, it appears that is more realistic for external actors 
to help build limited access orders than liberal democracies and markets, because the 
initial challenge in conflict torn states is to provide incentives for the conflicting 
parties to form a mutually benefiting pact.  By limiting access, the elites are 
guaranteed that they will maintain their power and wealth, as well as protection from 
the possibility of losing those privileges, which helps stabilize the society since the 
elites collectively increase their wealth and power by suppressing violence.   
When external actors focus on establishing democracies and free-markets, 
despite the good intention of spreading freedom across society, this may actually 
further destabilize the society, because the elites fear they will lose their wealth and 
power, making the costs outweigh the benefits of ending conflict.  Democracy 
proponents distinguish between electoral and liberal democracies (Diamond 2008).  
Fearon (2006) discusses the importance of elections as a self-enforcement mechanism 
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in democracies that aggregates private information to signal to the population when to 
rebel against a ruler.  Building upon this insight, this dissertation views the simple 
holding of elections not as the establishment of a limited form of a democracy or a 
signal to the population, but as a signaling mechanism between elites about their 
willingness to agree to and enforce a pact.  Building upon NWW’s theoretical 
framework, this chapter argues that external actors must enable the development of 
pacts between elites by serving as credible guarantors.  The “Third Wave” literature 
also emphasizes the importance of elite pacts in transitional societies (O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1993), but also does not explicitly consider how external 
actors can contribute to the development and enforcement of these stabilizing 
agreements.  As credible guarantors, the external actors ensure that if either the 
government or opposition cheats on the pact, they are punished and that the costs from 
the punishment outweigh benefits gained from reneging.  By enforcing against 
transgressions from either side, the external actor sets the conditions necessary for the 
pact to become self-enforcing over time.  Self-enforcement means that the government 
and opposition abide by the pact without the need for third party enforcement.  If 
external actors try to skip social order progression by trying to directly build a liberal 
democracy without first establishing the doorstep conditions, they are likely to fail in 
helping establish self-enforcing stability, and hence, effective state-building in these 
nations. 
The problem with the COIN literature is that it focuses on the wrong unit of 
analysis, or the entity of interest that affects the outcome under study in the research.  
The HAM approach focuses on the population as a unified actor.  This dissertation 
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argues instead that to reduce violence and achieve stability, external actors should 
focus on elites as the actors of concern.  The reason elites are important is because the 
population turns to meso-level, or local, elites to provide security and to distribute 
rents.  The people support leaders who provide these services and goods, and turn 
against the leaders who cannot provide for the population’s safety and material needs 
(Christia 2008, Forthcoming).  Further, recent empirical work shows how elites drive 
mass opinion and behavior (Zaller 1994; Berinsky 2007; Blaydes and Linzer 2010).  
Thus, to understand the incentives of the population, one must first identify the 
incentives of the elites who lead the population.   
This dissertation does not argue against the importance of the population, since 
as COIN theorists argue, securing and controlling the population allows for 
information gathering from the population that is vital to marginalizing the insurgents 
(Trinquier 1961 [1964]; Galula 1964 [2006]; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1971; 
Department of the Army 2006).  Rather, this dissertation argues that the “hearts and 
minds” paradigm alone is insufficient, but not irrelevant, for explaining how to 
achieve stability in conflict-torn societies, because the HAM approach ignores the 
credibility problem between the conflicting parties.  The theory in this chapter views 
the population as another parameter, like resources contributed by the external actor, 
that elites can access to have an impact on the stability in the society and on the 
ultimate social order to emerge.   
In moving from a failed state to a limited access order, the population initially 
helps maintain the dominant coalition’s pact.  It is in the interest of the elites to get the 
population’s support, because maintaining the pact is how elites increase their power 
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and wealth.  It is in the populace’s interest to follow the elites, because when the elites 
increase their wealth and power, as this paper’s model will show, the elites reduce 
violence, ultimately improving the security and livelihood of the mass population.  
This dissertation argues that after achieving a stable limited access order and solving 
the credible commitment problem between elites, winning over the population 
contributes to maintaining the stability equilibrium.  
 
3.3. Developing a Theory of Self-Enforcing Stability 
3.3.1. Basic State-building Model 
 Following a rational-choice approach, the model begins with the understanding 
that “the rational [actor] is one who combines his or her beliefs about the external 
environment and preferences about things in that environment in a consistent manner” 
(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 19).  For the theory, this chapter defines the actors as 
coalitions of elites.  The basic theory consists of three actors: the government, the 
opposition, and the external actor.  As there may be many different members within 
each of these coalitions, this model assumes for now that each overcomes its own 
collective action problem.  The players, then, are representative members from each of 
these groups.  The inability of the players to achieve an agreement exists because of a 
credible commitment problem.  Thus, a cooperation problem remains between the 
government and the opposition.  
 Without the external actor, a game exists where two parties are in conflict with 
each other over governmental control: the government and the opposition.  This 
conflict prevents state-building from occurring due to instability, which I define as the 
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existence of violence at a level which prevents political and economic development 
from taking place.  In this game, the government (G) moves first, followed by the 
opposition (O), and then nature (N) or the government moves in the third stage.   
 
3.3.1.1.  Order of the Game 
In the first stage, the government chooses whether or not to include the 
opposition in the government (see Figure 3.1).  In the second stage, the opposition 
either chooses to cooperate by laying down their arms and joining the government, or 
to subvert by continuing to fight.  In the third stage, if the government includes the 
opposition and the opposition cooperates, the government chooses to either fulfill its 
part of the pact by allowing the opposition into the government, or it reneges by 
breaking the agreement and leaving the opposition out.  If the opposition subverts after 
the government tries to include the opposition, nature determines if the opposition 
succeeds with probability p and fails with probability 1-p in overthrowing the 
government.  But, when the opposition subverts after the government tries to exclude 
the opposition, nature determines if the opposition succeeds with probability q and 
fails with probability 1-q in overthrowing the government.  Probability q of opposition 
success is greater than probability p, because if the government includes the 
opposition, negotiations take place between the government and opposition about how 
to include the opposition, giving the government time to strengthen itself against the 
opposition under the cover of negotiations.  This follows the logic of Fearon’s (1998) 
model about ethnic conflict. 
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 This chapter makes several assumptions in the game displayed in Figure 3.1.  
First, the government and the opposition are each unified actors, overcoming their 
own collective action problems.  Second, the government conditions opposition 
participation in the governance process on disarmament.  Third, the opposition has a 
large enough base of support to continue resistance for the foreseeable future.  If not, 
the government is typically strong enough to command the territory.  Additionally, the 
balance of power between the government and the opposition is equal to p or q 
depending on the choice to include or exclude, respectively, meaning that in the case 
of subversion the opposition is successful with probability p or q.  
 
3.3.1.2.  Actor Preferences 
In the game without an external actor (Figure 3.1), both the government and 
opposition have ranked preferences for the possible outcomes of their interaction.  The 
government’s ideal preference, D, excludes the opposition while obtaining the 
opposition’s cooperation, because the government would pay no cost of conflict and 
receive all of the benefits from controlling the government.  The government’s second 
best preference, B, initially includes the opposition and gets the opposition’s 
cooperation, and then the government reneges.  With outcome B, the government 
again avoids the cost of conflict, since the opposition gave up its arms when the 
opposition chose to cooperate, and the government receives all of the benefits from 
retaining monopoly control of the government.  The government includes the 
opposition, receives the opposition’s cooperation, and the government fulfills the 
terms of the agreement to include the opposition in government rule as its third 
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preference, A, because despite the government having to share the benefits of 
government control with the opposition, the government avoids all of the costs of war.  
The government’s fourth preference, C, is for the opposition to subvert after including 
the opposition, because the delay in fighting during the negotiation period allows the 
government to increase its strength vis-à-vis the opposition and decrease the cost to 
the government of fighting by a factor of q-p.  The government prefers for the 
opposition to subvert after the government excluded the opposition least, E, because 
the government pays a higher cost for conflict, since probability that the government 
will lose is q, and correspondingly, the government’s share of the benefit controlling 
the government may decrease depending upon the outcome of the conflict. 
The opposition ranks its preferences of the outcomes from the game in Figure 
3.1 differently than the government.  The opposition’s preferred outcome is A, 
because when the government includes the opposition, receives the opposition’s 
cooperation, and the government fulfills the terms of the agreement, the opposition 
gets to share the benefits of government control with the government and avoid all of 
the costs of war.  The opposition then prefers for the government to exclude the 
opposition and for the opposition to subvert, E, because the opposition retains its 
current strength compared to the government and has probability q of succeeding.  The 
opposition’s third preference is to subvert after inclusion, C, because despite the 
opposition’s probability of success decreasing from q to p during the negotiation 
period that allows the government to strengthen itself relative to the opposition, the 
opposition still has a chance of achieving some of the benefits of government control.  
Cooperating with the government after exclusion, D, is the opposition’s fourth 
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preference, because despite gaining no benefits from sharing government control, the 
opposition avoids all costs of conflict.  The opposition’s least preferred outcome, B, is 
for the government to include the opposition, for the opposition to choose to 
cooperate, and then for the government to renege.  While avoiding the cost of conflict, 
the opposition pays the cost of giving up its ability to defend the opposition’s interests, 
and the opposition again receives none of the anticipated benefits of sharing 
government control.  
 
3.3.1.3.  Solving the Game 
Solving the game in Figure 3.1 through backwards induction, based on the 
preferences described above, reveals that a commitment problem exists between the 
government and the opposition.  The problem is that the government is not credible in 
telling the opposition that if the opposition lays down its arms that it will not take 
advantage of them and renege on the agreement to incorporate the opposition into the 
governance process (Fearon 1995, 1998).  Working backwards through the game tree 
in Figure 3.1, the government will choose to renege in stage three, since the 
government gains all of the benefits of governance with no cost of conflict.  Thinking 
strategically, the opposition knows the government will renege, so in stage two the 
opposition will subvert.  And if the opposition will subvert in stage two, implying the 
opposition will not lay down its arm during the negotiation process, the government 
will choose to exclude the opposition.  When solving this game, despite the preference 
of the government for D and of the opposition for A, E is the game’s sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPNE).  With this SPNE, the opposition fights, not because it wants 
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to win rather than negotiate, but because the government cannot credibly commit to 
honor any agreement with the opposition.   The opposition would choose peace if the 
government would not renege.  In other words, peace is not only about both sides’ 
willingness to compromise; it is also about credibly implementing the agreement after 
the fact.  
 
Figure 3.1:  State-building Game without External Actor 
Addressing this problem of credibly committing to agreements after the fact, 
Weingast (2005) defines four conditions for pacts to become self-enforcing, which I 
apply to the development of stability.  First, pacts create structure and processes that 
provide rules of the game for participants in the pact.  In the case of conflict-ridden 
state-building, pacts form limited access elite organizations.  Second, the parties to the 
pact must believe they are better off with the agreement than without it.  So, on 
average, the government and opposition achieves greater benefits, in terms of rent-
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seeking opportunities and influence, under this pact.  Third, the parties agree to change 
their behavior simultaneously.  This is a challenge to achieve without external 
enforcement during ongoing civil conflict because of the lack of trust between the 
government and opposition.  Not until after both parties have moved can the pact 
become self-enforcing.  Fourth, the parties to the pact must defend the agreement 
against transgressions.  In post-conflict state-building, the government and opposition 
elites have to be willing to police their own members who violate the pact. 
 
3.3.2.  Incorporating an External Actor into the State-building Game 
The external actor enters the interaction here.  Under certain conditions, the 
external actor provides the credible commitment that neither the government nor 
opposition can.  This model assumes a benevolent external actor or one with benign 
intent, making the external actor unlikely to renege ex-post.  As the government and 
opposition cannot overcome the above commitment problems on their own, the 
external actor can serve as a guarantor or arbitrator to hold both the government and 
opposition accountable to the terms of the pact between the parties.   
The provision of resources—personnel, money, equipment, time, elections, 
institutional development, and public statements of intent—are the mechanisms that 
the external actor can use to realign the incentives of the elites and make their 
agreements credible.  Through personnel, the external actor is capable of helping both 
sides police the transgressions of their own coalitions, as well as policing the opposite 
side’s defectors.  And, personnel can help elites secure the portions of the population 
under the control of each of the elites, preventing one group from trying to reduce the 
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influence and power of another group, which would violate the pact.  Money serves as 
a commitment mechanism, because the external actor provides rent-seeking 
opportunities for both the government and opposition, allowing both groups to extend 
their influence capabilities and limiting access to elite organizations.  Equipment 
serves the purpose of enabling the diversification of force, which is necessary to attain 
social order in limited access orders, or natural states.  Time serves as a credible 
commitment mechanism when the external actor’s withdrawal timeline is ambiguous.  
While all parties know the external actor will eventually leave, it is important that 
there is not a clear departure date.  The external actor is needed until a balance of 
power is achieved through the diversification of violent means and rent-seeking 
opportunities, which is what the provision of the three other resources helps 
accomplish.  That is the point when stability becomes self-enforcing.  Since the 
government and opposition recognize the need for an external actor, they each solicit 
the external actor’s support. 
The presence of an external actor changes the game described in Figure 3.1.  
The new game, displayed in Figure 3.2, relies on several new assumptions.  First, the 
external actor engages only when the government is willing to include the opposition 
in the governance process, and when both parties see the external actor as a credible 
guarantor.  Second, the external actor punishes any side that violates the terms of the 
pact.  Third, the external actor can change the balance of power between the 
government and opposition by !.  Finally, the external actor has certain preferences 
for the outcomes as well: it prefers B to C and D to E.  The reason the external actor 
prefers to punish is because that is how the external actor maintains its credible 
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commitment and enables the pact over time to develop into one of self-enforcing 
stability. 
 
Figure 3.2: State-building with External Actor Support (“Podesta-type Model”9) 
3.3.2.1.  Order of the Game 
In the game in Figure 3.2, the government chooses to either exclude or include 
the opposition in the first stage.  The subsequent moves are the same as those 
described in Figure 3.1 if the government excludes the opposition.  If the government 
                                                
9 The use of the term Podesta to describe this model captures the general role of an outsider brought in 
to help build the Italian city-states, such as Genoa, in the late medieval period.  While not an exact 
analogy of the role of outsiders today, this model assumes that modern external actors “promote 
political stability, curtail political violence, and foster economic prosperity” (Greif 2006, 217) as the 
Podesta did in Genoa between 1194 and  1339.  The imperfect analogy exists because the Podesta 
garnered resources from the host-city-state, while external actors today, such as the United States, have 
their own resources and can dominate the host-nation in ways the Podesta could not. 
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includes the opposition, the opposition again chooses to either cooperate or subvert in 
the second stage.  Now, the game changes from Figure 3.1 because of the role of the 
external actor.  If the opposition cooperates then the government either fulfills or 
reneges on the agreement in stage three.  If they fulfill, the opposition enters the 
government and the game ends, but if they renege, the external actor chooses to punish 
the government or not in the fourth stage.  The external actor can use any combination 
of its credibility mechanisms— personnel, money, equipment, time, elections, 
institutional development, and public statements of intent —to punish the government, 
increasing the opposition’s probability of success by !.  For example, the external 
actor can use its personnel to work with the opposition to fight and help overthrow the 
government, they can withdrawal financial support, they can withdrawal equipment 
and trainers, and they can either extend or shorten their stay in the host country.  If the 
opposition subverts in the second stage, the external actor chooses to either punish 
them or not.  If the external actor punishes the opposition it reduces the opposition’s 
probability of success by the amount ß, which represents the external actor’s 
application of the credibility mechanisms.  
 
3.3.2.2.  Actor Preferences 
As previously discussed, the external actor has preferences about the possible 
outcomes in the game.  The external actor first prefers A.  That is, the external actor 
wants conflict not to occur and lasting stability to form in the other nation.  For this 
outcome to occur, the external actor must commit to the government and opposition to 
defend the elite pact, enabling the government to include a cooperative opposition and 
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for the government to fulfill its part of the pact.  A fulfilled pact creates the conditions 
for self-enforcing stability to form.  The external actor’s second preference is to 
punish either side that transgresses from the pact, either if the government reneges 
after the opposition cooperates, B, or if the opposition subverts the government after 
the government chooses to include the opposition, D.  The external actor prefers to 
punish the transgressor in order to maintain its credibility within the host nation, 
abiding by its commitment to the government and opposition, and to maintain its 
credibility within the international community in case other countries ask the external 
actor to intervene in the future in other locations.  The external actor next prefers for 
the government to exclude the opposition and for the opposition to cooperate, F, 
because this avoids conflict and achieves short-term stability.  But this is not self-
enforcing, because the opposition will have no role in government and the opposition 
can only express future grievances through violence.  Then, the external prefers for the 
government to exclude the opposition and the opposition to subvert the government, 
G, because this provides an opportunity for the opposition to create the conditions 
where the two groups have to come to an agreement that can potentially lead to short-
term stability.  The external actor least prefers for the government or opposition to 
break the pact and for the external actor to not punish the transgressor, either the 
government reneges, C, or the opposition subverts, E.  This is the external actor’s least 
preferred outcome, because it exposes the external actor’s lack of credibility, which 
impedes the external actor’s ability to help build self-enforcing stability in the host 
nation or in future interactions with other countries. 
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The credibility of the external actor leads the government and opposition to 
modify each of their preferences as shown in Figure 3.2.  The government and 
opposition’s primary preferences remain the same, but each of them prefer for the 
external actor to punish their counterparts for any transgressions over letting nature 
determine the outcome completely as in the game in Figure 3.1.  Each prefers for the 
external actor to punish the transgressor, because that increases the transgressed share 
of the benefits and reduces its costs, and because the punishment maintains the pact, 
improving the conditions for both the government and opposition in the long-run. 
 
3.3.2.3.  Solving the Game 
The credibility of the external actor changes the conflictual sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) described in Figure 3.1 to a cooperative, reduced violence 
SPNE, A, in Figure 3.2.  Backwards induction shows how the presence of the external 
actor ensures that a balance of power emerges between the government and the 
opposition, and shifts the SPNE.  In the last stage of the top two branches of the game, 
the external actor faces the decision to punish the government or opposition’s 
transgressions or not.  In accordance with the preferences outlined above, the external 
actor punishes either the government or the opposition.  Knowing the external actor 
will do this, the government chooses to fulfill rather than renege on its agreement, and 
in the stage prior to that, the opposition chooses to cooperate rather than subvert.  The 
lower branch of the game is the same as in the first game because the external actor is 
not involved, so the opposition will choose to subvert knowing that they have a 
probability q of succeeding against the government.  In the first stage, the government 
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strategically sees that it is less costly to include the opposition and the potential 
benefits are greater than to exclude the opposition, and this is consistent with the 
government preferences described earlier.   
So, the presence of the external actor changes the outcome of the first game.  
The inability of the government and opposition to credibly commit to one another 
created the problem in the first game that led to the government’s decision to exclude 
the opposition and for the opposition to choose to subvert, leading to a conflict 
decided by nature.  With the external actor’s presence and credibility to enforce the 
pact, the government and opposition determine that it is in each of their self-interests 
to receive the benefits provided by the external actor’s presence and avoid the costs of 
conflict.  The external actor’s credible commitment mechanisms, which require a pact 
between the government and opposition, help reduce violence to a manageable level 
and allow stability to take hold because the government and opposition want to avoid 
the external actor’s punishment.  
The solution the external actor provides in the second game to the commitment 
problem from the first game leads to the conditions for self-enforcing stability to 
occur.  The greater amount of resources provided enhances the external actor’s ability 
to serve as a guarantor, and the resources also allow for the government and 
opposition elites to diversify their means of violence and rent-seeking opportunities.  
So, rather than the resources on their own improving stability (Dobbins et al. 2003; 
Dobbins et al. 2005; Dobbins et al. 2008), “more is better” to the point where the 
resources serve a credibility function.  With the diversifications of violent means and 
rent-seeking opportunities, the government and opposition police violators within their 
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own groups, because the pact makes them better off on average over the long-run.  
Over time, as the government and opposition solidify the balance of power between 
them and internalize the self-interest of protecting the pact on their own, this allows 
the external actor to incrementally transfer enforcement responsibilities to the 
government and opposition.  This implies the need for another game that describes the 
achievement of self-enforcing stability, meaning that the government and opposition 
no longer have a credible commitment problem between them, and an exit strategy for 
the external actor exists.  Section 3.3.4 develops such a game, but before that, the next 
section builds a variation of the model just described by incorporating a non-benign 
external actor. 
 
3.3.3. “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model” for a Theory of Self-enforcing Stability 
 The model in Figure 3.2 assumes benign or noble intent by the external actor.  
The framework of the broader theory in this chapter allows for changing that 
assumption, making the external actor a strategic player in the game.  The behavior of 
a colonial power necessitates modifying the benign or benevolent assumption.  Under 
these circumstances, the colonial power has a stake and interest in shaping the 
outcome of events between the government and opposition to favor the colonial 
power’s interests.  The distinction between the colonial power as an external actor and 
colonial power as the government is blurred during periods of colonial rule.  Yet, it is 
still possible to distinguish the external actor from the portion of the population 
favored by the colonial power.   
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This argument maintains several fundamental assumptions.  First, the external 
actor wants to leave a stable state behind that supports the external actor’s economic 
and national security interests.  Second, favor from the external actor generally comes 
in the form of privileged positions in the government and the security forces given to 
the favored segment of the population; generally following colonial-style “divide and 
conquer” tactics.  Third, the favored party supports the colonial-type rulers in 
governing the colony.  Fourth, the favored segment of the population expects to 
assume governance from the colonial power upon independence.  Fifth, the 
government and opposition both want the external actor to leave, allowing their group, 
respectively, to dominate the governance structures. 
 Based on these assumptions, this model treats the favored group as the 
government, the colonial power as the external actor, and those who challenge the 
government or external actor as the opposition.  The theory throughout this chapter 
focuses on how external actors can help societies torn by civil conflict get on a path 
towards self-enforcing stability.  This section explains how the external actor can help 
the government and opposition achieve lasting stability after the external actor departs 
from the territory and governance structures.   
Since the external actor is a strategic actor, the external actor still has to 
support the four main arguments of the general theory to achieve the goal of self-
enforcing stability.  First, the external actor must help solve the commitment problems 
between the government and opposition.  Second, rather than seeking the Weberian 
monopolization of force, the external actor should help decentralize violent means 
between the government and the opposition.  Third, as competing elites are the source 
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of the credible commitment problem that creates instability, the external actor should 
initially have primarily an elite-centric focus for solving the commitment problems 
before shifting to population-centric strategies.  Finally, the parties to the conflict 
should focus on transitioning to a limited access order rather than a liberal democracy.  
So, the overall argument of the general theory remains.  The problem of conflict and 
instability comes from the failure of the government and opposition to provide 
credible commitments to one another.  The solution to the problem is for the external 
actor to provide the initial credible commitment that enables the diversification of 
power amongst a dominant coalition of government and opposition elites. 
As in the general model, described in Section 3.3.2, the external actor allows 
the government and opposition to credibly commit to honor their agreement, which 
they are unable to do in the absence of the external actor.  Despite the non-benign 
strategic actor in this model, the external actor still has mechanisms that allow the 
external actor to have potential credibility—that is, to credibly threaten to punish any 
transgression.  While the government and opposition may distrust the external actor, 
particularly following strategies of “divide and rule” to maintain power in a colony, 
distrust does not negate the potential credibility achieved through several mechanisms.  
As in the general model, the external actor can provide resources, such as personnel, 
money, equipment, and time, and hold elections, conduct institutional development, 
and make public statements of intent to prove its credibility.   
As before, the personnel allow the external actor to help government and 
opposition elites police transgressors of their own coalitions, respectively, as well as 
the opposite side’s defectors.  Personnel also help provide security for the population 
92 
under the control of each of the elite groups.  Money still allows the external actor to 
provide rent-seeking opportunities to both government and opposition elites, allowing 
the elites to extend their influence and limit access to elite organizations.  In this 
model, though, the external actor may distribute money raised within the host territory 
through taxation or natural resource revenues rather than contributing money directly 
from the external actor’s treasury.  Equipping the government and opposition still 
serves the purpose of decentralizing force, which allows for the creation of a balance 
of power, self-security, and the ability to attain social order within a natural state.   
The ambiguity about a timeline for withdrawal remains an important 
credibility mechanism under this “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model,” along with a couple of 
additional mechanisms accompany time.  The external actor must take a few concrete 
steps to prove to the government and opposition that the external actor will actually 
leave due to the colonial legacy.  The additional mechanisms that complement time 
includes: 1) elections, 2) institutional development, and 3) formal public statements of 
intent.   
Most arguments about elections revolve around the role of elections in creating 
democracy.  The theory presented here, however, views the elections mechanism 
differently.  Elections serve the function of solidifying the pact between the 
government and opposition.  They also signal that the external actor will ensure that 
the elites to the pact can run in and assume office after the elections.  Instituting a 
series of elections over time, starting locally and moving upward nationally, allows the 
external actor to maintain stability during the transition and show its commitment to 
eventual transition to host rule.   
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Also, establishing similarly structured governance institutions at all levels of 
government, with members to the elite pact given bureaucratic and leadership 
positions in the institutions, further strengthens the external actor’s credibility.  It 
proves the external actor’s intent to leave and that the external actor will maintain a 
balance of power between the government and opposition elites.  Combined with time, 
this mechanism allows for the training of host nation civil servants who can effectively 
manage the nation’s governance structure.  Additionally, as elections take place, the 
winners assume positions previously held by government or external actor appointees. 
The final additional mechanism that may complement time and the other 
resources is formal public statements of intent.  Public pronouncements by the external 
actor declaring the intent to grant self-rule or independence helps solidify the external 
actor’s credibility to the government and opposition elites.  These public statements 
create international and domestic audience costs for the external actor, so the elites to 
the pact know that the external actor has to eventually follow through on its 
commitment to leave (Fearon 1994).  By announcing a conditions-based, rather than 
set-date, timeline, the external actor can remain until the needed balance of power 
between the government and opposition elites is attained through the decentralization 
of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities.  All of the above mechanisms work 
together to create the conditions needed for self-enforcing stability to take hold. 
The new game for the “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model”, displayed in Figure 3.3, 
modifies the game and some of the assumptions in Figure 3.2.  Before explaining the 
order of this new game, it is necessary to state its assumptions.  First, the external 
actor starts out in control of the host nation’s governance structures, maintaining final 
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decision-making authority, even with local elites in leadership positions.  Second, the 
government and opposition see the external actor as a credible guarantor.  Third, the 
external actor will punish any side that violates the terms of the pact.  Fourth, the 
balance of power between the government and opposition is equal to p, q, or r.  If the 
government includes the opposition and the opposition cooperates, the opposition’s 
probability of success is p.  If the government includes the opposition, but the 
opposition subverts after some negotiations, the opposition’s probability of success is 
q.  The opposition’s greatest probability of success, r, exists when the opposition 
subverts after the government excludes them.  The probabilities vary based on the time 
the government has to strengthen its forces vis-à-vis the opposition, so r>q>p.   Fifth, 
the external actor can change the balance of power between the government and 
opposition by !1 or !2.  Finally, the external actor desires a stable state that will 
support the external actor’s economic and national security interests. 
 
3.3.3.1. Order of the Game 
 In the game in Figure 3.3, the external actor is the first mover, making it 
different from the general model in Figure 3.2 where the government moves first.  In 
the first move, the external actor chooses either to decolonize or retain the colony.   
The subsequent sub-game in the upper half of Figure 3.3 is the same as described in 
Figure 3.2, starting with the government decision to include or exclude the opposition, 
if the external actor decolonizes.  Next, the opposition chooses to cooperate or subvert.  
The government then either fulfills or reneges on cooperation.  Then, the external 
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actor punishes or fails to punish the transgressing actor, and nature determines the 
victor between the opposition and the government.   
The game changes more significantly than just the external actor moving first, 
if the external actor retains the colony.  The lower half of Figure 3.3 then begins a sub-
game with the government as the next mover.  The government either supports or 
challenges the external actor.  Support means the government wants to continue its 
status quo relationship with the external actor.  Challenge means that the government 
wants to change the status quo and desires the departure of the external actor from the 
state’s governance structures.  If the government supports, then the opposition 
cooperates or subverts.  The rest of the sub-game follows the same pattern of moves 
following government inclusion in the upper part of Figure 3.3.  The external actor can 
use the combination of any of the credibility mechanisms discussed earlier—
personnel, money, equipment, time, elections, institutional development, and public 
statements of intent—to punish the transgressor, either the government or opposition.  
If the external actor punishes the government, the opposition’s probability of success, 
p or q, increases by !1, while punishing the opposition decreases the opposition’s 
probability of success by !2. 
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Figure 3.3: Transitional State-building: Towards Self-Rule (“Post-(Neo)Colonial 
Model”) 
 
If the government challenges the external actor in the second move, the sub-
game follows a new path.  The opposition then chooses to cooperate or compete with 
the government.  Cooperate means that the opposition combines forces with the 
government to challenge the external actor.  Compete means that the opposition works 
against the government in challenging the external actor.  If the opposition and 
government cooperate, their probability of successfully defeating the external actor is 
s.  If the opposition and government compete, their probability of success is t.  The 
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paper assumes that s>t, because if both the government and opposition desire the 
defeat of the external actor, the probability of doing so is greater when they fight the 
external actor together.  The government and opposition fighting together against the 
external actor is possible when the benefit of decolonization minus the cost of 
decolonization (BD-CD) is greater than the benefit of maintaining colonization minus 
the cost of maintaining colonization (BM-CM): (BD-CD)> (BM-CM) for the government 
and the opposition. 
 
3.3.3.2. Actor Preferences 
The external actor first prefers for conflict not to occur, and lasting stability to 
form at minimal cost to the external actor.  So, the external actor commits to 
decolonization and defense of an elite pact, enabling the government to include a 
cooperative opposition and for the government to fulfill its obligations, A.  As shown 
in Figure 3.4 below, the fulfilled pact creates the conditions for self-enforcing 
stability.  The external actor’s second preference is to punish the pact’s transgressor.  
This is when either the government reneges following opposition cooperation, B, or 
the opposition subverting after government inclusion, D.  Punishing transgression 
allows the external actor to maintain its credibility to the parties of the elite pact, as 
well as internationally.  The third preference for the external actor is to retain the 
colony while maintaining government support, opposition cooperation, and 
government fulfillment of the pact, H.  The external actor prefers B or D over H, 
because while the short-run cost of punishing transgressors may be high for the 
external actor, the long-run cost of maintaining colonial rule is greater.  The external 
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actor also prefers the above outcomes to the following, because all of the above can 
lead to self-enforcing outcomes, meaning stability endures. 
The external actor next prefers for the government to exclude the opposition 
and for the opposition to cooperate, F.  While this avoids conflict and achieves short-
term stability, the exclusion of the opposition in government leaves the opposition 
only with the option of violence to express future grievances; hence, it is not self-
enforcing.  The opposition would never cooperate after exclusion, so this outcome is 
off the equilibrium path—Section 3.3.3.3 discusses the outcome equilibria of this 
game.  Then, the external actor prefers either to not punish the government for 
reneging on opposition cooperation, J, or to punish the opposition after opposition 
subversion following government support for the external actor retaining the colony, 
K.  The external actor rewards the government for its support of continued 
colonization by punishing the opposition’s, but not the government’s, transgression 
because the external actor’s primary concern is maintaining its own economic and 
national security interests.  This may enable short-term stability by strengthening the 
government, but will inhibit a self-enforcing pact and external actor credibility.  The 
next preference, punishing the government for reneging, I, creates the potential for a 
self-enforcing pact by showing the opposition that the external actor can serve as an 
honest broker.  However, the costs to the external actor for following the sub-game to 
I are greater than for J and K, because of the greater uncertainty about instability to 
follow that will hurt the external actor’s interests.   
The external actor’s seventh preference, G, costs the external actor less than J, 
K, or I, but adds even greater uncertainty about possible instability with a direct 
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conflict between the government and opposition in the immediate aftermath of 
decolonization.  The third to last preference for the external actor is to not punish the 
transgressor of the pact—the government, C or L, or the opposition, E—because it 
will affect the external actor’s utility gained from enforcing the agreement and will 
limit the likelihood of self-enforcing stability.  The penultimate preference is for the 
government to challenge the external actor and the opposition to compete against the 
government, N.  Fighting to maintain the colony is very costly to the external actor, 
but the division between the government and opposition provides an opportunity for 
the external actor to exploit and employ “divide and rule” tactics.  This may lead to 
short-term stability, but not a self-enforcing mechanism.  The external actor’s least 
preferred outcome is to face a unified government and opposition that challenge the 
decision of the external actor to retain the colony, M.  This outcome creates the 
maximum cost to the external actor with the least likelihood of a stable state that will 
support the external actor’s economic and national security interests. 
The role of the external actor as the first mover in this game leads to some 
changes in the government and opposition preferences in the general model described 
with Figure 3.2.  The model in Figure 3.3 assumes that while their preferences 
diverge, the government and opposition both ultimately prefer stable self-rule rather 
than remaining under the yoke of an external actor.  But, while wanting stability, each 
side prefers to maximize its own rent-seeking opportunities and share of power.   
The government’s top preferences follow the decolonization path.  
Decolonization provides the government the opportunity to gain more power in the 
country as the external actor departs.  The first preference remains where the 
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government excludes a cooperative opposition, F, reaping all of the benefits of 
government control without any costs of conflict.  But, this will only happen if the 
opposition is very weak and unable to resist.  Next, the government prefers to renege 
on a cooperative opposition without punishment by the external actor, C, since the 
opposition will have given up its arms, giving the opposition its lowest probability of 
success, p.  Next, the government prefers to fulfill its agreement with a cooperative 
opposition following decolonization, A, because the government avoids the costs of 
war and, even by including the opposition, increase its power and rent-seeking 
because the external actor is gone.  Fourth, the government prefers outcome D, 
because the external actor punishes the opposition, increasing the benefits to the 
government while decreasing the costs of fighting the opposition alone.  This also 
reduces the opposition’s probability of success by !2.  
The government then prefers to support the maintenance of the colony and 
renege on a cooperative opposition without punishment from the external actor, J, 
because this decreases the opposition’s probability of success by !1.  The government 
expects greater benefits at a lower cost.  The sixth preference is to avoid all costs of 
conflict and share power with the opposition under colonial rule, H.  Next, the 
government prefers to challenge the external actor with a cooperative opposition, M.  
This gives the government the greatest probability of success in defeating the external 
actor, s, and allows the government to share the costs of fighting the external actor.  
Eighth, the government prefers that the external actor punish the subverting opposition 
after the government supports the maintenance of the colony, K.  Then, the 
government prefers to face an excluded, subverted opposition after decolonization, G.   
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The government’s tenth preference is for the external actor to not punish the 
opposition after subverting government efforts to either include after decolonization, 
E, or government efforts to support the external actor’s maintenance of the colony, L.  
These outcomes reduce the external actor’s credibility and increase the opposition’s 
probability of success to q.  The government’s penultimate preference is to fight a 
two-front war, N, when the government challenges the external actor and the 
opposition competes with the government.  The least preferred outcome is when the 
external actor punishes the government for reneging on agreements made by the 
government to include a cooperative opposition following decolonization, B, or when 
the opposition cooperates with the government that supports the maintenance of the 
colony, I.  The punishment by the external actor increases the opposition’s probability 
of defeating the government by !1. 
The opposition’s preferences remain largely at odds with the government’s 
preferences in this game as they did in the “Podesta Model” in Figure 3.2.  The 
opposition’s preferred outcome remains A, because it allows the opposition to share 
the benefits of power with the government while avoiding the costs of war.  For the 
same reasons, the next preference is H, even though the benefits of government 
control are now split three ways with the external actor.  The opposition then prefers 
to cooperate with the government as it challenges the external actor, M.  Even with 
uncertainty about the long-term distribution of power, this increases the chances of 
success in removing the external actor.  Next, the opposition prefers that the external 
actor punish the government for reneging on deals the government makes with the 
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opposition.  The opposition prefers B to I, because of only having to distribute power 
between two rather than three actors, respectively. 
Preference Government Opposition External 
Actor 
1 F A A 
2 C H B, D 
3 A M H 
4 D B F 
5 J I J, K 
6 H G I 
7 M E, L G 
8 K N C, E, L 
9 G D, K N 
10 E, L F M 
11 N C  
12 B, I J  
Table 3.1: Summary of Actors’ Preferences in Transitional State-building Model 
When the opposition subverts, it prefers outcome G, because if the opposition 
subverts following government exclusion, the opposition retains its current strength 
and has its highest probability of success, r, against the government.  The opposition 
then prefers that the external actor not punish the opposition for subversion after 
inclusion or support from the government, E or L, because the opposition can face the 
government without interference even with the probability of success decreased to q.  
Next, the opposition prefers to compete with the government while it is challenging 
the external actor, N, because this requires the government and external actor to split 
their conflict efforts, improving the opposition’s probability of success.  Then, the 
opposition prefers to subvert after inclusion or support by the government knowing the 
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external actor will punish the opposition, D and K, because the opposition retains 
probability q-!2 of success.    
Cooperating with the government after exclusion, F, is the opposition’s next 
preference because the opposition avoids all the costs of war even though it gains no 
benefits from sharing government.  The second to last preference for the opposition is 
for the government to include, the opposition to cooperate, the government to renege, 
and the external actor to not punish the government, C.  The opposition’s probability 
of success deceases to p because the opposition has given up its ability to defend its 
own interests.  But, the least preferred option, J, is worse because with the external 
actor remaining as a colonizer, the external actor provides tacit and possibly direct 
support by not punishing the government, further decreasing the opposition’s 
probability of success to p-!1. 
 
3.3.3.3.  Solving the Game 
 Solving the game in Figure 3.3 through backwards induction shows how the 
credibility of the external actor prevents the possibility of a conflictual sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and leads to a cooperative, reduced violence SPNE, 
whose outcome is A.  This builds upon the understanding gained from the game in 
Figure 3.2 about the external actor ensuring the emergence of a balance of power 
between the government and the opposition.  In the last stages of each branch of the 
game, the external actor must decide to punish the transgressor or not.  In accordance 
with the described preferences, the external actor punishes both the government and 
opposition when the external actor decolonizes, but will only punish the opposition if 
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the government chooses to maintain the colony.  Therefore, the external actor solves 
the credibility problem between the government and opposition during decolonization, 
but contributes to the problem under colonial maintenance. Knowing what the external 
actor will do, in the upper branch of the game, the government will fulfill its 
agreement, and in the stage prior to that, the opposition will cooperate.  Without the 
external actor’s presence, the opposition will subvert since the opposition has a greater 
probability of success, q; therefore, the government will include the opposition in the 
prior stage. 
 In the lower half of the game, the external actor exacerbates the credible 
commitment problem, since the opposition knows that the external actor will favor the 
government at the expense of the opposition.  So, in the stage prior to the external 
actor’s decision to punish, the government will choose to renege on its deal with the 
opposition.  This will lead the opposition to choose to subvert in the stage prior, 
because their probability of success in defeating the government, q-!2, is greater even 
when punished by the external actor, than if the external actor does not punish and 
tacitly supports the government for reneging, p-!1.  When the choice is cooperating or 
competing with the government, the opposition will choose to cooperate since that has 
the greatest probability for defeating the external actor, s.  But, in the stage prior, the 
government will choose to support the external actor because of the long-term 
uncertainty about the future despite the opposition’s short-term cooperation.  The 
government and opposition fail to credibly commit to each other.  This leads to the 
external actor choosing to decolonize in the first stage of the game. 
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Despite changing the first mover in the above game compared to the general 
game in Figure 3.2, the external actor still must provide the credible commitment that 
the government and opposition cannot give to each other.  This enables self-enforcing 
stability to take hold during the transition from colonial rule.  Yet, the possibility of a 
self-enforcing agreement between the government and opposition elites that protects 
the external actor’s economic and national security interests only exists in the upper 
half of the game—transitioning from colonial-type rule.  The external actor’s credible 
commitment mechanisms in this game—personnel, money, equipment, time, elections, 
institutional development, and formal public statements of intent—enable the 
government and opposition elites to recognize that an elite pact is in each of theirs 
self-interest.  The external actor’s credible threat of punishment helps reduce violence 
to a manageable level and allows stability to take hold since the government and 
opposition recognize the benefits of maintaining the pact exceed the costs of breaking 
it. 
As the elite pact solidifies during the external actor’s transition away from 
(neo)colonial rule, a stable balance of power develops between the government and 
opposition.  The balance of power stabilizes through the diversification of violent 
means, rent-seeking, and power in governance institutions.  As this balancing occurs, 
initially with the assistance of the external actor’s credible commitments, the self-
enforcing nature of the pact emerges.  The government and the opposition begin to 
develop their own ability to provide credible commitments to one another through the 
period of balancing and stabilization.  As the external actor transitions out of 
governance control, the government and opposition take on greater shares of the 
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burden of making their promises to each other credible.  Ultimately, self-enforcement 
may take hold once the external actor exits and gives self-rule to the government and 
opposition elites.   
 
3.3.4. Model of Post-Transition Self-Enforcement 
Figure 3.4 shows a model for how the elite pacts described above lead to self-
enforcing stability.  The below figure looks similar to Figure 3.1 (State-building Game 
without External Actor), but the transition process described above alters the 
government’s preferences and the government’s and opposition’s expected behavior, 
leading to a change in the SPNE.  The game in Figure 3.1 described a conflictual 
SPNE because neither the government nor opposition could credibly commit to 
implementing an agreement after the fact.  The new game describes how the 
government and opposition can maintain the cooperative, reduced violence SPNE 
established in the games of Figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
Several assumptions exist for the game in Figure 3.4.  First, the external actor 
established stability and a power-sharing pact between the government and opposition 
before exiting.  Second, the power-sharing arrangement achieved through the 
diversification of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities changed the cost and 
benefit values of decisions in the game.  Third, the ability of the government and 
opposition to guarantee their own security and protect their material interests allows 
both sides to credibly commit to one another if they choose. 
The government now prefers to maintain the elite pact, following path A: 
government inclusion, opposition cooperation, and government fulfillment.  The 
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government recognizes the long-term benefit of fulfilling the elite pact is greater than 
the short-term gain from reneging.  Next, the government prefers exclusion followed 
by opposition cooperation, D, since the government will receive all the benefits of 
power without any costs of conflict.  The government prefers A over D because it 
recognizes that by choosing to share with the opposition the government will have 
greater overall benefits in the long-term by avoiding the cost of future conflicts with 
the opposition.  Then the government prefers to renege on the pact, B, over the 
opposition subverting after inclusion, C, or exclusion, E.  The opposition’s probability 
of success increases from B to C to E, since p>q>r.  The opposition’s preferences 
remain the same as in the game from Figure 3.1, but now the government and 
opposition both have the same first preference, A. 
Figure 3.4: Self-enforcing Stability without an External Actor 
  The elite pact that formed before the external actor’s exit, because of the 
external actor’s credible commitment mechanisms, adjusted the costs and benefits of 
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each of the paths in the upper half of the game in Figure 3.4.  Solving the game 
through backwards induction clarifies the cost and benefit adjustments enabled by the 
balance of power and stability achieved from the games in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.  In the 
last stage of the game in Figure 3.4, where the government chooses to fulfill or renege, 
the government fulfills due to the long-term gains from the existing elite pact.  This 
means the benefit minus the cost of fulfillment (BF-CF) is greater than the benefit 
minus the cost of reneging (BR-CR).  In the preceding stage of the upper half, the 
opposition chooses to cooperate knowing that the government fulfills its part of the 
agreement.  Here, the benefit minus the cost of cooperation (BC-CC) exceeds that of 
subversion (BS-CS).  In the lower half of the game, however, BS-CS > BC-CC since the 
opposition fails to receive any of the benefits of cooperation, so the opposition 
subverts.  Understanding this, the government chooses to include the opposition in the 
first stage since the benefits minus the costs of inclusion exceed those of exclusion 
(BI-CI > BE-CE).  This makes path A the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the 
game.  Backwards induction shows that the SPNE is the one in which the government 
and opposition maintain the cooperative, reduced violence SPNE established in the 
games from Figures 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
3.4.  Conclusion 
 This chapter developed a theory of self-enforcing stability to explain how 
external actors can help bring about stability and social order in conflict-torn societies.  
The theory’s four main arguments run counter to the conventional wisdom of the 
counterinsurgency literature and build upon theories within the state-building literature 
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by explaining under what conditions an external actor may help end civil conflict.  
This chapter showed how a credible commitment problem lies at the heart of civil 
conflict.  The two different extended form models (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) in this chapter, 
based on rational choice institutionalism, theorize how external actors can enable the 
competing government and opposition to overcome this credible commitment 
challenge. 
The theory needs these two different models based on how the external actor 
enters the role of enabler in the state-building process.  The model in Figure 3.2 
describes how an external actor enters the interaction between the government and 
opposition from abroad after civil conflict has erupted.  The model in Figure 3.3 
describes the role an external actor has in enabling stability when the external actor is 
already involved in the host nation’s internal affairs prior to the eruption of civil 
conflict.   
 In the first model (Figure 3.2), the external actor performs a function similar to 
the Podesteria of the late Middle Ages.  During this time, the republics of the Italian 
city-state sent outsiders, Podestas, to dependent cities, or city-states hired their own 
Podesta, to administer the city and avert conflict between competing local elites.  
Podestas enabled credible commitments between these parties by treating each side 
equally and protecting the defenders against the defectors of the pact (Greif 1998, 
2006).  The external actor functions as a colonial, imperial, or trustee power in the 
second model (Figure 3.3).  This model assumes that the external actor intends to 
transition away from external actor to host nation independent rule, enabling the actor 
to facilitate a credible pact between the conflicting parties in the host nation. 
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 The next two chapters will test these two models and the four main hypotheses 
of the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this chapter through case study 
analysis.    Again, these four hypotheses are:  
H1: An elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to 
greater success in establishing stability in conflict-torn states. 
 
H2: External actors contribute to the establishment of stability more 
successfully when they help nations establish limited access orders rather than 
open access order (liberal democracies). 
 
H3: An external actor is usually needed for internal actors to overcome their 
underlying credible commitment problems in order to put them on the path 
towards self-enforcing stability. 
 
H4: The oligopolization of violent means amongst competing elites allows 
stability to develop in conflict-torn societies. 
  
 The case study chapters reanalyze two quintessential cases of supposed success 
according to proponents of population-centric theory.  Chapter 4 focuses on the 
Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 as this is the case where most of the lessons of 
“hearts and minds” theory, as well as the rhetorical use of the phrase, come from.  The 
chapter will recount the conventional interpretation of the British success in Malaya, 
and then scrutinize the story to see if the outcome in Malaya follows the logic of the 
“hearts and minds” model presented in Chapter 2.  Chapter 4 proceeds with a 
reinterpretation of the Malaya story and further tests that story to see if the outcome in 
Malaya more closely follows the logic of the “Post-(Neo)Colonial model” (Figure 3.3) 
of the theory of self-enforcing stability. 
 Chapter 5 examines the story of the “Awakening Movements” in Iraq between 
2006-2008 in the same manner.  The chapter first provides the conventional 
interpretation for the reduction of violence in Iraq that came with the shift in tribal 
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support away from Al-Qaeda in Iraq towards the Iraqi government and coalition 
forces.  Chapter 5 then analyzes if the outcome based on that story follows the logic 
the “hearts and minds” model in Chapter 2.  Then, the chapter provides an alternative 
narrative of the “Awakening” story and examines the outcome against the logic of the 
“Podesta model” (Figure 3.2). 
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Chapter 4: Reexamining the Lessons of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 
“The answer [to the terrorists] lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but 
rests in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people.” – General Sir Gerard Templer 
(Mills 1958, 63) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The above quote by General Sir Gerard Templer has contributed to the nearly 
sacrosanct belief that counterinsurgencies are principally won by winning over the 
“hearts and minds” of a targeted population and separating the populace from the 
insurgents.  The general idea is, using Mao’s analogy of insurgents as fish swimming 
in the sea of the peasantry (Mao 1961 [2000], 8, 92-93), to shift the currents of the 
waters so that the insurgents are separated from the pools of fish that make up the 
population.  The Malayan Emergency has become the quintessential example of how 
to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations and for how to build a state during 
civil conflict.  Many lessons that shape today’s views about the role of external actors 
in contributing to the end of civil conflict come from this case. 
This chapter argues that the general narratives about the Malayan Emergency 
do not provide the best explanations for why the British succeeded in defeating the 
communist insurgency.  The conventional and revisionist narratives focus on changing 
the behavior of the population through persuasion or coercion, respectively.  The 
conventional wisdom that focuses on the role of the population in an insurgency fails 
to acknowledge how the government and opposition elites influence the population.  
So, these narratives fail to capture how the external actor influences the interaction of 
the competing elites.  This chapter argues that an elite-centric strategy to adjust the 
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incentives of the government and opposition elites served as the underlying 
mechanism driving British success in Malaya.  
This chapter re-examines the lessons learned from the Malayan Emergency 
based on the formalization of “hearts and minds” (HAM) theory in Chapter 2 and the 
theory of self-enforcing stability presented in Chapter 3.  This chapter begins by 
discussing the prevailing conventional wisdom about how the British and Malayan 
government defeated the communist insurgency.  Then, the chapter analyzes these 
generally accepted lessons learned from the Malayan experience to determine if they 
follow the expected logic of the HAM model.  This is followed by an explanation of 
the revisionist narrative, as well as a critique of those lessons learned.  Finally, this 
chapter applies the “Post-(Neo)Colonial” model of self-enforcing stability and 
explains the underlying factors and dynamics that most contributed to stability in 
Malaya, which the conventional lessons learned have masked.  Appendix A of this 
chapter describes a brief history of Malaya before and after World War II, providing 
context, if needed by the reader, of the conditions that led to the Malayan Emergency.    
 
4.2. Conventional Explanations for Ending the Malayan Emergency 
 “Hearts and minds” (HAM) dominates the conventional narrative about how 
the British successfully defeated the communist insurgency in Malaya and established 
a newly independent and stable post-colonial nation-state.  The tendency to combine 
the population-centric HAM theory with organizational learning and unified command 
lessons, as discussed in Chapter 2, arose in recent interpretations of COIN in Malaya.  
Organizational learning and unified command under dynamic leadership, in this 
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interpretation, serve as the means to implementing an effective HAM policy.  This 
conventional story of the Malayan Emergency has led to the development of modern 
counterinsurgency theory (see Chapter 2) and doctrine (Department of the Army 2006; 
British Army 2009; Sepp 2005) that explains, according to the narrative’s 
proselytizers, how to defeat insurgencies and build stable nation-states.  The rest of 
this section describes the conventional Malayan HAM narrative, which this chapter 
critiques in the proceeding section (4.2.1). 
Richard Stubbs explains how three factors allowed the British colonial and 
Malayan governments to shift from a policy of coercion and enforcement during the 
early emergency years to a policy based on winning “hearts and minds”.  First, the 
demand generated for rubber and tin by the Korean War created an economic boom 
for the government, allowing it to achieve full employment and increase government 
revenues to pay for HAM policies.  Second, the newly elected Conservative 
government in Britain took advantage of High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney’s 
assassination by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to install General Sir Gerard 
Templer as the new leader in Malaya—with unified military and civilian authority—to 
change senior personnel in the colonial government and to implement a HAM 
approach.  Third, the MCP revised its policies in October 1951 to reduce military 
activity and increase political organization, creating space for the government to 
implement HAM policies (Stubbs 1989, 6). 
The HAM story, following the presumption that these above factors generated 
a change in British strategy, unfolds in 1951.  Proponents argue the British recognized 
that their policies of coercion and enforcement in place between 1948 and 1951 were 
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counterproductive and the cause of a stalemate between the government and 
insurgents in Malaya.  The government and insurgents recognized this stalemate in 
1951 and both shifted strategies from trying to directly defeat the other side to trying 
to win over and gain the allegiance of the population, particularly the Chinese.  The 
MCP shifted focus with the October Resolutions of 1951, trying to balance military 
and political strategies in order to limit violence against the population (Stubbs 1989, 
133-151).  This stalemate set the conditions for a battle for the Malayan population’s 
“hearts and minds”. 
With High Commissioner Gurney’s assassination on 6 October 1951, Oliver 
Lyttelton, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, led a review of the British 
strategy of coercion and enforcement in Malaya.  Lyttelton concluded that the 
government in Malaya needed a new strategy to improve the lives of the Malayan 
population and that the government needed a single leader to unify the government’s 
civilian and military efforts to put in place the new strategy.  Prime Minister Churchill 
followed this advice and appointed Lieutenant General Sir Gerard Templer to take this 
post in February 1952.  HAM proponents credit Templer as the right person to see 
through the changes necessary to implement and shepherd this new strategy to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the population (Stubbs 1989, 133-151).  
The population-centric “hearts and minds” strategy consisted of the British 
colonial government’s use of minimum force, persuasion, political concessions, and 
social provisions to prove the legitimacy of the Malayan government and undermine 
the Chinese population’s support for the communists.  The overall HAM strategy that 
 116 
emerged in Malaya, based on the ostensible desire to gain the “enthusiastic support” of 
the Chinese (Stubbs fn 1, 250), consisted of eight key components.   
First, the government improved the existing resettlement centers by calling 
them “New Villages” and improving the quality of services, such as clean water, 
medical care, education, farmland, and community center provision.  Second, the 
government incrementally introduced elections in some villages and over time 
incorporated state and federal elections.  Third, the government retrained the Malayan 
security forces to focus on helping rather than abusing the population, and the 
government established locally recruited Home Guards to protect local villages and 
kampongs.  Fourth, very strict food control measures augmented severe population 
control measures already in place to deprive the insurgents of supplies and base 
support.  Fifth, the government imposed severe penalties, such as collective 
punishment on villages, life imprisonment, and the death penalty, for violating or 
suspicion of violating the control measures to prevent aid to the communists.  Sixth, 
the government gave “white area” status to communities with no guerilla activity, 
which meant a reduction in Emergency regulated population control measures.  
Seventh, the British released offensive propaganda denouncing the communists and 
praising the government.  Finally, the security forces used improved intelligence 
sources to take more directed offensive action against the insurgents and their 
supporters (Stubbs 1989, 250-1). 
 Tied to this HAM argument is the role of Templer in enabling and pushing the 
HAM policy that broke the stalemate that emerged in 1951 between the government 
and insurgents.  Templer played two decisive roles according to HAM proponents.  
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First, Templer psychologically impacted the campaign through deliberate words and 
deeds that instilled confidence in the government and the Malayan population that the 
government would defeat the communists (Ramakrishna 2001, 79).  He helped “lift … 
morale throughout the Federation and imbue the Security Forces and civil 
administration with a new spirit and a will to win” (Stubbs fn 120, 190)(Stubbs 1989, 
190).  Instilling confidence is necessary to win “hearts and minds”; the population 
must believe in the government, so the government also has to believe in itself. 
HAM proponents argue that before Templer’s arrival, the British maintained 
an anti-Chinese bias based on perceptions that the Chinese only understood 
intimidation.  So, government policies had to make the Chinese “fear Government 
more than they fear the Communists” (Ramakrishna fn 24, 82).  This anti-Chinese bias 
led to the coercion and enforcement policies of individual and mass detentions and 
deportations, as well as other forms of collective punishment.  Templer countered this 
bias by trying to cultivate relationships with the Chinese, particularly the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) (Ramakrishna 2001, 80-82; Smith 2001, 65-67).   
Templer’s dynamic leadership style and ability instilled confidence in the population, 
including the Chinese.   
Further, HAM proponents argue that Templer instilled similar confidence in 
the Malayan government.  He provided moral inspiration by visiting the field 
regularly, and speaking to the troops in plain speech rather than through written 
conveyances.  Through such behavior, Templer provided an “infectious and confident 
determination to win” to the government and the population (Ramakrishna fn 58, 85).  
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Additionally, Templer inserted urgency into the implementation of the Briggs Plan, 
which had languished in slow progress under Gurney (Smith 2001, 63-64). 
Templer’s second decisive role, according to HAM proponents, was to build an 
organizational structure optimized for implementing a HAM policy, including revised 
elements of the Briggs Plan.  Templer established a unified command, serving as both 
the civilian High Commissioner and military Director of Operations; the decisive 
factor in implementing the HAM strategy that defeated the insurgents in Malaya.  
Using this absolute command authority in Malaya, Templer had the necessary skill to 
overcome the previous inertia and energize the campaign against the communists 
(Short 1975, 12-13; Hack 1999, 100).  For example, before Templer arrived, the 
resettlement program instituted under the previous Director of Operations, Lieutenant 
General Harold Briggs, amounted to “the mere fact of herding [mostly Chinese] 
squatters behind barbed wire” (Ramakrishna fn 20, 81) to contain the insurgents’ base 
of support.   
Templer overcame these problems in several ways, and was essential to 
implementing his “hearts and minds” strategy to win over the Chinese population.  
First, he revitalized the Information Services’s “project[ion] to the Chinese that the 
government was provider” (Ramakrishna 2001, 86), boosting Chinese confidence to 
support the government over the MCP (Smith 2001, 73-74).  Second, Templer further 
projected the government-as-provider idea by reframing Briggs’s “Resettlement 
Areas” as “New Villages”.  He created the belief that New Villages would improve the 
quality of life for its residents.  While Templer still used collective punishment against 
the New Village residents, HAM proponents argue that Templer used those techniques 
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in a calculated manner to show that the government “was prepared to do something” 
(Ramakrishna fn 87, 88).  Third, Templer introduced the “White Areas” plan, where 
districts that no longer fell under MCP control had Emergency restrictions lifted so 
they could return to “normal life”.  Templer further used the “White Areas” as part of 
his Information Services campaign to “amplify the psychological effect” of this return 
to “normal life” to other districts to motivate the others to get the reward of normalcy 
(Ramakrishna 2001, 85-89).  Fourth, Templer tried to introduce a belief in local 
responsibility for the security and governance of the New Villages through the 
creation of Home Guards and Local Councils, respectively (Ramakrishna 2001, 91).  
Fifth, Templer conducted patient diplomacy amongst the Malays to integrate Malayan 
Chinese into government service that had previously been the exclusive domain of the 
Malay population (Smith 2001, 67). 
HAM proponents further argue that Templer optimized his unified command 
to implement a HAM strategy by encouraging organizational learning.  According to 
the HAM narrative, this was another necessary condition for ending the stalemate 
between the government and the MCP in Malaya.  British colonial experiences 
developed a culture of using limited war or minimum force to achieve limited goals at 
minimal costs.  To achieve these ends in defeating the Malayan insurgency, the British 
had to develop tight civil-military cooperation and eschew tight adherence to doctrine 
in favor of embracing decentralized operations and decision-making by small units 
and junior leaders (Mockaitis 1990, 110-113; Nagl 2005 [2002], 42-43).  This part of 
the HAM argument assumes that the addition of revolutionary politics at the end of the 
18th century made guerilla warfare, relatively unchanged since the Romans and 
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Persians, a more potent means for achieving political change (Nagl 2005 [2002], 15-
17).  According to HAM proponents, the ability of states faced by insurgencies to 
understand the power of “People’s Wars” and adopt strategies with “hearts and minds” 
principles and unified command structures determines if a state can successfully defeat 
an insurgency (Nagl 2005 [2002], 28-30).   
Despite Briggs’s efforts to develop a plan to address the problem of the MCP 
and to improve implementation of the new policy, the organizational resistance to 
pursuing this new course required the intervention of Templer to see them through.  
Templer’s first organizational innovation was the establishment of unity of 
command—all civilian and military authority now existed under the control of one 
person.  Second, Templer improved organizational processes by putting all 
intelligence analysis under the control of a Director of Intelligence and keeping that 
effort separate from the collection efforts of the Special Branch, with collection seen 
as primarily a police rather than military function.  Third, the Information Services 
developed coherent propaganda and psychological warfare efforts directed at the 
population to win “HAM” and at the insurgents to demoralize them, respectively.  
Fourth, Templer improved innovative thinking in the military through a couple of 
organizational process changes.  Templer established the Combined Emergency 
Planning Staff “CEPS,” a small personal staff representing the different civil-military 
efforts who made unannounced field visits, as his eyes and ears from military, airman, 
police, and civil servant perspectives.  Additionally, Templer added to his staff an 
Operational Research team as his own “think-tank” to analyze everything going on to 
establish applicable lessons for future operations (Nagl 2005 [2002], 91-97).  All of 
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these efforts by Templer aided the British in rapidly developing, implementing, and 
assessing the effectiveness of HAM strategies and tactics in Malaya. 
Templer’s focus on the importance of lessons learned led to the fifth 
organizational change that contributed to the British success in Malaya: the 
establishment of doctrine that pooled tactical knowledge.  From these lessons came the 
focus on policing New Villages and expanding of “oil spots” of security.  “Oil spot” 
tactics call for the concentration of counterinsurgency forces in expanding secure 
zones of operations to win hearts and minds (Taber 1965 [2002], 50- 61; Krepinevich 
2005).  The government did this in part by infiltrating the Min Yuen organization, 
emplacing strict food rations, and finally masquerading as insurgents to draw the real 
ones out.  From these lessons learned, Templer saw the need not just for 
organizational changes in the British military, but also amongst the Malayan security 
forces.  He worked to train an ethnically representative national military, and placed 
even greater importance on the creation of effective Home Guards as local popular 
militias responsible for securing themselves.  Finally, Templer stressed the 
organizational use of the chain of command established through the Federal Executive 
Council and the subordinate Councils at the State and District level for coordinating 
social, political, economic, police, and military efforts.  These institutions created the 
initial multiracial institutions to support a Malayan independent government (Nagl 
2005 [2002], 97-102).  Such institutions improved, according to the HAM narrative, 
the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people. 
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4.2.1.  Critique of the Conventional Explanation for Ending the Malayan Emergency 
 The preceding section provided an idealized HAM narrative that explains the 
success of the British in defeating the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960.  The 
HAM narrative argues that a dynamic leader who can establish a unified command 
structure and learning organization enables counterinsurgents to implement an 
effective strategy based on “hearts and minds” principles to defeat insurgents.  This 
section critiques that argument both logically and empirically.   
 
4.2.1.1.  Logical Critique 
 The population-centric theory model presented in Chapter 2 provides the basis 
for critically analyzing the logic of the conventional explanation of the British success 
in Malaya.  Section 2.5 explained the logic of the extended game tree model illustrated 
in Figure 2.4.  According to the model, one should expect that the population would 
support the opposition at the outbreak of an insurgency.  In the case of Malaya, the 
population was divided ethnically in choosing to support the insurgents.  Support 
came almost exclusively from the Chinese and aborigines, 39% and less than 1% of 
the population, respectively.  As the HAM model is based on popular support for the 
insurgents, this raises a logical puzzle.  With the clear ethnic divisions in Malaya, did 
the Chinese insurgents really think they could win over the “hearts and minds” of the 
Malay and Indian portions (48% and 11%, respectively) of the population?  If not, 
then the British did not face a general insurgency; they merely faced a civil unrest 
from an aggrieved minority of the population.  As the general population did not 
support the insurgency, according to the model in Figure 2.4 the insurgency should 
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have come to an end.  HAM theory and the model fail to provide criteria for a 
minimum percentage level of popular support needed to sustain an insurgency.  
Figure 2.4. Model of Population-Centric Theory 
 To continue with the logical critique, it is necessary to assume that any popular 
support, no matter from how small of a percentage of the population, can sustain an 
insurgency.  Following that assumption, the next move in the model is for the 
counterinsurgents to choose between a counterinsurgency policy of HAM or coercion.  
According to the conventional narrative of Malaya, the British chose a HAM policy.  
So, in the next move according to the model, the population should have chosen to end 
their support of the insurgency.  Yet, even after the supposed implementation of the 
HAM policy by Templer in 1952, the Chinese continued to support the insurgents for 
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several years.  The population’s continued support of the insurgents implies, according 
to the model, that the British must have implemented a policy of coercion, despite 
Templer’s “hearts and minds” rhetoric.  The revisionist narrative in Section 4.3 below 
argues exactly that point. 
 Assuming the revisionist narrative is correct and that the British implemented a 
policy to coerce the insurgents, the conventional narrative of Malaya continues to fail 
to follow the logic of the HAM model.  Through coercive population control measures 
implemented by the British, the Chinese ultimately ended their support of the 
insurgents, which counters the expected move of the population according to the HAM 
model.  Further, the communist insurgents did not end their fight after losing the 
population’s support, as the model predicts.  While the Emergency ended in 1960, the 
communists continued a low-level insurgency against the Malaysian government until 
1989.   
What happened on the ground in Malaya actually follows a logic almost 
opposite of the one depicted in the HAM model at each stage of the game.  With 
Chinese popular support for the communist insurgents, the British implemented a 
coercive policy of population control to separate the population from and destroy the 
insurgents.  The harsh measures of collective punishment directed at the Chinese 
people cut the insurgents off physically and materially from the population.  After 
breaking the population down, then the British implemented a policy to improve the 
condition of the people as long as they continued to not support the insurgents.  While 
the British carrot and stick measures may have changed the population’s behavior, 
they unlikely won the “hearts” or affection of the people. 
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4.2.1.2.  Empirical Critique 
In addition to the logical limitations of the conventional narrative of the 
Malayan Emergency when evaluated against HAM theory, the conventional story also 
suffers from empirical challenges.  Even as proponents discuss the eight key 
components of the idealized version of the “hearts and minds” strategy in Malaya (see 
Section 4.2), they concede that this approach did not win over the population.  As 
Richard Stubbs, one of the leading proponents of HAM, states, “Rather, the result was 
more to neutralize the key sectors of the population—the rural Chinese and especially 
the New Villages—and to make it impossible for the guerillas to rely on them for 
recruits and supplies” (Stubbs 1989, 251).  If the outcome of the above strategy was 
neutralization, the wrong lessons are learned from this case due to the focus on the 
rhetoric of winning “hearts and minds”.  In implementing the strategy, the promised 
provision of services and quality did not materialize in many of the New Villages 
(Stubbs 1989, 251).  The government got villages to behave by coercing them through 
deprivation rather than by persuading the villagers and earning their affection and 
loyalty as the HAM story argues happened in Malaya, as well as one expects from the 
logic of HAM theory. 
The conventional story also argues that Templer was the key individual in 
enacting the winning strategy for the British, emphasizing his role as instiller of 
confidence and morale.  Yet, that interpretation to put Templer in a morally positive 
light obfuscates Templer’s greatest contributions to the counterinsurgency effort.  
Templer’s efforts to be “feared and respected” (Ramakrishna 2001, 90) and control a 
strategy of carrots and sticks enabled him to coercively change the behavior of the 
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population, particularly the Chinese.  Templer supporters concede that Templer 
initially had to energize the government by “cracking the whip” and adopting more 
authoritarian methods to achieve his objectives (Ramakrishna 2001, 84).  “Templer’s 
violence of language was a fact” (Short 1975, 382), as were the deeds of the policies 
he continued to pursue, such as resettlement operations, collective punishments, and 
offensive sweep operations. 
Further, the chorus of praise for Templer leadership in the conventional 
narrative implies that effective counterinsurgency is largely actor dependent.  The 
counterfactual to this story is that if not for Templer, the Malayan Emergency would 
have remained in the stalemate situation that arrived by 1951 for many years to come 
(Smith 2001, 63).  By arguing that an effective HAM policy is actor dependent, the 
conventional narrative undermines the HAM logic explained in Chapter 2 that relies 
on the population to defeat an insurgency. 
Tied to the importance of leadership, the conventional narrative also argued 
that organizational learning was a key enabler of the British ability to implement a 
successful HAM strategy.  Yet, the romanticized view of the British organizational 
culture of limited goals achieved through limited force at minimal cost actually leads 
to improper lessons learned.  Rather than seeking to win population support, as this 
apologetic narrative claims, the British applied extremely harsh measures to control 
the population from which these operational and organizational lessons came (Elkins 
2005).  Following acquiescence by the population, Templer introduced the “White 
Areas” plan, where districts that no longer fell under MCP control had Emergency 
restrictions lifted so they could return to “normal life”.  But, what was “normal life” in 
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the “New Villages”, because the population had no roots in these locations.  The 
government forcibly moved the Chinese population to these resettlement locations in 
which they were previously interned.  
The US Army has adopted the lessons derived from this conventional story in 
its most recent counterinsurgency manual, explaining that the training of a well-
disciplined police force in Malaya provided a solid foundation for the defeat of the 
insurgents and only took 15 months to accomplish (Department of the Army 2006, 6-
21-6-22).  But, as Karl Hack explains, the lesson that training host nation’s security 
force before transferring control makes the host security forces more effective “is 
unexceptional, and almost tautologous.”  The Emergency did not actually turn because 
of the retraining of the police.  Gurney and Briggs delayed police training in 1950 in 
order to expand the size of the security forces rapidly to enable the massive 
resettlement of the Chinese population.  Population control measures improved 
security, allowing the time and space to conduct police retraining (Hack 2009, 395-
396).  Additionally, the lessons learned incorporated into current US doctrine ignore 
the role of the Home Guards in providing local security. 
 Another complementary element of the conventional narrative is that the 
unified command structure established by Templer allowed for this organizational 
learning to take place, and for the effective implementation of the HAM policies.  
However, according to the conventional story proponents, the Briggs Plan laid the 
foundation for Templer’s future efforts by recognizing the political nature of the war 
in Malaya.  Briggs also provided the framework to coordinate all aspects of the war—
civil, police, and military—through the creation of the Federal War Council and future 
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District and State War Executive Committees (Nagl 2005 [2002], 71-77).  These 
changes in processes and strategic direction created the shift in focus from defeating 
the communists to winning the support of the population.  Though, this raises a 
question, if Briggs had it all right, and the British had an ingrained learning culture 
due to their colonial experiences, then why would you have to have Templer to turn 
things around?  The organization should have been able to adapt based on this 
argument.  The British organizational structure should not have been so personality 
dependent.  This actor-based component to the conventional story provides no insight 
into the type of person who is needed, when during the conflict, and under what 
conditions to implement a successful HAM policy against an insurgency. 
The conventional narrative argued about the importance of the 
counterinsurgents’ use of minimum force, persuasion, political concessions, and social 
provisions to win the “hearts and minds” of the population.  Yet, these terms have 
different meanings in terms of the ideal or mythical usage and the usage that matches 
implementation.  Most people interpret HAM to mean a soft approach to deal with and 
persuade the population to support the government.  But, changing the mindset of the 
population is not that simple, and tough measures and hard approaches continued after 
1952 to achieve that change (Rigden 2008, 12).  In Malaya, this included the 
continuation of policies of mass deportations, mass population resettlement, martial 
law, and direct military action.     
While HAM proponents exclaim the British use of minimum force, implying a 
soft approach, they gloss over the reality that minimal force determined tactically or 
strategically just means the minimum force to achieve the objectives, not necessarily 
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the lowest force option (Rigden 2008, 12).  Additionally, political concessions and 
social provision do not necessarily occur out of the benevolence of the government as 
implied in, and often interpreted from, the phrase “hearts and minds.”  In Malaya, the 
provision of support and concessions followed a carrot and stick method that utilized 
extensive population control and coercion.  
 
4.3. Conventional Revisionist Narrative 
 Alternative narratives to explain the British success in Malaya have existed 
since the time of the Emergency.  This section presents the overall argument made by 
proponents of a revisionist narrative of Malaya.  This narrative provides an alternative 
to the conventional HAM story in the previous section.  Following the presentation of 
the revisionist story, this section will discuss some challenges with this narrative.   
Victor Purcell, one of the original critics of the conventional narrative, argued 
that the “the main success against the Communists was, in fact, won before General 
Templer’s arrival” (Purcell 1954, 6).  Additionally, Purcell only credits Templer, in 
the words of Sir Cheng-lock Tan, founder of the MCA, with enabling a police state to 
form in Malaya during Templer’s tenure (Purcell 1954, 5-19; Ramakrishna 2001, 80).  
After the Emergency, revisionism mostly laid dormant as the conventional narrative 
took center stage.  Yet, contemporary revisionist narratives have reemerged, and have 
taken a more analytical approach than Purcell’s more polemical critiques of Templer. 
 Public relations in part explain the dormancy of revisionist narratives.  Since 
the end of British colonialism, the British have worked to build their image as a 
gentler fighting force.  The association of General Templer and the “hearts and minds” 
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approach with the successful defeat of the communists in Malaya contributes to this 
mythology.  According to the revisionists, while the British have more generally 
adopted HAM principles since the end of the Cold War, the lessons derived from 
Malaya do not match reality.  The British conducted highly coercive operations in 
Malaya, which involved high, rather than minimal, levels of force, and was fought 
above the law, rather than within existing law as HAM theorists argue.  Malaya, 
compared to Vietnam, is an apparently successful external actor-led counterinsurgency 
during the Cold War, making HAM proponents want to clearly distinguish HAM from 
conventional warfare (Dixon 2009).   
 Definitionally, “hearts and minds” consists of two components.  The “hearts” 
part focuses on “winning the emotional support of the people,” while the “minds” 
element centers on the “people as pursing their own ‘rational self-interest’” (Dixon 
2009, 363).  The overall term itself implies that the approach seeks the active support, 
consent, and trust, rather than just acquiescence, of the population (Stubbs 1989).  
British COIN doctrine since at least 1970 has emphasized this (Ministry of Defence 
1970, 4; Dixon 2009, 364), with the most recent British COIN manual replacing the 
term “hearts and minds” with “gain and maintain popular support” (British Army 
2009, 3)  The current definition states, “Gaining and maintaining popular support is an 
essential objective for successful counterinsurgency.  It gives authority to the 
campaign and helps establish legitimacy.  Unless the government gains its people’s 
trust and confidence, the chances of success are greatly reduced.  The degree to which 
it is achieved is in effect the measure of campaign success” (British Army 2009, 3-11).   
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Revisionists argue that despite the clear doctrinal meaning and usage of “hearts 
and minds”, some proponents of HAM reinterpret the definition and use the term 
simply for public relations purposes because of its gentle connotation despite 
acknowledging harsh treatment of the population.  In reference to lessons from 
Malaya, Hew Strachan states, “When we speak about ‘Hearts and minds’, we are not 
talking about being nice to the natives, but about giving them the firm smack of 
government.  ‘Hearts and minds’ denoted authority, not appeasement” (Strachan 2007, 
8).  People who use such arguments abuse the term HAM in order disguise their belief 
in the centrality of coercion to change behavior to make such an argument less 
offensive.   
Such statements align with the revisionist argument that identifies the use of 
coercion in the form of a series of harsh population control measures led to success in 
Malaya.  The revisionists argue that what HAM proponents call the “coercion and 
enforcement” stage before 1952 (Stubbs 1989, 66-93), actually led to the British 
success in defeating the communists in Malaya and set the stage for the formation of a 
stable independent state.  The revisionists do not completely dismiss “hearts and 
minds”.  Rather, they argue the role of HAM varied during different phases of the 
Malayan campaign and ultimately HAM supported a coercion strategy (Hack 1999, 
124; Dixon 2009, 369).   
Contemporary revisionists focus on the lessons gained from different phases of 
the campaign in Malaya.  They define three main periods, and argue that the 
government broke the insurgency when population control, rather than “hearts and 
minds” was at the fore (Bennett 2009, 416-417; Hack 2009, 384).  The first period, 
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from 1948-1949, primarily consisted of lethal counter-terror tactics and mass 
punishment sweep operations.  Part of the justifications for the use of harsh tactics by 
the security forces to coerce the population came from the belief that the Chinese only 
understood intimidation, so the security forces had to instill fear in order to gain 
cooperation (Harper 1999, 151; Ramakrishna 2002a, 336)(Bennett 2009 fn 94).  
Additionally, the British had a colonial history of using harsh treatment to punish 
recalcitrant populations and nip problems in the bud (Elkins 2005).  Gurney created 
the conditions for a permissive environment to use lethal force (Bennett 2009, 421-
432).  He stated, “It is paradoxical though none the less true that in order to maintain 
law and order it is necessary for the Government itself to break it for a time. … At the 
present time, the Police and Army are breaking the law every day” (Bennett 2009 fn 
107, 432).  Recognizing the limits of wanton destruction and poor intelligence 
collection, the British changed course and developed a cohesive strategy.   
The second phase occurred between 1950 and 1952.  The focus shifted towards 
population control through a clear and hold strategy based on the Briggs Plan, which 
concentrated resources to improve security.  The Briggs Plan was highly coercive, 
with five key elements: 1) shifting massive portions of the population—resettlement 
of over 500,000 rural Chinese and the regroupment of up to 600,000 estate laborers; 2) 
the government asserting administrative control over the “New Villages”; 3) forming 
civil-military committees to bring together the army, police, civil administration, and 
Special Branch intelligence down to the district level to coordinate efforts; 4) 
assigning individual military units specific areas to patrol in order to build up 
intelligence and provide security, freeing up the police for other duties; and 5) 
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remaining military units operating conventionally to destroy communist forces state-
by-state.  The MCP actively resisted these efforts in 1950, but by 1951 decided to take 
a political tact to counter the British.  The MCP issued their “October Resolutions,” 
which ordered its members to scale back military activity and focus on regaining mass 
support and conducting subversive activities (Hack 1999, 104-108; 2009, 386-390).   
The third period of the campaign ran from mid-1952 to 1960.  During this 
time, Templer initiated an effort to optimize the turn around that had already taken 
place, and ensured maximum efficiency in the government efforts.  The revisionist 
argument concurs with elements of the conventional narratives about Templer.  
Revisionists agree that Templer improved the functioning of the government 
bureaucracy, reorganized intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, codified 
lessons learned and doctrine, and tried to improve the lives of the lower classes and 
win their “hearts” (Hack 2009, 402-404).  However, the revisionists argue that the 
conventionalists derived the wrong lessons from these actions. 
For revisionists, the conventional proponent’s argument about a stalemate in 
1951 that Templer ended with his arrival in 1952 is incorrect.  Rather, the tide had 
already turned by the end of 1951 due to the efforts of Gurney and Briggs.  The 
policies of coercion implemented by Gurney and Briggs had forced the MCP to 
change its behavior, ultimately opening the door for Templer to optimize Gurney and 
Briggs’s gains.  The coercive period between 1950 and 1951 set the conditions that 
allowed Templer and his successors to ease restrictions over time, continue with 
elections, win the hearts and minds, and transition to Malayan independence in 1957.  
The real lesson about Templer, from the revisionist perspective, is that he did things to 
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improve the efficiency of existing policies and plans.  Ultimately, success during the 
Emergency came from population and spatial control, with components of the 
conventional narrative supporting that effort (Hack 1999, 2009; Bennett 2009).   
 The revisionists developed their alternative narrative by using British and 
Chinese sources, rather than relying solely on British sources like most of the 
conventional narratives.  Incorporating the Chinese perspective allowed the 
revisionists to see the important impact that the population control and security 
approach had on changing Chinese behavior, allowing eventually for “hearts and 
minds” tactics and dynamic leadership to improve organizational efficiency.   
 
4.3.1.  Critique of the Revisionist Narrative of the Malayan Emergency 
The revisionist argument implies that population control merely coerced a 
desired behavior.  The revisionist’s lesson underemphasizes the role of the British in 
appealing to the rational self-interest of the Chinese to obtain enduring security and 
material gain.  Just like the conventional proponents, the revisionists focus on the 
population as the center of gravity for the counterinsurgents to be able to defeat the 
insurgents.  But rather than emphasize the importance of positive persuasion in 
changing the population’s behavior, as do the proponents of HAM, the revisionists 
argue that punitive coercion changes the population’s behavior. 
A model of the revisionist argument would consist of an extended game tree 
with the same decision nodes as the model of population-centric theory (see Figure 
2.4), except the preferences of the actors would change, leading to different expected 
outcomes at each stage of the game.  Figure 4.1 displays the new expected outcomes at 
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each stage based on backwards induction.  According to this model, the population 
should initially support the insurgents.  Then, the counterinsurgents should then 
implement a coercive COIN policy that places emphasis on counter-terror and 
population control operations.  This policy in turn should lead to the population no 
longer supporting the insurgents.  Ultimately, leading to the end of the insurgency. 
Figure 4.1.  Model of Revisionist Narrative 
While the revisionist story of Malaya appears to validate this model, this model 
relies on several assumptions that obscure other dynamics taking place amongst the 
different actors that may account for why coercion worked in Malaya.  The most 
challenging assumption is the role of the population as the center of gravity.  The 
causal logic linking population control directly to the population misses the 
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intervening variable of local elites.  Second, the narrative treats the Malayan 
government as mere lemmings of the British.  The local and foreign counterinsurgents 
do not necessarily have the same interests, nor do the population necessarily have the 
same perceptions about the legitimacy of both.  Finally, the revisionist narrative does 
not capture why the MCA began to support the Malayan government, but the MCP 
continued the insurgency campaign. 
 
4.4.  Ending the Malayan Emergency through a Self-enforcing Stability Narrative 
The problem with the conventional and revisionist accounts of the Malayan 
Emergency are that they both focus on adjusting the behavior of the population.  Each 
argues for achieving behavior adjustment through either persuasion or coercion, 
respectively.  Both fail to fully appreciate the importance of understanding and 
aligning the interests of the government and opposition elites who will ensure that the 
sub-populations under the influence of different elites see the benefit from supporting 
their leaders.  Adjusting the incentives of the elites and later the masses served as the 
underlying mechanism that led to the government’s success over the insurgents in 
Malaya.  The conventional narrative misses this point, because of its focus on Templer 
instituting a policy based on winning hearts and minds, his ability to instill confidence, 
or his encouragement of organizational learning.  The revisionist narrative misses the 
mechanism of incentives, because of its focus on coercion.  The population control 
strategies instituted under Gurney and Briggs, and continued with important 
modifications by Templer, set the conditions for the British to serve as a credible 
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guarantor of a self-enforcing pact between Malay and Chinese elites, ultimately, 
leading to stability in Malaya and the end of the insurgency.  
Where the conventional narrative of the Malayan Emergency attributes the 
successful defeat of the insurgency to a dynamic leader who adapts policy and 
organizations to win the hearts and minds of the population and the revisionist 
narrative explains success through the use of coercion and enforcement to provide 
material carrots and sticks to the population, a theory of self-enforcing stability 
explains the end of the insurgency and establishment of stability based on interests and 
the alignment of incentives of elites.  This section applies the “Post-(Neo)Colonial 
Model” of the theory of self-enforcing stability, explained in Chapter 3, to the 
Malayan Emergency, providing an alternative narrative to explain how the British (the 
external actor) contributed to establishing an enduring, stable limited access order 
(LAO) in Malaya.   
The application shows how the external actor has to have the flexibility to shift 
between the tactics described in the HAM and coercion approaches to 
counterinsurgency.  The use of these different tactics can persuade the population, 
through the intervening variable of government and opposition elites, that it is in the 
population’s long-term self-interest to stop supporting the insurgency and participate 
in the government.  Ultimately though, the combination of these tactics cannot win 
over the hearts or affection of the population.  But, they can win over the minds as the 
elites and population pursue their rational self-interest—security and material benefits.  
Winning over the elites, and ultimately the population, comes not simply through 
coercion, which is a tactic, but by creating incentives and aligning interests between 
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the government and opposition.  This dissertation has theorized that credible external 
actor commitments and decentralization of violent means and rent-seeking 
opportunities allows for the alignment of interests and the creation of an elite pact that 
can lead to self-enforcing stability. 
Following the general theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter 
breaks the key actors in the Malayan Emergency into three main categories: the 
government, the opposition, and the external actor.  To remain parsimonious and in 
keeping with the model, this application assumes that each of the groups form their 
own elite coalitions, solving internal collective action problems. 
 
4.4.1. Key Actors 
The government refers to the Malays, but more specifically, the Malay 
members of the civil administration of the Malayan government, the Malay sultans 
who serve as nominal heads of the Federated and Unfederated States of Malaya, and 
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) political party.  The Malay 
population initially was the only ethnic group to serve in the government and national 
security forces.  The Malays supported British rule, because they gained the most 
politically under colonial rule, and had the most to gain during a transition to 
independence due to their monopoly on positions in government.  Very few Malays 
ever joined or supported the insurgency.  While initially on the sidelines, due to their 
limited influence and power, this paper considers the Indian population part of the 
government, but due to the Indian’s limited role does not discuss them further. 
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Defining the opposition is a bit more complicated than defining the 
government.  Two main groups existed within the Chinese community: the 
communists and the nationalists.  Initially, a tenuous elite pact existed between these 
two groups in opposing the government and the external actor.  The communists 
consisted of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led by Lai Tek before WWII—a 
triple agent of the British, Japanese, and traitor of the MCP—whom Chin Peng 
replaced in 1947.  The MCP controlled the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions 
(PMFTU) until the government disbanded it in 1948.  Additionally, the MCP 
consisted of its militant wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), and its 
civilian and logistic support group, the Min Chung Yuen Tung (Min Yuen) or 
“People’s Movement.”  Some refer to the MNLA as the Malayan Races Liberation 
Army (MRLA), which formed out of its predecessors, the Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA) and the successor Malayan People’s Anti-British Army 
(MPABA).   
The nationalist side primarily consisted of the business-dominated Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) led by Tan Cheng Lock.  The MCA wanted to ensure the 
maintenance of the privileged position held by the Chinese population in the 
plantations, shipping, banks, and import and export companies in Malaya.  The MCA 
and MCP represented the urban and rural divide amongst the Chinese population.  The 
MCA and MCP put aside differences to challenge the Japanese occupation, and 
initially in opposing the Malay maintenance of dominance following the British 
return, developing an internal elite pact.  Over time, however, internal contestation 
developed between the MCA and MCP in representing the Chinese population.   
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An internal contestation approach shows how internal pressures, within an elite 
bloc, “that render some leaders ready to make peace can drive their opponents to 
disrupt it.  In addition, … [internal elites’] relative power shapes their antagonism 
toward a peace process” (Pearlman 2008/09, 106). This internal balance of power 
struggle contributed to the MCA desire to work as peacemakers with the government 
and the external actor, while the MCP preferred to act as a spoiler.  Once the MCA 
and MCP tacked in these directions, the MCA and other business and nationalist 
Chinese elites became the unitary opposition actor.  The Chinese-manned units of the 
Home Guards that began to form in 1950 fall under the opposition in this model.  
Eventually, the MCA worked with the government, leaving the MCP as the sole 
irreconcilables, and decreasing the support structure of the opposition. 
Lastly, this section treats all foreign elites, composed mainly of members of 
the British colonial government and the European mine and plantation owners, as a 
unified external actor.  Even when High Commissioner Gurney and Director of 
Operations Briggs maintained separate chains of command, which Templer eventually 
unified, the actions of the military, civil administration, and police were closely 
coordinated to achieve Britain’s interests.  Again, within the rational-choice 
framework of this theory of self-enforcing stability, the rest of this section assumes 
that each of the elites within the government, opposition, and external actor coalitions 
support a dominant elite pact despite some differences, because they are each on 
average better off through cooperation.  
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4.4.2. Commitment Problems 
 After World War II, Malaya had to recover from the experience of the British 
defeat and the Japanese occupation.  The population now saw the weakness of what 
they previously thought was a benign colonial protector.  The Malayan population had 
to fend for themselves under the Japanese, with part of the population fighting the 
occupier and the other part collaborating.  These different actions by the population 
during the occupation created great resentment and further divided the ethnic groups 
that previously lived in relative harmony.  The resentment from the occupation 
combined with unequal representation in Malaya’s government, national security, and 
business sectors contributed to immense distrust between the government (the Malays) 
and the opposition (the Chinese).  Ultimately, it took the British (an external actor) to 
provide credible commitments to both sides that enabled an elite pact to form with the 
exclusion of the communists. 
The government could not provide credible commitments to the opposition 
because of the fresh memories of Japanese imperialism.  The animosity over Malay 
collaboration with the Japanese to suppress the Chinese was particularly strong.  The 
Malay members of the police under the Japanese treated the Chinese quite harshly, 
creating persistent fear amongst the Chinese of Malay intent to do further harm to the 
Chinese population.  Additionally, the Malays displayed to the Chinese the desire to 
keep the Chinese as second-class citizens when the Malays organized mass 
demonstrations and civil disobedience to protest the formation of the Malayan Union.  
The Malayan Union would have granted citizenship to the Chinese population, 
allowing the Chinese greater access to political power. 
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The opposition also could not credibly commit to not attempting to overthrow 
the government.  In the aftermath of World War II, the Chinese exacted revenge upon 
the Malays for their collaboration with the Japanese.  The MPAJA’s “people’s trials” 
contributed to cycles of violence between the Chinese and the Malays, as well as racial 
clashes between the MPAJA and the Malay police force.  Further, Chinese control of 
commercial interests as well as over the labor unions contributed to the sense of fear 
amongst the Malays that the Chinese desired to dominate the Malay population 
economically, which granted the Chinese population Malayan citizenship and 
participation in government would exacerbate.  Both groups’ concerns about the 
actions of the other and belief in each trying to dispossess the other of power 
contributed to the development of a rationality of fear between the government and the 
opposition.   
The MCA Chinese elites who took part in the initial opposition coalition had 
the incentive to work with the government to defeat the MCP, because the MCP 
threatened the MCA’s political and economic interests as much as they did the 
government’s interests.  The MCP wanted to dominate control of the Chinese 
population, not just the government, and redistribute the wealth of the Chinese who 
supported the MCA.  Amongst the Chinese community, this is a story of an internal 
power struggle.  The opposition’s MCA elites were essentially satisfied with the status 
quo pre-WWII, because of the rent-seeking opportunities and their maintenance of 
traditional power structures.  The MCA feared the younger Chinese more than the 
Malays since the MCP sought to tear down those traditional structures and establish 
modern political structures based on the Communist system (Wang 1992, 188-190).   
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Despite the incentives for some opposition elites to work with the government, 
the two actors could not credibly commit to one another without a credible external 
actor, in keeping with Fearon’s (1995) rationalist explanation of war described in 
Chapter 3.  Understanding that the government had an incentive to renege, as shown 
by their protests against the Malayan Union, the Chinese attacked preemptively 
through labor strikes and insurgent warfare.  Additionally, without a credible British 
presence, the opposition could not credibly commit to the government that the Chinese 
would share power economically or politically if the government helped the 
nationalists defeat the communists.  This led to the need for the British to establish 
their role as a credible guarantor of a pact between the government and the 
reconcilable part of the opposition.   
The British had initial difficulties in establishing their credibility.  The 
revisionist narrative’s definition of three main periods of the Malayan Emergency 
helps identify the shifts in British credibility, but this paper adds an additional period 
before those three phases.  During Phase Zero, 1945-1948, the British mishandled 
their return to Malaya following WWII.  The ineptitude of the British Military 
Administration (BMA) from 1945-1946 allowed the resentment, exacerbated by 
WWII, between the Malays and Chinese to fester.  British favoritism towards the 
Malays, through provision of government positions and arrests of key Chinese leaders 
despite Chinese support to the Allies, contributed to general distrust of the British.  
Then, the British decision to establish the Malayan Union without serious consultation 
with the different groups of the Malayan population created greater distrust of the 
British.  But, the British decision to abandon the Malayan Union and its promise of 
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Chinese citizenship in favor of the Federation of Malaya to meet Malay demands, and 
again without Chinese consultation, further undermined British credibility with the 
Chinese.  This contributed to the Chinese decision to seek “peaceful agitation” against 
the British and the Malayan government, whom the Chinese saw as one in the same at 
that time.   
In response to the labor strikes and the murder of three British planters, the 
British entered Phase One, 1948-1949, of the Emergency.  During this period, the 
British used indiscriminate counter-terror tactics and mass punishment sweeps against 
the entire Chinese population.  Neither the British nor the government differentiated 
the Chinese based on the nationalist and communist split.  This lack of differentiation 
further aggravated the lack of credibility of the external actor in the eyes of the 
opposition.  Yet, the British began to overcome that problem during Phase Two, 1950-
1952.   
Phase Two was the period of the Briggs Plan, which shifted strategy to the use 
of population control to clear and hold areas, improving security and appealing to the 
self-interest of the elites to have confidence in the government.  Gurney and Briggs 
recognized the split in the Chinese community and worked to adjust the incentives for 
the Chinese elites and population.  The British simultaneously reached out to the 
MCA, while they implemented coercive strategies in the form of resettlement areas, or 
“New Villages”, to separate the Chinese community from the communists.  The MCA 
appreciated these moves, and also recalled the British history of letting Chinese 
business interests prosper prior to WWII, improving the ability of the British to serve 
as a credible guarantor of a pact between the government and the opposition.   
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The external actor solidified its ability to make credible commitments during 
Phase Three, mid-1952-1960, which began with the arrival of Templer.  Templer 
optimized the Briggs Plan and the government’s efficiency in implementing the Plan.  
Additionally, Templer made clear to the opposition that they could have a stake in the 
future of an independent Malaya.  He held out the carrot of citizenship and 
participation in government for Chinese cooperation.  Those promises along with the 
decentralization of violent means—through the rapid expansion of the Home 
Guards—and rent-seeking opportunities, by protecting Chinese business interests, 
ultimately allowed the external actor to serve as the credible guarantor of an elite pact 
between the government and the reconcilable part of the opposition.  Further, Britain’s 
public commitment to self-rule solidified the external actor’s credibility with the 
government. 
 
4.4.3. Mechanisms Moving Malaya Towards Self-Enforcing Stability  
 With the external actor now able to give credible commitments to the 
government and reconcilable opposition, Malaya could follow the post-(neo)colonial 
transitional model in Figure 3.3 to move towards self-enforcing stability.  The external 
actor used a variety of credibility mechanisms to help the internal actors get on a path 
towards self-enforcing stability by guaranteeing the pact between the dominant 
coalition of Malay and Chinese elites.  The mechanisms at British disposal were 
personnel, money, equipment, time, public statements of intent, elections, and 
institutional development.  In terms of personnel, the British had ten Commonwealth 
battalions on the ground in 1948 for military operations and 9,000 Malayan police at 
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its disposal.  By 1951, the British doubled the number of battalions to 20 and 
increased the police, largely composed of Malays, to nearly 50,000 (Clutterbuck 1966, 
42-44).  Additionally, the British reorganized the functions of the personnel to make 
them more effective, as described in the organizational learning narrative earlier in this 
chapter.   
While the British government had limited money to provide directly, due to the 
costs from World War II, the Korean War boom in tin and rubber revenues allowed 
for locally generated revenue streams.  The money from the largely European-owned 
mines and estates paid for most of the external actor and government’s population 
control measure of resettlement.  The Korean War boom also helped pay for the 
provision of goods and services at the local level that helped gain local elite support.  
The British also used these revenues to acquire equipment for the Malayan security 
forces, as well as the local security forces—the Home Guards.   
The British used the time mechanism ambiguously.  They said early on that 
they planned to transition Malaya to self-rule, but the British did not provide a date for 
independence till much later.  Yet, time tied in with the credible commitment 
mechanism of public statements of intent.  Despite lacking a specific date for 
transferring sovereignty, the British took public actions of intent starting with the 
Malayan Union declaration in 1946.  While the Malayan Union would have a British 
governor, the intent was to grant equal treatment to all races, and develop leaders 
through appointments to legislative and executive councils.  Despite the political 
ineptness of the British in creating the Malayan Union and transitioning to the 
Federation of Malaya in 1948, the goal of the Union and the Agreement was to set the 
 147 
conditions for an independent Malaya with leaders who could take over governance 
upon independence (Sarkesian 1993, 56-59).   
The ambiguous timeline worked to get the Malays and MCA to work together 
and solidify an elite pact, culminating in the creation of the Alliance Party, merging 
the UMNO and MCA, in 1952.  The Malayan Indian Congress party joined in 1954.  
They formed an alliance in order to contest elections, another external actor credibility 
mechanism, that the British established first at the local level.  The joint party gave the 
MCA a pathway to express its political views, as well as positions of power in 
government as the junior partner with the UMNO.  Following victories in local and 
state elections, the Alliance Party dominated the 1955 national elections.  The Alliance 
Party victory provided the framework for establishing an independent stable state, in 
the form of a limited access order.  Setting up the Alliance Party to take over an 
independent Malaya helped assuage British concerns about their economic and 
national security interests, which enabled the British exit strategy of an independent 
Malaya with the creation of the Merdeka Constitution in 1957 (Short 1975, 345; 
Sarkesian 1993, 59). 
Besides elections serving as a mechanism for the external actor to prove its 
credible commitment to the government and opposition, elections can also help 
diversify power.  The series of elections started by Templer in 1952 helped solidify the 
elite pact between the Malays and the nationalist Chinese by balancing political power 
between the two sides.  Templer’s Citizenship Bill in May 1952 allowed the Chinese 
to become citizens and take part in these elections (Smith 2001, 66). Decentralization 
of power helps the internal actors overcome their own credible commitment problems 
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by creating a balance that prevents one side from cheating on the pact and taking 
advantage of the other side.  
In addition to the decentralization of political power, the British enabled the 
decentralization of economic and military power.   The government and external actor 
established agreements with the MCA that allowed the Chinese to maintain their 
business interests, while sharing some economic power with the Malay elites, to 
spread the benefits of rent-seeking.  The MCA supported the tight control of the 
unions, which helped the members of the elite pact, while excluding those outside the 
pact, particularly the MCP.  The MCA saw the MCP as a bigger threat to the MCA’s 
rent-seeking opportunities than the British or the Malays, because the UMNO had 
aligned interests, where the MCP wanted to destroy the current system.   
The British helped establish a security balance of power and overcome each 
side’s rational fear of and incentives to renege by decentralizing violent means.  The 
British did this in part by recruiting Chinese into the Malayan police, but were more 
effective in decentralizing violent means by creating the Home Guards—village 
militias responsible for self-security (Smith 2001, 67-68).  By 1953, there were over 
350,000 Home Guards compared to 40,000 British, Commonwealth, and Malayan 
military forces and 45,000 regular and special police forces (Tilman 1966, 417).  The 
Home Guards protected their own villages and policed transgressors of the pact (i.e., 
the Chinese Home Guards fought against the MCP).  Surprisingly, the armed Chinese 
rarely lost their weapons to the communists or turned their weapons against the 
Malayan or British forces—only three cases of treachery were reported in 1954, the 
peak year of transitioning security responsibility to the Home Guards (Coates 1992, 
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121).  As the Home Guards stood up and took over greater responsibility between 
1952 and 1954, the level of insurgent incidents and government and external actor 
deaths declined (Coates 1992, Appendix A). 
While decentralizing power between the government and opposition, the 
external actor helped the elites punish and police their own transgressors of the pact so 
the pact would become self-enforcing without the British.  The Chinese nationalists 
helped to keep their communist ethnic kin in check.  By keeping the self-rule date 
undefined, retaining ultimate decision-making in government despite the elections, 
and maintaining superior forces to the local and Malayan security forces, the British 
could use sticks in different ways against transgressors.  But, the decentralization of 
economic, political, and security power helped strengthen the position of the elite 
members of the pact.   
Despite the use of the term “hearts and minds,” with its population-centric 
connotation, in Malay and its association with Templer, the real focus of Briggs’s and 
Templer’s efforts was on the elites.  While winning the support of the population was 
important, the British had to win the support of the elites first.  The British recognized 
the importance of the split amongst the Chinese, and that the MCA elites were the part 
of the opposition that could work with the UMNO and government elites.  The British 
concern was that a communist Malaya would work against British interests, so giving 
special privilege to the MCA, uniting the MCA and UMNO, and providing a path to 
independence took away the MCP’s argument for establishing an independent 
government with Chinese participation.  The Chinese community was vulnerable to 
communism not because of ideology per se, but due to Chinese immigration patterns.   
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The Chinese arrived as members of groups, or with close personal connections, 
rather than as individuals.  Most Chinese belonged to secret societies, clans, guilds, or 
other associations, which provided protection and helped new arrivals assimilate.  So, 
the Chinese found security from highly personal relationship, relying on individual 
leaders.  They brought this reliance on leaders and a distrust of government with them 
from China, recreating that pattern in Malaya.  The local Chinese elites had great 
control over the Chinese population.  During the Great Depression and the Japanese 
occupation, the MCP promised material support and security that the business elites 
could no longer provide (Pye 1956, 52-56).   
After World War II, the MCA and MCP competed for control over the 
population.  Fotini Christia (2008) has shown that intra-group violence depends 
largely on local elites and micro-level economic incentives.  She shows that when 
economic incentives are high, local elites who can guarantee survival while 
distributing access to these rents will gain the support of the population. Through its 
elite pact with the government, guaranteed by the British, the MCA proved to the 
Chinese population that the UMNO-MCA alliance would deliver material benefits, 
while securing the population.  The ability of the MCA to deliver this undermined 
Chinese support for the MCP.    
The MCA appealed to the rational self-interest of the Chinese population by 
improving security and material benefits.  The harsh population control measures 
implemented by the British under the Briggs Plan set the conditions for this to happen.  
By the British creating resettlement areas, the MCA elites assumed the leadership 
positions in the New Villages, and the MCP had to survive in isolation.  Chin Peng, 
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the leader of the MCP, has stated that the resettlement areas greatly constrained the 
MCP’s activity and access to the population (Chin and Hack 2004, 150-160).  MCA 
leader Tan Cheng Lock confirmed that Gurney provide strong support for the MCA 
(Hack 2009, 393), which Templer continued.  Templer’s granting of citizenship and 
holding elections at the local level, allowed the MCA to take control of the village 
councils inside the Chinese New Villages.  Through the village councils, the MCA 
elites delivered goods and services provided by the British and the government to the 
population.  Additionally, the establishment of the Home Guards gave the MCA local 
leaders the tool to provide security for their population.  Once the MCA provided 
security and delivered material benefits to the New Villages, they won over the 
population—or at least, their rational self-interest.  
While the nationalist Chinese elites initially brought along the population, the 
elites and population developed a mutually supporting relationship based on rational 
self-interest.  The opposition elites and population gained greater security and material 
benefit through adherence to the pact with the government elites.  Support of the 
Chinese population increased the power of the MCA elites in the pact till it reached a 
balance with the Malays.  The Malay elites also saw the rational self-interest in 
strengthening the pact because they wanted to maintain their advantaged position at 
independence.  The Malay population had supported the Malay elites before the 
Emergency based on their ethnic and religious traditions of supporting traditional 
leaders.  Although the initial operational tactics during the Emergency were directed at 
the Chinese population, Chinese elites, particularly the MCA, were the strategic focus 
of those tactics.  Winning over the elites and giving them power over the population, 
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gave the opposition elites the incentive to join and maintain an elite pact with the 
Malay elites in government.  This led to the establishment of a limited access order 
(LAO).  As the LAO matured, winning over the population contributed to the 
maintenance of a self-enforcing equilibrium.   
 The sharing of power between the government and opposition through the 
UMNO-MCA alliance solidified the limited access order’s elite pact in Malaya as 
exemplified by the Alliance Party’s domination of local through national elections.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the general theory of this dissertation explains that external 
actors help stabilize conflict-torn societies by focusing on developing limited access 
orders rather than liberal democracies, or open access orders.  Limiting access 
guarantees that elites maintain power and wealth, as well as protection from possibly 
losing that privilege, by working collectively to increase elite pact members’ wealth 
and power by suppressing violence.   
In Malaya, the British worked to bring together the UMNO and MCA to form 
the Alliance Party.  The British used the mechanisms described above to achieve 
credible commitments and diversify power in order to set the conditions for the 
transition to self-rule.  The Malayan elections, local through national, were not about 
democracy per se.  They were a signaling mechanism of British credibility to depart 
Malaya, and to solidify the pact between the government and opposition elites—the 
Alliance Party won 51 of 52 elected seats (Clutterbuck 1973, 101-102).  These elites 
used the Alliance Party as a mechanism to divide representation in the government 
based on the alliance and number of seats won in the election.  To ensure the outcome 
of the balance of power and to protect access to government, the British established 52 
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elected and 46 nominative seats in the parliament (Mills 1958, 84-87).  The same logic 
underlay the local and state elections that preceded the national elections.   
Similarly, the purpose of establishing village and district councils before and 
after the elections was to prepare and teach members of the elite pact to govern upon 
independence.  So, democratic mechanisms were used in Malaya for the purpose of 
establishing an LAO rather than a democratic regime and solidifying the elite pact.  
Britain’s continual moves towards independence, through citizenship, elections, and 
institution building, served as credible commitments that the Chinese would not be 
dispossessed and provided the opportunity for the UMNO and MCA to establish a 
limited access elite pact that would lead to self-enforcing stability upon independence. 
This narrative affirms the logic of the “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model” of self-
enforcing stability described in Chapter 3.  Based on the model in Figure 3.3, one 
expects that the government will attempt to include the opposition after the external 
actor decides to decolonize.  Given the overtures for cooperation by the government 
and credible commitment by the external actor the opposition will join an elite pact 
that maintains their security and rent-seeking opportunities.  The government will 
abide by the pact knowing that the external actor has credibly committed to protecting 
the pact and punishing any transgressor of the pact.  This establishes a self-enforcing 
limited access order amongst the elite coalition members.   
 The self-enforcing narrative of the Malayan Emergency follows these expected 
outcomes from the model.  Once the British made overtures the decision to eventually 
grant self-rule to Malaya with the announcements of the Malayan Union and the 
Federation of Malaya, the Malays eventually agreed to cooperate and try to bring the 
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Chinese opposition into a ruling elite pact.  The British proved their credibility to the 
Chinese by pushing forward the extension of Malayan citizenship to the Chinese, and 
including them in the civil service.  The British made a credible commitment to the 
Malays by beginning the process of elections to transition to self-rule and keeping the 
Malays in privileged governance positions.  The nationalist Chinese elites agreed to 
join the pact once the Chinese were granted Malayan citizenship and allowed in the 
civil service.  The MCA also maintained their privileged position in the business 
community as part of the pact, which allowed the MCA to regain their rent-seeking 
opportunities that had diminished while the Chinese supported the insurgency against 
the British and the Malays.   
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Figure 3.3: Transitional State-building: Towards Self-Rule (“Post-(Neo)Colonial 
Model”) 
 
To further strengthen the pact, the British armed the nationalist Chinese, as 
members of the Home Guards, to allow the nationalists to protect themselves from the 
Malays.  The establishment of the Home Guards also allowed the Chinese to police 
their own transgressors to the pact, the communists.  While the nationalist Chinese 
participated in the government with the Malays, in terms of the elite pact that formed 
an LAO in Malaya, the Chinese were still collectively the opposition.  The nationalists 
had to help marginalize the irreconcilable part of the Chinese community, the MCP.  
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In marginalizing the MCP, the MCA had to fight the communists, but also act as a 
peaceful opposition.  Acting as a peaceful opposition within the rules of the elite pact, 
allowed the MCA elites to take influence over the Chinese population away from the 
MCP elites.  The MCA did this by taking on local leadership roles in the Chinese 
villages and using those positions to provide security for the population and 
distributing rents to the people.  Once the Chinese people began to follow the MCA 
elites, the MCP were marginalized, which led many MCP leaders to defect and seek to 
join the rent-seeking opportunities enjoyed by the MCA elites. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This reinterpretation of the Malayan Emergency narrative shows how an elite-
centric, rather than population-centric strategy primarily enabled the British to help 
defeat the communist insurgency and establish a stable independent state.  The British 
aligned incentives by appealing to elite rational self-interest, rather than by winning 
the population’s “hearts and minds” or merely coercing behavior through population 
control and material deprivation.  This case analysis of Malaya supports the main 
arguments of the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation.  In 
Malaya, the government and opposition required credible commitments from an 
external actor before they could see the long-term benefits of cooperation.  The British 
provided these commitments through the mechanisms of personnel, money, 
equipment, time, elections, institutional development, and public statements of intent.  
Additionally, the British facilitated the decentralization of violent means and rent-
seeking opportunities in order to establish a balance of power between the Malays and 
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the Chinese.  Over time, as the ruling elite pact solidified and the government and 
opposition could make credible commitments to one another without the external 
actor, the Malayan government recentralized violent means.   
In order to provide these credible commitments and the diversification of 
power, the British adopted an elite-centric approach.  While the British adopted tactics 
that improved the security and well-being of the population, the strategy focused on 
strengthening the Malay and nationalist Chinese elites.  By empowering the elites, the 
government and opposition developed a collective pact that appealed to the elites’ 
long-term rational self-interest over their short-term gains from non-cooperation.  Both 
the Malay and Chinese populations in Malaya deferred to their leaders due to 
structures, customs, and traditions within each society.  Increasing elite power by 
allowing the leaders to provide their own security and distribute rents strengthened the 
elite pact between the government and opposition.  The British focus on establishing 
stability through the pact rather than trying to build a liberal democracy led to the 
formation of a self-enforcing limited access order in Malaya.    
Malaya shows how decentralizing violent means by employing significant 
manpower from indigenous groups with the limited purpose of self-protection can 
have a major impact on defeating an insurgency.  The police reached a peak total of 
45,000 personnel, while the Home Guards numbered over 350,000.  The Home 
Guards accepted responsibility for ensuring the security of the Chinese population in 
the New Villages and protecting the village populace from the MCP.  While the 
trained police did help gather intelligence against the MCP, the Malayan Police had 
difficulties recruiting Chinese members, which is why Templer pushed for the 
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expansion of the Home Guards (Smith 2001, 67-68).  So, a more nuanced balance 
between manpower and trained forces appears necessary to defeat an insurgency.   
Following the decentralization of violent means, Malaysia ultimately 
recentralized force as the elite pact solidified and became self-enforcing.  This was 
possible as Malaya transitioned from a basic to mature LAO.  The Alliance Party 
helped solidify an enduring elite pact as Malay elites shared power with Chinese 
elites.  With greater voice and shared political and economic benefits, it was possible 
for the Malays and Chinese to overcome the rationality of fear, since the elites saw the 
short- and long-term benefits of cooperation.  Once the rationality of fear dissipated, 
the Home Guards went through what today would be called Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) as they were incorporated into the police, 
military, or society, and the state gained greater civilian control over all security forces 
around the country.  
While this chapter analyzed the role of an external actor in helping establish 
self-enforcing stability following conflict in a nation where the external actor was a 
colonizer, the next chapter looks at the role of an outside external actor.  Chapter 5 
analyzes the role of the United States and Coalition Forces had in helping establish the 
elite pact between the Iraqi government and the Sunni opposition during the 
“Awakening Movement” in Iraq between 2006-2008.  The chapter will explain and 
test both the conventional narrative and an alternative narrative against their respective 
theoretical models.  
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Chapter 4, Appendix A:  A Brief History of Malaya and its Key Actors 
 
4.A.1.  Pre-World War II 
Malaya is a peninsula of just over 50,000 square miles, sharing a single land 
border (Nagl 2005 [2002], 60).  Thailand and Malaya share approximately 300-miles 
of contiguous land along Malaya’s northern boundary.  Two main mountain ranges 
divide Malaya, with the majority of the land to the east, but the majority of the 
population along the western coast (Sarkesian 1993, 63-5; Tilman 1966, 413).  
Mountain ranges and jungles cover 80% of Malaya, while the remaining 20% consists 
of rubber plantations, tin mines, towns or urban centers, and native villages 
(kampongs) (Pye 1956, 12).  Anybody who lives in Malaya is termed Malayan, while 
Malays, Chinese, and Indians make up the three primary races of Malaya.  The Malay 
population, considered the native inhabitants, besides the small aborigine population, 
largely immigrated to the coastal plains from Melanesia (Clutterbuck 1973, 32-33).  
The Malays follow traditional customs and largely practice Islam.  The Chinese and 
Indian immigrants mostly came to Malaya seeking economic opportunity.   
The British interest in Malaya arose from trade, with Malaya occupying a 
strategically important position between several trade routes.  The British leased the 
island of Penang in 1786, and Sir Stamford Raffles purchased Singapore in 1819 from 
Sultan Hussein Shah (Mills 1958, 3).  During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain occupied 
the Dutch parts of Malaya to prevent France from claiming rights to the Dutch 
colonies.  After the war, the British and Dutch signed the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, 
which divided the territories into British-controlled Malaya and Dutch-controlled 
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Indonesia (Webster 1998, 83-105).  Under the Treaty, Britain obtained the decayed 
seaport of Malacca (Mills 1958, 3).  Additionally, the Treaty established most-favored 
nation trade status between these territories, as well as Raj India and Ceylon (Webster 
1998, 102-105).   
The British established their colony through a patchwork of authorities to 
maintain governance and political rule over Malaya.  They created a disparate 
grouping of states based on three different agreements.  The Straits Settlements, 
consisting of Singapore, Malacca, and Penang, maintained crown colony status with 
rule coming from Singapore based on the acquisitions described above.  The Federated 
Malay States, made up of Selangor, Perak, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan, each had 
their own legal sovereign sultans as de-jure rulers, but de-facto rule remained in the 
hands of British administrators based in Kuala Lumpur.  The remaining five states—
Johore, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu—formed the Unfederated Malay 
States.  While these states had British administrators embedded in each of their 
governments, they were under much less overt British control than the Straits 
Settlements and the Federated Malay States (Stubbs 1989, 22). 
By the 1900s, Malaya had an essential part in 20th century globalization as the 
country moved beyond its position as a trade transit point to an essential global tin and 
rubber producer.  During this time, the Malays maintained their traditional roles as rice 
farmers and fisherman, while Chinese and Indian immigrants flooded the country to 
work on plantations, in mines, and as urban laborers.  The Malays chose to continue 
rice farming in part due to their adherence to traditions, as well as because Malays 
wanted to control their own lives rather than work as wage labor for others.  The 
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Chinese and Indians filled this labor vacuum. The Indian population primarily came to 
work the rubber plantations and consisted mainly of Tamils from Madras.  Initially, 
the Chinese primarily worked the tin mines and as urban laborers, but then moved into 
the rubber plantations as well (Mills 1958, 4-6, 10-12; Pye 1956, 12). 
 
Figure 4.A.1.  Map of Malaya ("Malayan Emergency Map"  2000) 
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Much of Chinese immigration was from southern China to western Malaya—
the location of the bulk of tin mines and rubber plantations.  Chinese laborers 
established separate communities in these areas and maintained their traditional way 
of life.  The Chinese population increased from over forty thousand during the 1800s 
to over two and a half million by 1947.  The British encouraged this immigration since 
the Malays would not work in the mines or on the plantations.  The Chinese became 
very successful in Malaya.  They obtained control of almost one-third of the tin mines, 
with Europeans controlling the rest, as well as providing substantial investments in 
plantations, shipping, banks, and import and export companies.  The Chinese came to 
dominate retail trade, produce buying, and money lending in Malaya.  The prosperity 
of the Chinese, large-scale immigration, and indebtedness of the Malays to the 
Chinese became a major source of resentment amongst the Malay population.  To 
tame that resentment, the British gave the Malays privileged positions in the Malayan 
government, which they excluded the Chinese from, and further, the British refused to 
grant citizenship to most of the Chinese population. (Mills 1958, 4-6, 12-20; Sarkesian 
1993, 59) 
 Tin dominated Malaya’s export trade till the interwar period.  At that time, 
rubber supplanted tin as Malaya’s primary export, but tin still remained important to 
the Malayan economy.  Both were volatile exports, but became more so as world 
prices plummeted before fluctuating greatly during this period.  The Great Depression 
caused the rubber industry to learn to operate more efficiently, reducing labor demand 
and the number of plantation owners as estates consolidated.  Despite the changes in 
the global market, Malaya remained dependent on rubber and tin trade till the outbreak 
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of World War II (Mills 1958, 20-28).  Rubber and tin played a vital role later during 
the Emergency period; the outbreak of the Korean War created a demand for these 
commodities that funded the Malayan government’s efforts to fight the communist 
insurgency (Komer 1972, 14; White 1998, 165, 174-175; Stubbs 1989, 108-114; Mills 
1958, 155-158).   
The communist insurgency did not overtly begin till 1948, but the communist 
movement in Malaya began in the early 20th century.  Communism in Malaya was 
mostly a Chinese phenomenon.  Mirroring the split in the Chinese nationalist 
movement on Mainland China, the Kuomintang in Malaya expelled the communists in 
1927.  Shortly after, the Comintern helped establish a group in Malaya that would 
eventually become the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930.  The MCP 
struggled, going through several reorganizations throughout the thirties, but they did 
have a major achievement that would become important after the war: the 
establishment of ties with labor unions.  In the late thirties, the MCP gained 
momentum from Chinese nationalism arising in 1937 because of the war between 
Japan and China, as well as from labor frustration with the British.  Despite the 
increased MCP activity, the MCP did not seem at the time more than a nuisance to the 
British.  This changed when the Japanese invaded on 8 December 1941.  The British 
then saw the MCP as an important ally to serve as “stay behind” forces to conduct 
guerilla operations against the Japanese.  The British even helped train the Chinese 
guerillas (Stubbs 1989, 42-43; Pye 1956, 51-62; Short 1975, 19-21). 
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4.A.2.  Post-World War II 
 After the outbreak of World War II and Britain’s ignominious departure in 
1942 that allowed the Japanese to occupy Malaya, the status of the British changed in 
the eyes of the Malayan people.  Malays termed the period between 1942 and 1945, 
when the British returned, as “the time the white men ran” (Allen 1983, 254 in Stubbs, 
10).  The Malayans initially had high expectations that the British would rapidly 
restore order and prosperity to pre-war, colonial rule levels, but the British quickly 
dashed those hopes.  It took the British four weeks after the Japanese surrender to 
reach Kuala Lumpur and over six weeks to reach the East Coast despite not having to 
retake Malaya in battle (Stubbs 1989, 10).  These factors further deteriorated Britain’s 
credibility, already hurt amongst the various Malayan populations by the British defeat 
at the hands of the Japanese in 1942. 
 Besides the problems the British faced directed at them, the British returned to 
increased antipathy and dissension between the different ethnic groups in Malaya.  
The Japanese occupiers sowed animosity between the groups through divide and 
conquer policies that privileged some at the expense of others.  During the occupation, 
the Japanese co-opted the Malay population while targeting the non-Malay minorities, 
particularly the Chinese, with the support of the Malays.  Demographically, the 
population did not change much during the war.  Out of a population of around five 
million people, the Malays, including aborigines, accounted for 49% of the population, 
while the Chinese and Indians made up 39% and 11%, respectively, with the 
remaining  “others” including Europeans (Federation of Malaya 1952, in Hack and 
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Chin, 380).  Additionally, few of the non-Malay minorities enjoyed Malayan 
citizenship, including many born in Malaya.   
 During the occupation, the Japanese incorporated the Malays into the Japanese 
administration of Malaya, and the Malays took part in the harsh treatment of the 
Chinese.  Malays served on the police force that the Japanese used to harass the 
Chinese (Stubbs 1989, 35).  The Chinese came to view the Malays as corrupt 
collaborators whom they distrusted and sought justice from.  The Chinese, on the other 
hand, worked with the Allies during the war to fight the Japanese, seeing themselves 
as the defenders of Malaya and victors of the war.  At the time, the Chinese were 
divided between communists and nationalists, but the MCP and the Kuomintang in 
Malaya put aside differences to fight the Japanese.  The MCP established the Malayan 
People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), who the British trained in guerilla warfare, to 
fight the occupation (Stubbs 1989, 42-43).     
 While the MPAJA was open to all races of the Malayan population, 90 percent 
of the fighters were Chinese.  Additionally, the MCP established a parallel political 
organization, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU) to provide support 
for the MPAJA from local communities (Stubbs 1989, 44).  The MPAJA served as the 
pre-cursor to the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA), which ultimately 
became the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA)—also known to some as the 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA)—that became the insurgent wing of the 
MCP fighting the Malayan Government during the Emergency.  Furthermore, the 
MPAJU evolved into the Min Yuen, the population supporters of the MNLA.  The 
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number of MPAJA totaled between 7,000-8,000 by 1945 with thousands of more 
supporters in the MPAJU (Purcell 1965, in Stubbs, 45). 
 After the fall of the Japanese, the MPAJA, with popular support from the non-
Malay population, sought retribution against those they saw as traitors and 
collaborators during the occupation.  Racial clashes broke out between the MPAJA 
and the Malay police force that suppressed the Chinese for the Japanese occupiers.  
The MPAJA conducted “people’s trials” to exact retribution, creating cycles of 
violence between the Chinese and Malays (Cheah 1983, in Stubbs, 45).  These clashes 
further cemented the antipathy between the races in Malaya, broadening the lack of 
trust and credibility between the parties. 
 Once the British reentered Malaya, seeing themselves as victors returning to 
take back their position as colonial rulers, they further exacerbated the tensions 
between the different Malayan population groups.  From the British return in 
September 1945 till April 1946, they ruled through the British Military Administration 
(BMA).  The BMA was a military organization with civilian advisors, but the majority 
lacked government administration or Malayan experience.  The BMA operated in a 
manner that quickly soured the population on the British return.  First, the Army 
received many complaints that they acted as victors who took the spoils of war and 
went unpunished for misconduct.  Second, the BMA demonetized the Japanese 
currency, wiping out the value of money kept by the general population, forcing 
people to give away and barter goods.  Third, the BMA did little to dismantle the 
corruption that grew rampant under the Japanese occupation.  Fourth, British 
authorities circumvented its own rationing policies forced upon the population to favor 
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European estate and mine owners at the expense of local entrepreneurs, mainly 
Malayan Chinese.  Fifth, the BMA ignored calls to mediate justice for the behavior of 
different groups of the population during the occupation.  Many Malays who worked 
for the Japanese were allowed to stay in their positions or given other favorable 
treatment, as they were seen by the BMA as indispensible to governing.  Yet, at the 
same time, those who fought for the Allies were mostly excluded, feeding resentment 
amongst the Chinese.   Sixth, the BMA tried to limit MCP activity by closing 
newspapers and arresting key officials, further arousing Chinese antipathy and the 
feeling of betrayal after supporting the Allies.  These factors contributed to general 
distrust of the British return to colonial rule when the BMA turned over power to 
civilian government in April 1946 (Stubbs 1989, 11-16).   
The formation of the Malayan Union without consultation of the Malayan 
population under the rule of Sir Edward Gent generated even further distrust.  Before 
the BMA’s transition to civilian government, the British established the Malayan 
Planning Unit in London to develop a unitary, modern secular state in Malaya to 
replace the pre-war disparate groupings of the Settlement Straits colony minus 
Singapore, the Federated Malay States, and the Unfederated Malay States.  In January 
1946, the British Government published its first public White Paper on the Malayan 
Union (Stubbs 1989, 22-26).  The Malayan Union plan called for the sultans, ethnic 
Malays, to surrender their sovereignty to a new central government and to confer 
citizenship and equal political rights upon all Malays and non-Malays in Malaya.   
The proposal quickly received sharp criticisms from the Malays and former 
British members of the Malayan civil service.  The Malays had three primary 
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concerns.  First, removing sovereignty from the sultans threatened the social, political, 
and religious authorities of Malay traditions and the Malay way of life.  Related, 
centralization would undermine the power of local and state elites.  Second, granting 
citizenship to non-Malays would undermine the pre-eminence of Malays in Malaya 
and undermine their special position and privileges in society.  The Malays did not 
want the others to enter the civil service or government, because the Malays controlled 
that source of power.  Malays already resented the prominent role of the Chinese in 
Malayan business and feared a redistribution of political power.  Third, the Malays felt 
the British bullied the sultans into agreeing to the creation of the Malayan Union, 
undermining previous arrangements between the Malays and British to maintain the 
Malay’s privileged status (Stubbs 1989, 22-26).   
The primary group to organize against the Malayan Union was the Pan-
Malayan Malay Congress, which was replaced by the United Malays National 
Organization (UNMO) in May 1946.  UNMO organized mass demonstrations against 
the Malayan Union across the country.  In wake of the unexpected, well-organized 
Malay civil disobedience, the Colonial Office established the Constitutional Working 
Committee, consisting of representatives of the Malayan government, the sultans, and 
UNMO, to draft a successor to the Malayan Union.  Non-Malays were excluded from 
this committee, and were disappointed with the new constitutional proposals made in 
December 1946.  The draft combined the British desire for greater centralization with 
the Malay demands to impose strict limitations on citizenship for non-Malays and 
returning sovereignty to the sultans.  To overcome non-Malay objections, the British 
formed a Consultative Committee to solicit non-Malay views, but ultimately, they 
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ignored all of those recommendations and signed the Federation Agreement, creating 
the Federation of Malaya on 1 February 1948 (Stubbs 1989, 26-27). 
The British vacillation between the Malayan Union and the Federation of 
Malaya created distrust between the Malays and the British.  Simultaneously, the 
British lost any remaining credibility they had with the Chinese.  The Chinese 
accepted the Malayan Union plan, but were completely angered by the Federation 
Agreement.  The British already betrayed the allegiance the Chinese had shown 
fighting for the Allies against the Japanese during BMA rule after the war, but 
undoing the Malayan Union signaled to the Chinese they would remain politically 
powerless.   
While the Malays distrusted the British because of the initial push for the 
Malayan Union, they were satisfied with the outcome of the Federation Agreement.  
The Malays knew they had more to gain in the long-run by supporting the British than 
possible short-term gains from opposing the British.  The British rewarded Malay 
patience and strengthened British credibility in the eyes of the Malays when the 
British made clear their intention to grant independence to Malaya and end colonial 
rule.  The Colonial Secretary made a statement in late 1954 to the House of Commons 
promising Malayan independence at the conclusion of the Emergency.  The first 
national elections to the Federal Legislative Council followed in 1955, strengthening 
British credibility amongst the Malays (Short 1975, 13-14; Pye 1956, 13).  Eventually, 
with the promise of self-rule and elections that included Chinese participation, the 
British strengthened their credibility amongst large portions of the Chinese population; 
particularly those associated with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). 
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 The MCP saw the opportunity to challenge the British through “peaceful 
agitation” by organizing labor through unions.  As described in Section 2.A.1, the 
Chinese comprised a large portion of the labor force in Malaya’s important economic 
sectors (rubber plantation workers, tin miners, and service sector employees), 
providing a strong base for the MCP to influence.  After the war, unemployment was 
high and labor disorganized due to the effects of the Japanese occupation.  The MCP 
re-established the General Labor Union (GLU), which provided a source of revenue 
for the MCP through dues of its members.  The GLU could also influence members to 
find employment only at unionized workplaces.  With the establishment of the 
Malayan Union and the separation of Singapore, the GLU split into two different 
groups and registered each with the respective governments to maintain legal status: 
the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) and the Singapore Federation 
of Trade Unions (SFTU) (Pye 1956, 75-82; Clutterbuck 1973, 51-57).   
Upon consolidating control, to demonstrate the PMFTU’s power, the unions 
turned 1947 into ‘The Year of Strikes.’  Of the 289 registered unions in Malaya, 203 
were under the direct control or influence of the PMFTU (Gamba 1962, 155; 
Federation of Malaya 1949, 2 in Clutterbuck, 54).  There were over 300 major strikes, 
resulting in 696,036 lost work-days in 1947 (Miller 1954, 74 in Clutterbuck, 54).  By 
1948, these strikes had turned violent.  As a result of the increasing power and 
associated violence with the unions, the Malayan Government in June 1948 passed 
very restrictive legislation to curb the MCP control of the unions.  The three main 
elements of the law were: 1) union office holders had to have at least three years of the 
specific industry or trade experience; 2) convicts of extortion, intimidation, or similar 
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crimes could not hold office; and 3) only industry- or occupation-based unions could 
exist, meaning federations of unions could not (Clutterbuck 1973, 56-57; Sarkesian 
1993, 67).  These restrictions threatened a large portion of the MCP’s political and 
economic power bases, and forced union leaders into covert MCP roles.  
 Shortly after the passage of the laws, the murder of three British rubber 
planters in Perak sparked the beginning of the Malayan Emergency.  On June 16, 
1948, High Commissioner Sir Edward Gent declared a state of emergency for the 
states of Perak and Jahore, and extended the order to the rest of the Federation on June 
18 (Sarkesian 1993, 67).  The declaration of the Emergency and the banning of the 
Malayan Communist Party signified the start of the communist insurgency against the 
British and Malayan Federation.  The Malayan Emergency has become the 
quintessential example used by counterinsurgency theorists in explaining how external 
actors can help nations succeed in defeating insurgents, ending civil conflict, and 
establishing stable states and governments. 
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Chapter 5: Reexamining the Lessons of Stabilization in Iraq, 2006-2008 
“[Operation Iraqi Freedom] is a war that’s going to be won by not just combat 
effectiveness, but by winning hearts and minds and getting people to cooperate with 




The lessons drawn from the conventional “hearts and minds” narrative of the 
Malayan Emergency described in Chapter 4 have had a major impact on the thinking 
of how to end the current civil conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  By mid-2006, the 
media, punditry, and think-tank analysts reached a near-consensus that Iraq was in the 
midst of a sectarian civil war between the Shi’a and Sunni communities.  The public 
debate at the time revolved around the options of withdrawing American troops and 
letting the Iraqis fight it out or increasing American involvement to stabilize the 
country.  On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced that the United States 
would increase its troop strength in Iraq by over 21,000 soldiers—known as the 
“Surge”—and essentially adopt a classic population-centric counterinsurgency 
strategy (i.e., a “hearts and minds” approach).   
This chapter argues that the conventional wisdom about how Iraq achieved 
stabilization between 2006 and 2008 does not capture the underlying dynamics in Iraq 
that led to the major reduction in sectarian violence and diminishment of the 
insurgency.  The conventional narrative argues the “hearts and minds” approach 
adopted with the “Surge” increased the legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the eyes 
of the Iraqi people.  Like the Malaya case, this narrative focuses on how 
improvements in development and institutional capacity won over the “hearts and 
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minds” of the population.  This conventional narrative fails to capture how the 
external actor influenced competing elites to stabilize the conflict.  This chapter shows 
how the United States helped adjust the incentives of the government and opposition 
elites in Iraq to bring about stability. 
This chapter uses the formalization of population-centric theory (Chapter 2) 
and the elite-centric theory of self-enforcing stability (Chapter 3) to re-examine the 
lessons learned from Iraq’s stabilization between 2006 and 2008.  First, the chapter 
describes the prevailing conventional narrative about how the “Awakening 
Movement” and “Surge” helped stabilize Iraq.  Then, the chapter analyzes the lessons 
learned from each of these components of the conventional narrative through the 
population-centric model from Chapter 2 to assess if the narrative follows the model’s 
logic.  Next, the chapter applies the “Podesta Model” of self-enforcing stability from 
Chapter 3.  This demonstrates how an elite-focused strategy in which an external actor 
helped internal actors overcome commitment problems by enabling a limited access 
order through the oligopolization of violent means and distribution of rents brought 
about stability in Iraq.   
 
5.2. Conventional Explanation of Stabilization in Iraq 
 The conventional explanation for how stability arose in Iraq by 2008, 
following a spiral of sectarian violence that began with the February 2006 bombing of 
the Askariya Mosque in Samarra, revolves around two main components.  The first is 
the “Awakening Movement”; the second is the “Surge”, which enjoys greater credit of 
the two components in the popular lore of how the United States snatched victory 
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from the jaws of defeat in Iraq.  The rest of this section provides a quick description of 
the main actors in the conventional narrative before discussing the “Awakening” and 
the “Surge”.  
Shortly after the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, an insurgency began to 
form.  Several players, or actors, exist in this story.  Initially, the insurgents were 
members of a religious-based alliance, although the different participants had different 
objectives.  One group to the insurgent alliance, the Iraqi Sunni tribes, consisted of 
Iraqi tribes who felt dispossessed of their power upon the removal of the Saddam 
regime and who wanted a return to the pre-invasion status quo.  The other main 
opposition group, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), consisted mostly of foreign fighters and 
terrorists trying to force the U.S. to leave as ignominiously from Iraq as the U.S. did 
from Somalia, and to establish an Islamist government in Iraq.   
The insurgents directed their actions against several groups.  First, they 
targeted the coalition forces that invaded Iraq and whom the United Nations Security 
Council later authorized to operate as the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).  
Second, the insurgents targeted the progression of Iraqi governments following the 
invasion—the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) appointed by coalition forces after the 
invasion, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) elected mostly by the Shi’a and 
Kurdish populations due to a Sunni boycott on January 30, 2005, and finally, the 
permanent Government of Iraqi (GoI) elected by the Iraqi people on December 15, 
2005.   Third, the insurgents also targeted the Shi’a political parties, their 
corresponding armed militias, and the Shi’a civilian population due to the rise of Shi’a 
power in Iraq at the expense of the formerly ruling, although minority, Sunnis.  The 
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first part of the story that explains the reduction of violence is the “Awakening” 
narrative. 
 
5.2.1. Conventional Explanation of the Iraqi “Awakening Movement” 
 While the “Surge” maintains pride of place in the conventional narrative about 
how stability emerged in Iraq by 2008, some “Surge” proponents acknowledge the 
importance of the “Awakening Movement” in setting the conditions for the “Surge” to 
succeed, while others argue that the “Awakening” alone brought about stability.  
Sunni tribes began the “Awakening Movement” in the summer of 2006 in Anbar 
Province.  This “Movement” is also known as the “Sons of Iraq” or “Concerned Local 
Citizens” efforts.  The “Awakening” arose when Sunni tribal leaders chose to stop 
fighting and began cooperating with American and Iraqi forces in Anbar Province.  
These tribes cooperated by not targeting American or Iraqi forces and by turning 
against Al-Qaeda in Iraq, their previous allies.  With American financial support, the 
“Movement” spread across the country with Sunnis protecting themselves locally, and 
it eventually grew to include some Shi’a members as well (New York Times 2010).   
 The “Awakening” narrative argues that the Sunnis started the “Awakening” in 
response to internal disputes and indiscriminate violence employed by Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI).  AQI is a foreign-led, radically religious organization intent upon 
establishing a caliphate beyond Iraq.  The local tribes felt that AQI threatened their 
way of life, and that the violence against fellow Sunnis pushed them out of the Sunni 
tribes’ original alliance with AQI.  The conventional story is that AQI lost the hearts 
and minds of the Sunni population who had provided support to AQI, and the Sunni 
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tribal insurgents felt that in the short-term they would be better off cooperating with, 
rather than fighting, the coalition forces and the Iraqi government to preserve the 
power of the tribes and to get help in removing AQI from their tribal areas (Bruno 
2009).   
“Awakening”-alone proponents further argue that the Iraqi government and 
coalition were slowly defeating the insurgents, which caused the Sunnis to flip sides 
away from AQI.   The Sunnis made a cost-benefit choice between the coalition and 
AQI at this point, seeing greater possible long-term benefits from allying with the U.S.  
Those who see it from this perspective argue that by bringing the Sunnis back into the 
fold, during the “Awakening”, coalition forces stoked Sunni revanchist hopes and 
have ultimately undermined the central government of Iraq.  By siding with the 
coalition, the Sunnis could get the coalition to protect them from the Shi’a militias and 
Iraqi government, provide them with money, and give them weapons (or at least not 
disarm the Sunnis) and training to help them prepare for a future civil or ethnic 
conflict when the coalition departs.  This strategy will provide short-term stability at 
the expense of long-term “tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism” (Simon 2008).    
The story continues that by giving credibility to tribal leaders, the coalition 
actually undermined the democratic institutions they touted by enabling alternative 
power structures to grow (Kukis 2006).  So, according to the “Awakening”-alone 
narrative, the coalition has not necessarily gained the hearts and minds of the 
population, it is just that AQI lost them, and the coalition are the best alternative to 
help the Sunnis rid themselves of the AQI threat while preparing for an eventual 
conflict with the other parties that they see as long-term threats.  Additionally, as the 
 177 
more cynical critics describe it, “The Americans think they have purchased Sunni 
loyalty, but in fact it is the Sunnis who have bought the Americans” (Rosen 2008).  
Therefore, the conventional “Awakening”-alone proponents hold that the agreement, 
or what they call temporary cease-fires, of the “Movement” and the transitioning of 
the Sunnis into the Iraqi government are not sustainable (Biddle et al. 2008) and that 
as soon as the “U.S. paymasters” are of no more use to the Sunnis, the coalition and 
Iraqi government “will once again be their targets” (Simon 2008).   
The conventional “Awakening”-alone wisdom concludes that the “Awakening 
Movement” is a series of temporary agreements that has helped bring short-term 
security, but that it will not last in the long-run—hence it is not self-enforcing.  
Additionally, the coalition’s support of this effort will actually weaken the Iraqi state, 
leading to an eventual return to instability and bloodshed.  
 
5.2.1.1. Critique of Conventional Explanation of the “Awakening Movement”  
The problem with the conventional “Awakening” argument is that it attributes 
short-term stability to the wrong actors—the populace—for the wrong reasons—
winning hearts and minds.  The reason this is wrong in Anbar is because the 
population followed the leadership of the most powerful elites.  Traditionally, the 
tribal leaders have controlled power in Anbar.  For a short-time period, AQI leaders 
displaced the tribal leaders as the dominant elite by controlling greater means of 
violence and appropriating rent-seeking and distribution avenues.  During that time, 
the populace acquiesced to the AQI elite demands.  Once the tribal leaders restored 
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their elite position through the control of coercion and rent distribution, the population 
returned to following the commands of the tribal elites.   
Therefore, the conventional wisdom establishes the wrong causal logic for the 
achievement of stability in the short-term, missing the actual dynamics taking place 
between the proper actors.  Even if the long-term predictions of the conventional 
“Awakening” argument come true, the lessons drawn will be invalid because the 
argument’s faulty causal logic will lead to incorrect explanations and policy 
prescriptions.  Section 5.3 provides an alternative narrative based on the same events 
that took place during the “Awakening”, but grounded in the theory explained in 
Chapter 3.  Section 5.3 will show how the “Awakening” may have led to self-
enforcing stability by decentralizing force and expanding the dominant elite coalition 
to give more actors a stake in the future of Iraq and incentives to sustain the 
agreement.  Before examining this alternative theory, the next section describes and 
critiques the conventional explanation of the “Surge” story. 
 
5.2.2.  Conventional Explanation of the “Surge” 
Most “Surge” proponents accept the view that the “Awakening” brought about 
short-term security.  Yet, the conventional “Surge” narrative views the impact of the 
“Awakening” somewhat differently.  Proponents of the conventional “Surge” narrative 
argue that the “Awakening” set the conditions for the “Surge” to spread stability 
across Iraq and make it sustainable.  “Surge” proponents argue that earlier efforts by 
U.S. forces to gain Sunni tribal support, such as outreach to the Abu Mahal tribe in 
2005 (Semple 2005; West 2008, 101-102), helped to eventually bring the Sunnis 
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over—implying that some Sunni “hearts and minds” were won—to the Coalition 
(Robinson et al. 2008).  The “Surge” enabled the implementation of a full-scale 
“hearts and minds” strategy to consolidate and spread the gains from the 
“Awakening”. 
 While the “Awakening” began in the summer of 2006, the “Surge” did not 
begin till January 2007 and was not completed until the summer of 2007.  At the heart 
of the “Surge” was a belief by the strategy’s proponents for the need to shift to a 
classic counterinsurgency strategy—a euphemism for the population-centric “hearts 
and minds” approach.  President Bush announced the “Surge” in an address to the 
nation about “The New Way Forward in Iraq” (Bush 2007b).   This announcement 
shifted the U.S. from an enemy-centric to a population-centric strategy to improve the 
legitimacy of the Iraqi government. 
 The six fundamental elements of “The New Way Forward in Iraq” strategy 
were: “1) let Iraqis lead; 2) help Iraqis protect the population; 3) isolate extremists; 4) 
create space for political progress; 5) diversify political and economic efforts; and 6) 
situate the strategy in a regional approach” (Bush 2007a).  To achieve these objectives, 
the President committed over 20,000 additional U.S. combat troops (Bush 2007b) plus 
supporting units, eventually increasing total U.S. forces from 132,000 in January 2007 
to 171,000 by October 2007 (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2010, 19).  The six 
fundamental elements of the strategy follow closely to the HAM principles, outlined in 
Chapter 2, of population control, use of minimal military force, improved public goods 
and service provision through development efforts, and building and strengthening 
institutional capacity.   
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 Operationally, the increase in American force levels in Iraq helped protect the 
population from insurgents by working with Iraq Security Forces (ISF) to clear and 
secure neighborhoods.  Coalition and Iraq forces used minimal force to gain the 
confidence of the people and to prove that the forces would protect the population.  To 
support the goal of setting the conditions for the ISF to take over security 
responsibility, the U.S. continued efforts to increase the size and effectiveness of the 
ISF through training, equipping, mentoring, and embedding programs.  The ISF 
support efforts, as well as a focus on rule of law institutions and service providing 
ministries, made up the institutional capacity component of the “Surge” strategy.  The 
development component articulated in the “Surge”, following HAM theory, consisted 
of delivering essential services to all communities and creating jobs (Bush 2007a, 
2007b).  
The goal for the main elements of the “Surge” was to gain legitimacy for the 
Iraqi government in the eyes of the people—in other words, win their “hearts and 
minds”.  In order to implement this new strategy, General David Petraeus took 
command of Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) two weeks after President Bush’s 
address.  General Petraeus had just officially released the Army’s new 
counterinsurgency manual in December 2006.  He led the authorship of this “radical 
field manual” that brought together stakeholders from the military, government, 
academic, and NGO communities to set a new strategic direction for the military 
(Sewall 2007).  The “Surge” was the culmination of a doctrine that General Petraeus 
spearheaded.   
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“Hearts and minds” proponents of the “Surge” narrative have created a 
hagiography about General David Petraeus that is similar to the one created about 
General Sir Gerard Templer during and after the Malayan Emergency.  These 
advocates of the “Surge” success, defined tactically or strategically, argue that General 
Petraeus turned things around because he understood and implemented a classic 
population-centric counterinsurgency strategy (O'Hanlon and Pollack 2007; Robinson 
2008; Ricks 2009b).   
Petraeus implemented a series of directives across MNF-I that were not solely 
concerned with tactical operations, but focused more on the strategic effects generated 
by the tactics.  These measures included securing the population by walling off 
neighborhoods, creating entry and exit checkpoints, and having coalition and Iraqi 
forces live among the population.  Further, the strategy according to HAM proponents 
included political institutionalization by empowering provincial and local councils.  
The conventional narrative also argues that stability arose through the centralization of 
force as the Government of Iraq (GoI) incorporated former insurgents into the military 
and police.  Finally, the strategy focused on development efforts by pushing large 
amounts of reconstruction and Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
funds out to the provinces (Robinson et al. 2008).   
According to the conventional narrative, the “Surge” of personnel and 
resources enabled the combination of population security measures, improvements in 
political institutional capacity, development efforts that spread the provision of public 
goods and services, and the centralization of violent means that brought Iraq back 
from the brink of civil war.  The joint efforts of the coalition and Iraqi forces during 
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the “Surge” to engage in community-specific operations enabled the provision of basic 
services to the people and created new local level political and economic arrangements 
that stabilized Iraq (O'Hanlon and Pollack 2007).  Political institutionalization at the 
local level and the strengthening of the GoI ministries centrally displayed to the Sunni 
and Shi’a that they each had a stake in the future of Iraq and could resolve conflict 
peacefully through the government.  The coalition and GoI no longer treated the Sunni 
population as the enemy (Robinson et al. 2008). 
Proponents of this narrative cite the massive reduction in violence in Iraq as 
evidence of the “Surge’s” effectiveness in winning the “hearts and minds” of the 
population and improving the legitimacy of the coalition and Iraqi government (Biddle 
2008; Exum 2010).  Through the implementation of a cohesive COIN strategy, 
civilian deaths declined 48% across Iraq and 74% in Baghdad from December 2006 to 
September 2007 (Boot 2007).  “Surge” supporters further cite that the Sunni uprising 
against AQI and in support of the coalition and GoI had affected over 40% of the 
country by September 2007 (Boot 2007), in effect giving credit for the “Awakening’s” 
success to the “Surge”.  Economically, the improved provision of public goods and 
services to the Sunni areas took away popular support for Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
Previously, the population had turned to AQI for goods and services, since the GoI 
had not been providing them.  
 
5.2.2.1. Logical Critique of Conventional Explanation of the “Surge”  
 Chapter 2 provides the basis for critically analyzing the logic of the 
conventional explanation for the success of the “Surge” in Iraq.  The extended game 
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tree model in Figure 2.4 illustrates the logic of the population-centric theory.  The 
“Surge” is held up as the implementation of classic COIN strategy, meaning that it 
should follow the logic of the HAM model.  According to the model, the population 
should support the insurgency due to the lack of government legitimacy.  In Iraq, the 
population was divided ethno-religiously, which determined who among the 
population supported the insurgency.  Support for the insurgency was a Sunni Arab 
phenomenon.  Shi’a Arabs account for approximately 60% of the Iraqi population, 
Sunni Arabs make up approximately 18-20% of the population, the Kurds 
approximately 15-20% of the population, and other ethno-religious groups make up 
approximately 5% of the population (Central Intelligence Agency 2010).  Just as in 
Malaya, the Sunni dominance of the insurgency raises a logical puzzle about the 
population-centric model.  If the insurgents require popular support, did the Sunnis 
really think they could win the “hearts and minds” of the Shi’a and Kurdish 
populations?  Did the Sunnis ever try to win “hearts and minds”, or did they just try to 
regain power through coercion?  Since HAM is about a competition for legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population, would wanton killing of the other groups by the Sunnis 
gain the legitimacy that would allow the Sunnis to recapture control of the country?  If 
not, Iraq faced a civil war rather than an insurgency since neither group would 
capitulate to the other.  If it was an insurgency without general popular support, the 
insurgency should have ended according to the model in Figure 2.4. 
This analysis shows, again as with the Malaya case, the inability of the 
population-centric model to provide criteria for a minimal level of popular support to 
sustain an insurgency.  To continue with the logical critique, this section assumes that 
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as little as 20% of the population (assuming unanimous Sunni support) can sustain an 
insurgency.  This leads to the next move in the population-centric model, which is the 
choice of the counterinsurgents to pursue a HAM or coercion policy.  The “Surge” 
narrative argues that the counterinsurgents, the coalition and Iraqi forces, chose a 
HAM policy.  The HAM policy should have led the population to end their support of 
the insurgency.  While the Sunnis did end support for the insurgency, it is not clear 
that the “Surge’s” implementation of HAM led to the end of that support.  The Sunnis 
had previously ended support for the insurgency with the “Awakening”.  Depending 
on how one views the “Awakening”, as discussed in Section 5.2.1, either the previous 
coercion of the counterinsurgents led to the end of popular support before the “Surge”, 
or AQI lost the population’s “hearts and minds”.  In either case, the counterinsurgents 
never won the population’s “hearts and minds” due to a deliberate HAM policy 
choice.  The empirical critique of the “Surge” explanation in Section 5.2.2.2 will 
support the point that the Sunnis stopped supporting the insurgency before the 
counterinsurgents implemented a comprehensive HAM strategy. 
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Figure 2.4.  Population-Centric Theory Model 
The model also treats the counterinsurgents as a unified actor, assuming that 
the government and external actor have the same ultimate goal—defeating the 
insurgents.  This assumption fails to capture differences in policy choices, however.  
Even if the coalition forces implemented a HAM strategy, the government pursued a 
policy of coercion to change the behavior of the Sunni population.  Following the 
outbreak of the insurgency, the GoI and Shi’a population showed restraint in terms of 
violence towards the Sunnis in hope of establishing national reconciliation.  That 
restraint, however, ended with the Samarra bombing in February 2006 (Morales and 
Alexander 2006).  At that point, the government pursued a policy of coercion by 
 186 
unleashing the Shi’a militia linked to the governing political parties to target the Sunni 
population directly (Worth 2006).  The coalition forces at this time already relied 
heavily on coercion, with the use of “cordon and search” operations and mass arrests 
of younger male Sunnis (Filkins 2005).  This use of coercion showed the Sunnis that 
the counterinsurgents, particularly the government, were more powerful than the 
Sunnis believed.  The government made little effort at this time to improve public 
goods provision to the Sunnis; the government relied on sticks rather than carrots to 
change the Sunni population’s behavior.  
 Following the Sunni change in behavior, through these coercive measures, it 
became possible for the counterinsurgents to shift to the provision of carrots to the 
Sunnis.  The split in the opposition between the tribes and AQI occurred before the 
implementation of the HAM strategy.  The HAM strategy may have consolidated 
gains made through the coercion strategy, but HAM was not the cause of the 
population ending support for the insurgency as predicted by the HAM model.  With 
the population control measures of the “Surge” to further separate the population from 
the insurgents, it became possible to improve public goods provision, development, 
and political institutionalization.  As in Malaya, the counterinsurgent’s use of these 
policies may have appealed to the rational self-interest of the population, but they 
unlikely won the affection of the people.   
 
5.2.2.2. Empirical Critique of Conventional Explanation of the “Surge” 
 Empirically, proponents of the “Surge” rely primarily on two pieces of 
evidence that the “Surge” worked.  The first is that the HAM strategies of the “Surge” 
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proved the coalition’s and Iraqi government’s legitimacy to the Sunnis, which enabled 
the Sunni uprising against AQI.  The problem with the framing of the Sunni uprising 
by “Surge” proponents is that they smuggle in the “Awakening” as a component of the 
“Surge” even though the “Awakening” pre-dated the surge and was initiated by the 
Sunnis, not the coalition or GoI.  Some proponents acknowledge that the 
“Awakening” started first, but they still argue that the “Surge” is what made it succeed 
(Boot 2007; Biddle 2008; Exum 2010).  The “Awakening” began six months before 
the announcement of the “Surge” and over a year before the completion of the 
“Surge”.  This conventional HAM argument however suffers from an endogeneity 
problem.  Did the “Surge” enable the “Awakening” as argued, or did the “Awakening” 
set the conditions for the “Surge” to work?  Would the flood of resources—personnel, 
money, and material—have made a difference without the “Awakening”?  Combining 
the logical and empirical critiques of the conventional narrative show that the 
“Awakening” likely set the conditions for the resources of the “Surge” to serve as 
effective mechanisms for the external actor to help the government and opposition 
elites overcome credible commitment problems.  
 Second, the conventional narrative relies heavily on the data showing a 
reduction of violence in Iraq as evidence that the “Surge” worked.  The problem is that 
supporters of the “Surge” either misread or misuse the data.  “Surge” supporters 
choose the near peak of violence in Iraq when describing the drop in violence.  The 
48% decline in civilian deaths across Iraq by September 2007 value in Section 5.2.2 is 
compared to December 2006 (Boot 2007).  This data value obscures the fact that 
President Bush did not announce the surge until January 2007, however, and that the 
 188 
full complement of surge forces did not arrive till the summer of 2007.  Further, U.S. 
and coalition troop strength did not peak till October 2007 (O'Hanlon and Livingston 
2010).   
Figure 5.1 displays the number of Iraqi civilian deaths and the number of 
coalition forces in Iraq between March 2005 and June 2010.  The left-side vertical axis 
provides the value for the number of Iraqi civilian deaths.  The blue line (initially the 
lower line) plots the deaths by month.  The right-side vertical axis provides the value 
for the number (in thousands) of coalition forces in Iraq.  The red line (initially the 
upper line) plots the number of troops by month.  The horizontal axis represents time 
(in months).   
Figure 5.1.  Iraqi Civilian Deaths and Coalition Troop Strength, March 2005-
June 2010 (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2010; icasualties.org 2010) 
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The graph shows that the number of Iraqi civilian deaths peaked just after the 
start of the “Awakening Movement”, but then declined sharply.  Deaths then increased 
just after the announcement of the “Surge” strategy, but then continued the major 
downward trend that started after the “Awakening” began.  During this time, the 
“Awakening” spread beyond Anbar and included Shi’a as well as Sunni populations.  
The chart also shows that the declining death trend preceded the increase in troop 
levels.  While increased troops may have enabled the trend to continue by supporting 
the “Awakening,” the data presented on the chart raise questions about the “Surge” 
argument that increases in troops led causally to the decline in civilian deaths.  
Further, a likely lag exists between the time of troop arrival and their impact, because 
it takes time for troops to reach and become familiar with their areas of responsibility 
(AORs).  Since HAM theory relies on gaining the confidence of the population, it is 
hard to accept that COIN forces could have instantaneously changed the conditions on 
the ground immediately upon their arrival. 
 
5.3.  Applying a New Theory of Self-Enforcing Stability to the “Awakening 
Movement” 
The problem with the conventional explanations of the stabilization of Iraq 
between 2006 and 2008, both the “Awakening” and “Surge” arguments, is that they 
focus on the change in the behavior of the population.  The “Awakening” argument 
describes how the opposition lost the “hearts and minds” of the population, while the 
“Surge” explains how the counterinsurgents won the population’s “hearts and minds”.  
Both fail to recognize the importance of the role of elites as an intervening variable 
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that impacts the behavior of the population.  Neither of these narratives explains the 
role of incentives, positive or negative, in aligning the interests of elites.  The 
conventional narratives miss how aligned interests led to the development of an elite 
pact between the Sunnis and the Shi’a in Iraq.  The interests of these two groups 
became aligned when AQI threatened the security and rent-seeking opportunities of 
elites from both the opposition and the government.  
This section will now link the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in 
Chapter 3 to provide an alternative narrative of the stabilization that took place in Iraq 
between 2006 and 2008, showing that the theory is plausible and potentially 
generalizeable.  The “Awakening” set the conditions for the mechanisms employed 
during the “Surge” to solidify an elite pact between the government and opposition.  
This section applies the “Podesta Model” from Chapter 3 to Iraq.  This application 
shows how a de-facto elite-centric strategy that supported the oligopolization of 
violent means and rent-seeking helped the coalition resolve commitment problems 
between the Sunni and Shi’a, contributing to the establishment of a potentially self-
enforcing limited access order (LAO) in Iraq by 2008.  Once the elites were able to 
provide security and rent provision locally, they won the support and allegiance, but 
not necessarily the affection, of the population.  
 
5.3.1.  Key Actors 
The three actors in this self-enforcing narrative are the government (made up 
of the Government of Iraqi (GoI) and the Shi’a parties and militias), the opposition 
(the Sunni tribes), and the external actor (the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I)).  
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This narrative assumes that each of these groups has worked out their own internal 
collective action problems, forming their own elite coalitions.  The Government of 
Iraqi (GoI) and the Shi’a groups are treated as a unified actor, the government, 
because each of the primary militia groups is an armed element of the major political 
parties.  For example, “ISCI [the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq] and Fadhila … 
meld[ed] nearly all of their own independent militia units into the Iraqi security 
forces… Their approach has … largely removed the … problem that these militias 
employed systematic violence to advance their political agendas beyond, and at the 
expense of, government control” (Biddle et al. 2008, 39).  Additionally, the GoI and 
Shi’a elites who headed the Shi’a political parties and militias aligned closely and 
generally acted in concert with one another, except for the spoiler group—the Sadr 
militia.   However, the GoI and the Shi’a groups ultimately worked together to check 
the power of the Sadr militia when the Sadrists threatened the pact, discussed below, 
between the government, the external actor, and the opposition. 
For the opposition, this narrative treats all of the Iraqi-led Sunni tribes as a 
unitary actor.  The Sunni tribes are elite organizations that permeate Iraqi society, as 
Sheik Abdul Sittar, the original leader of the “Awakening,” states, “Tribes aren’t what 
you’re imagining, these people who make up tribes are doctors, engineers, 
intellectuals, farmers, and mechanics” (Kukis 2006).  These tribal leaders actually 
maintain parallel extra-state governance structures to the formal state ones as well as 
political allegiances (Kilcullen 2007).  AQI is excluded from the opposition, because 
they are an irreconcilable, foreign-led, spoiler group with different goals from those of 
Iraq’s Sunni population. 
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Lastly, the narrative treats all the elites within MNF-I and their corresponding 
diplomatic missions as a unitary external actor as there is a single chain of command 
among all military forces, and because of the close coordination between the military 
and civilian policymakers.  Each of the elites within the government, opposition, and 
external actor coalitions may have their own interests, but this rational-choice 
framework assumes that the elites support the dominant coalition despite some 
differences since they all become better off on average by working together.     
 
5.3.2.  Commitment Problems 
As the tribal revolt began in the summer of 2006 in Anbar province, and 
because informal tribal structures pervade Iraqi society, the “Awakening” turned out 
to be “a major social movement that could significantly influence most Iraqis” 
(Kilcullen 2007).  And, although not mentioned much in the conventional story that 
credits the “Surge” with the “Awakening,” “…the Iraqi government was in on it from 
the start … with tribal leaders turning toward the government and away from the 
extremists” (Kilcullen 2007).  The reason that the government and opposition had to 
turn to an external actor to finalize the deal was that both sides needed an external 
actor to provide a credible commitment mechanism.  
The government could not provide a credible commitment to the Sunnis 
because of the sectarian violence since the collapse of the Saddam regime.  With much 
of the Iraqi Security Forces consisting of former Shi’a militia members, the opposition 
could not believe that the government would not renege on any agreement; especially 
one in which the opposition would lay down their arms to join the government.  Once 
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the Sunnis laid down their weapons, it would be relatively costless for the government 
to renege and crush the opposition or continue excluding them from the government, 
as explained in the game in Figure 3.1.  Fearon (1998) helps us understand this 
commitment problem in terms of ethnic conflict, and when he (1995) describes that 
war is rational when there are incentives to misrepresent private information and when 
commitment problems provide incentives to renege.  In Anbar, the government and 
opposition both had incentives to misrepresent their strength, because they each 
wanted the other side to think fighting was futile.  The government had an additional 
incentive to renege; they wanted to guarantee that the Sunnis who had tyrannized the 
Shi’a for decades would never take over the government again.   
 
Figure 3.1.  State-building Game without an External Actor 
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On the opposition side, the members of the coalition had the incentive to work 
together and with the government to defeat AQI because the foreign-born leaders of 
AQI were attempting to overthrow the supremacy of the Sunni tribal leaders, 
threatening their political interests.  Additionally, AQI threatened the Sunni sheiks’ 
economic interests as “the tribes run smuggling, import/export, and construction 
businesses which AQI shut down, took over, or disrupted through violent disturbances 
that ‘were bad for business’” (Kilcullen 2007).  Without the external actor, however, 
the opposition could not credibly commit to the government either as explained by 
Fearon’s rationalist explanation of war described above.  The game in Figure 3.1 
described this problem.  Understanding that the government had an incentive to 
renege, the Sunnis rationally attacked the government preemptively.  This follows the 
backwards induction of the game described in Chapter 3; if the opposition waited to 
fight after the government consolidated and strengthened its power, the costs to the 
opposition would have been much greater.   Additionally, without MNF-I, the 
opposition could not credibly commit to the government.  The Sunnis had to overcome 
the government’s rational fear that the Sunnis would try to restore what they saw as 
their rightful position as the leaders of Iraq after the Iraqi Security Forces helped the 
Sunnis defeat AQI.  This problem again follows from the game in Figure 3.1, because 
the government would also understand that the opposition would subvert when the 
opposition had its greatest strength vis-à-vis the government. 
The inability of either the government or the opposition to credibly commit to 
one another led both sides to turn to the external actor to serve as the guarantor of the 
agreement (see Figure 3.2).  With the “Awakening,” MNF-I became responsible for 
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preventing the disarmament of and providing payment to the “Sons of Iraq” (SOI) or 
“Concerned Local Citizens” who volunteered to police their own neighborhoods.  By 
the end of 2008, there were more than 100,000 SOI members operating across most of 
the country (Weinstein 2008), contributing to the reduction in violence.  “The role of 
American forces has shifted from crushing sectarian groups intent on causing violence 
to essentially policing cease-fires among the groups and reassuring ordinary Iraqis that 
the violence will not be allowed to resume” (Biddle et al. 2008, 31).  This description 
follows the role of the Podesteria in Italian city-states during the late Middle Ages, 
discussed in Chapter 3.  The republics sent an outsider, a Podesta, to dependent cities 
or city-states, such as Genoa, or hired its own Podesta to administer the city and 
prevent strife between competing local elites.  The Podesta treated each side equally 
and sided with the defenders against the defectors of the pact (Greif 1998, 2006).  
During the “Awakening Movement” and “Surge”, the external actor provided the 




Figure 3.2. State-building with External Actor Support (“Podesta Model”) 
 
5.3.3.  Moving Towards Self-Enforcement 
Coalition forces used the mechanisms of personnel, equipment, money, and 
time to make their commitment credible.  The “Surge” enabled the coalition to utilize 
these mechanisms.  The diversification of violence potential between government and 
opposition forces formed a balance of interests between the government and 
opposition, which is indicated by the sharp decline in violence (see Figure 5.1) since 
the “Awakening” (Berman et al. 2008).  The coalition helped diversify violent means 
by partially training the SOI, as they had done with the ISF, and by indirectly 
equipping the SOI through money transfers—or at least not disarming them—
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establishing a defined balance of power between the government and the opposition.  
The increase in personnel during the “Surge” also solidified this balancing, because 
coalition forces operated with both opposition and government forces, helping to 
maintain the pact by identifying and punishing violations by either side, similar to a 
Podesta.  The personnel also helped to protect the populace, which strengthened the 
influence and power of the elites over their supporters.  
With the decrease in violence, both the opposition and government have been 
able to increase economic activity, providing the elites on both sides with the rent-
seeking opportunities they desire, showing the mutually supporting relationship that 
exists between balanced violence potential and prosperity.  Greater rents help create an 
incentive to establish peace.  The coalition also enabled diversified rent-seeking 
opportunities through the use of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP), which allowed local elites to deliver local public goods (Berman et al. 2008), 
while providing other reconstruction funding to government elites.  Along with the 
personnel, equipment, and money, MNF-I’s ambiguous withdrawal timetable extended 
the shadow of their future involvement, adding to the credibility of their commitment 
in the eyes of the government and the opposition and strengthening the pact.  As the 
government and opposition reaped benefits from the agreement, this created a focal 
point for both sides to defend.   
Each side determined that they were better off policing their own members 
who violated the agreement in order to maintain the long-run benefits.  The 
government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, confronted the Sadr militia, the Jaysh-al-
Medhi (JAM), in Basra and Sadr City in late March 2008 (Ghosh 2008; Hider 2008).  
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Following this action, “Sunni groups in Anbar began to speak positively about Maliki 
(Biddle et al. 2008, 40),” whom they had distrusted before.  Similarly, the Sunni 
tribes’ actions against AQI, reduced attacks against the Shi’a, and participation in the 
political process has shown the government that the opposition is serious about 
maintaining the agreement with the government (Kilcullen 2007).  The actions of both 
the government and the opposition helped to build the credibility of each party in the 
eyes of the other.  Those signals mattered, particularly since responsibility for 76% of 
the SOI program was turned over to the Iraqi government on 1 January 2009 
(Weinstein 2008).   
As coalition forces disengage, the Iraqi government and the Sunni tribes will 
have to make credible commitments to one another to achieve a self-enforcing 
stability mechanism.  A credible commitment problem arises, in part, because of what 
Di Figueredo and Weingast (1999) call the “rationality of fear.”  This problem arises 
because of economic and political puzzles about accepting the high costs of conflict 
rather than higher benefits from gains through cooperation, and understanding the link 
between leader’s intentions and citizens’ fears.  The coalition helped overcome this 
“rationality of fear” by lowering the stakes between the government and opposition 
through the diversification of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities. 
The preliminarily shift away from MNF-I as the guarantor shows that under 
certain conditions, such as during civil conflict, an external actor can contribute to the 
development of a self-enforcing stability mechanism that reduces violence.  This 
mechanism requires that coalitions of elites within the government and opposition 
come to an agreement initially enforced by an external actor to overcome credible 
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commitment problems.  As discussed above, MNF-I’s several resource-based 
mechanisms allowed it, as an external actor, to credibly commit to the government and 
the opposition that MNF-I supported their pact.  These mechanisms were: 1) 
personnel—“Surge” to monitor and punish transgression; 2) equipment—materiel and 
training used to diversify violent means; 3) money—decentralizing the distribution of 
rents amongst elites; and 4) time—strategic ambiguity about external actor mission 
length enables extension of time horizon.  During the course of the agreement, both 
the government and opposition have to prove to one another that they are willing to 
defend their pact against any party, including members of their own coalition, who 
threatens the endurance of the agreement.  The agreements create focal points that all 
parties know to defend, because they are better off with the whole thing even if they 
lose with some parts of the pact.    
The 2006 to 2008 Iraq narrative supports the theory that an important part of 
the elite agreement that makes the pact self-enforcing is the diversification of means of 
violence and rent-generation, creating an internal balance of interests between 
government and the opposition elites, so both sides know that it costs more to fight the 
other side than to cooperate with them.  This recognizes, counter to the conventional 
wisdom, that monopolization of force and rent-seeking opportunities by the state to 
distribute through a population-centric strategy can actually further destabilize a failed 
or fragile state.   
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5.4.  Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that the conventional narrative about how stabilization 
in Iraq between 2006 and 2008 occurred due to winning the “hearts and minds” of the 
population is faulty both logically and empirically.  The alternative presentation of the 
evidence in this chapter supports the main arguments of the theory of self-enforcing 
stability developed in this dissertation.   
The data suggests that the coalition pursued an elite-centric strategy, rather 
than a population-centric strategy, to reduce violence between the Sunni insurgents 
and the Shi’a-dominated government in Iraq.  The pursuit of an elite-centric strategy 
allowed the external actor to overcome the credible commitment problem that existed 
between the government and opposition.  This strategy included Sunni engagement 
during the “Awakening Movement,” and the provision of credibility-establishing 
mechanisms—personnel, money, equipment, and time—with the “Surge”.  The 
coalition’s ability to provide credible commitments to both sides allowed time for the 
Sunnis and Shi’a to see the potential long-term benefits of cooperation. 
The provision of resources during the “Surge” enabled the external actor to 
facilitate the oligopolization of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities that 
began during the “Awakening”.  This diversification of power gave both Sunni and 
Shi’a elites the ability to protect themselves while increasing the elites’ prosperity.  
Through the establishment of self-protection means, levels of violence declined across 
Iraq, increasing the rent-seeking opportunities for the elites and showing each side that 
they had a stake in the future of a stable Iraq.   
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Further, the pact established between the government and opposition, which 
the external actor helped guarantee to overcome the initial credible commitment 
problem, focused on establishing a limited access order.  The coalition limited the 
provision of resources during the “Surge” to cooperative elites from the government 
and the opposition. Those outside of the pact, such as the Sadr Militia and Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, were isolated and policed by all members of the pact.  While different 
contemporary factors may derail the progress made between 2006 and 2008, the 
coalition had helped place the government and opposition in Iraq on a path towards 
self-enforcing stability.  As the Iraq case analysis has shown, getting on the path is one 
challenge, but staying on the path is also another.  Moving towards self-enforcing 
stability in conflict-torn states likely requires a major commitment of time and 
resources from an external actor hoping for the possibility of success: this is when 
“more is better”.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
“[The new constitution] would give Iraq the political framework to build a peaceful, 
democratic country… From the outset, the Coalition … judged that we had a special 
obligation to help Iraqis design a political and legal structure to guide Iraq’s journey 
from tyranny to democracy.” – L. Paul Bremer (2005) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has taken on a 
more prominent role in state-building efforts.  The goal of these efforts has been to 
end internal conflict in other countries and to change their domestic authority 
structures to reduce the threat that failed states pose to intervening nations, as well as 
the international system.  Such unilateral and multilateral state-building interventions 
have taken place across the globe, and even pre-date the end of the Cold War.  Since 
the Cold War, however, state-building in weak and failed states has largely consisted 
of counterinsurgency efforts combined with the promotion of democratic and liberal 
economic institutions.  L. Paul Bremer’s quote above captures the belief by many 
external interveners that outsiders possess the expertise to transform and impose 
democracy upon other societies.  
 This dissertation has explored the prevailing literature and theories about how 
external actors can help establish stability in conflict-torn states.  As state-building is 
such a broad topic, this dissertation focused on external actors helping establish the 
minimal level of stability necessary for other state-building processes—political, 
economic, and social development—to take place.  The driving research question was: 
what is the appropriate social order external actors should help nations attain in order 
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for successful state-building to take place, and what incentives can external actors 
provide to set host nations on this path?  
 To explore this question, the dissertation adopted a rational-choice perspective 
and used game theory to explain the logic of the prevailing population-centric theory 
about how external actors help establish enduring security amidst internal conflict.  
Next, the dissertation provided an alternative elite-centric theory—again using a 
simple game to show the logic of the argument.  The dissertation then tested the 
population-centric and elite-centric theories through case analysis of the Malayan 
Emergency from 1948 to1960 and the stabilization of Iraq from 2006 to 2008.  
Evidence from both cases provided support for the elite-centric theory proposed in this 
dissertation and exposed logical and empirical flaws in the population-centric theory.  
The rest of this concluding chapter discusses the contributions made by this 
dissertation to the academic literature, explores the implications of the case study 
findings for policy makers, and recommends some paths for further research. 
  
6.2.  Contribution to the Literature 
This dissertation’s theory of self-enforcing stability counters the prevailing 
Weberian-based ideas in the state-building and COIN literatures that the state 
government must monopolize the legitimate control and use of force (Weber 1978, 
314).  Rather, the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation argues 
that diversifying violence helps achieve security and stability.  Diversification of 
violence balances power amongst elites by distributing violent means, ensuring that 
competing elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening 
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each other with overwhelming force.  Additionally, the conceptual framework laid out 
by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a) implies that the diversification of force is 
more likely to lead to a reduction of violence in failed or fragile states than is the 
consolidation of force.  Failing to balance power suggests the state will abuse the 
opposition if the state maintains a monopoly of force, so the opposition will never stop 
fighting.   
Also, amongst the reigning views about state-building is the underlying belief 
that external actors can or should help develop institutions based on those in modern, 
liberal democracies (Carothers 1999; McFaul 2004).  In addition to theorists who 
make the case for the importance of democracy promotion in state-building, some 
policymakers also strongly believe in it.  President Bush stated during his second 
inaugural address, “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth 
of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Bush 2005).  While staying away from 
democracy promotion rhetoric at the start of his administration, President Obama has 
since affirmed his support for promoting democracy abroad.  But, President Obama 
wants to promote democracy through multilateral institutions rather than having the 
U.S. lead the effort.  He reflected that sentiment while addressing the U.N. General 
Assembly in arguing that “It’s time to reinvigorate U.N. peacekeeping, so that 
missions have the resources necessary to succeed, … because neither dignity nor 
democracy can thrive without basic security” (Obama 2010b).   
Yet, the stability-through-democracy approach focuses on the wrong type of 
social order.  Again following North, Wallis, and Weingast’s framework, the theory 
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developed in this dissertation focuses on the two social orders, rather than multiple 
regime types, that exist today: limited access orders (LAOs) and open access orders 
(OAOs).  In LAOs, or natural states, “Personal relationships among the elite form the 
basis for political organization and constitute the grounds for individual interaction… 
People outside the [ruling dominant] coalition have only limited access to 
organizations, privileges, and valuable resources and activities” (North et al. 2009b, 
56).  OAOs develop “impersonal categories of individuals…[that] allow people to 
interact… where no one needs to know the individual identities of their partners.  The 
ability to form organizations that the larger society supports is open to everyone who 
meets a set of minimal and impersonal criteria” (North et al. 2009b, 56). 
The theory in this dissertation departs from NWW’s explanation of the social 
orders in two primary respects.  First, while NWW start with the existence of social 
order, the theory in this dissertation starts where no social order exists, which is the 
case in failed or collapsed states.  Second, NWW’s framework implicitly describes the 
process of social order development as something that occurs internally amongst 
actors within the state, but this dissertation’s theory incorporates an explicit role for an 
external actor to facilitate the development of social order in failed, collapsed, or weak 
states.  Using NWW’s distinction of social orders clarifies how this theory of self-
enforcing stability challenges the prevailing Weberian monopoly of force and 
population-centric focuses in the reigning literature.  
Open access orders did not emerge until the 19th century.  People in only about 
25 countries today, accounting for 15 percent of the world’s population, live in open 
access societies.  The remaining 85 percent of the world’s population live under 
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natural states or no social order at all (North et al. 2009a, xii).  So, an implication of 
NWW’s framework is that external actors need to approach security development in 
war-torn countries, where social order has broken down, with the objective of helping 
the government and opposition achieve a limited access order rather than an open 
access order.   
The theory in this dissertation, developed in part from the NWW framework, 
contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, the theory removes the focus on 
democratic institutional development in favor of focusing on establishing institutions 
that support self-enforcing, stable societies that may develop over time into open 
access orders rather than having democratic institutions imposed by outsiders.  It is 
necessary to recognize the appropriate social order to encourage in conflict-ridden 
states.  Failed states first need to become a fragile natural state in which incentives are 
embedded in organizations that “produce a double balance: a correspondence between 
the distribution and organization of violence potential and political power on one 
hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power on the other hand” 
(North et al. 2009a, 20).  A dominant coalition based on personal relationships 
determines the distribution of these factors.   
While some theorists (Zakaria 1997; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 
2008) may describe these regimes as pseudo-, proto-, or illiberal democracies or even 
electoral democracies if the elites use the mechanism of elections to solidify the pact, 
such a designation does little to explain how stability will form in the society.  That is 
one reason why this dissertation focuses on social order rather than regime-type.  Over 
time, the state will hopefully develop expanded opportunities and broaden the 
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coalition, as well as centralize violent potential, through impersonal relationships, 
achieving an open access order. However, that is not an immediately achievable goal 
in conflict-ridden societies since the coalition members cannot credibly commit to not 
trying to dominate one another.  If a state ultimately becomes an OAO, then it will 
achieve the status of liberal democracy, but again that designation primarily focuses 
on the regime-type rather than the stability of the society.   
Second, the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation 
recognizes that the diversification of force has the potential to reduce violence, rather 
than expand violence, when the diversification conditions make the benefits for those 
controlling force exceed the costs from conflict.  The prevailing focus on Weberian 
centralization of force fails to recognize the disincentives that exist for elites in the 
society to give up violent means and the complexity of the institutions required to 
maintain the monopoly of force.    
Third, this theory of self-enforcing stability shows how an external actor can 
help put failed, collapsed, or weak states on the path toward the development of a 
stable social order.  As NWW explain, elites must form a dominant coalition and 
respect each other’s privileges to build a limited access order.  They do not, however,  
show how to enable the necessary credible commitments among elites.   The theory in 
this dissertation demonstrates that the external actor initially provides the credible 
commitment mechanism that is absent amongst the elites in these societies, allowing 
for each society’s elites to develop their own credible commitment mechanisms. 
Finally, the theory in this dissertation contributes to the literature, particularly 
the COIN literature, by shifting from a population-centric focus to an elite-centric 
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focus.  As NWW (2009) describe, as well as the “Third Wave” democracy literature 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1993), the elites in the society need to 
form the pact that guarantees and protects the privileges granted to each member of 
the dominant coalition.  This theory argues that elites have their own followers—
members of the populace—that will follow the elites’ lead or directions (North et al. 
2009a; Berinsky 2007; Christia 2008, Forthcoming; Blaydes and Linzer 2010).  The 
populace will follow the elites for various sociological, cultural, economic, or political 
reasons, but explaining those is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  While the 
populace’s behavior does matter, the dissertation assumes that the elites drive the 
populace’s behavior.  So, for an external actor to maximize its use of limited resources 
while state-building, the theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation 
argues that the external actor should focus on distributing its resources, or credible 
commitment mechanisms, towards the elites rather than the populace.  Again, this 
theory argues that distributing resources through local elites appeals to the rational 
self-interest of the elite and enables, strengthens, and supports the elite pact, rather 
than winning the affection and mass support of the population for the regime in power.  
For example, the external actor may supply personnel to protect the populace, but the 
primary purpose of resource provision is to strengthen the elites in the dominant 
coalition at the expense of those outside of the coalition.   
 
6.3.  Implications for Policy Making 
The case studies presented in this dissertation test the logic of the population-
centric “hearts and minds” theory in Chapter 2 against the alternative logic of elite-
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centric theory of self-enforcing stability in Chapter 3.  The findings from the analysis 
of the Malayan Emergency in Chapter 4 and Iraq stabilization in Chapter 5 show that 
the theory of self-enforcing stability better explains how external actors contributed to 
the stabilization of these two countries during the examined time frames.   However, 
the analysis in those chapters did not address the question of how the actions of the 
external actors in both states facilitated long-term stability.  This section begins to 
explore the endurance of the stability achieved by the external actors in Malaya and 
Iraq, and explains why the stability is self-enforcing in Malaysia, but that it is unlikely 
to become self-enforcing in Iraq.  These implications provide new lessons for policy 
makers to consider while making decisions about future state-building ventures. 
 
6.3.1. Implications of Self-Enforcing Stability Established in Malaya following the 
Emergency 
The elite pact between the Malayan government and opposition formed in 
1952 endured after independence in 1957.  The Alliance Party, which became the 
Barisan Nasional (“National Front”) in 1973, has dominated Malayan (now 
Malaysian) politics.  They held at least two-thirds majorities in Parliament until the 
2008 election.  This shows that the external actor’s exit strategy of establishing a 
stable state through an elite pact led to self-enforcing stability even in the absence of 
the external actor, as was hypothesized and shown in Figure 3.4.  The opposition and 
government elites recognized that they were each better off in the long run through 
cooperation. 
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Figure 3.4: Self-enforcing Stability without an External Actor 
While decentralization of violent means helped establish credible 
commitments between the government and opposition and form a basic limited access 
order, the state consolidated control over these forces over time.  Not long after, the 
Emergency the Home Guards disbanded.  Yet, the Malaysian government maintained 
diversified violent means amongst the population, but under greater state control.  
Malaysia created RELA, “People’s Volunteer Corp,” in 1972, an over half-a-million 
strong armed force that is used by the elites to protect their pact.  It does so today by 
helping maintain “public order” through crackdowns on illegal immigration that 
undermine the Malaysian work force (Human Rights Watch 2007; Mydans 2007); in 
other words, RELA protects elite control of rent-seeking opportunities. 
The enduring elite pact, which the British helped form, and its self-enforcing 
equilibrium allowed Malaya to transition quickly from a fragile to basic limited access 
order after the Emergency.   Malaysia then transformed to a mature limited access 
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order10 and even came close to establishing the “doorstep conditions” for moving to an 
open access order (OAO) before slipping away from the doorstep in recent years.  
Malaysia became a mature LAO, because the state supports many organizations 
outside the government while the state sanctions each organization.  This sanctioning 
allows the government, run through a hegemonic party in Malaysia, to limit 
competition and create rents that perpetuate the ruling elite coalition.  The Alliance 
Party and its successor, the National Front, continued to expand access to elites in 
Malaysia, which increased the size of rent-seeking opportunities.   
Despite the recent crisis within the National Front, which contributed to it 
losing its two-thirds majority in government in 2008, Malaysia’s public institutions 
have survived changes within the ruling coalition.  Until the late 1990s, Malaysia 
appeared to have reached the “doorstep conditions” where Malaysia could have moved 
from an LAO to an OAO.  Malaysia’s self-enforcing equilibrium that emerged after 
the Emergency evolved as an LAO capable of impersonal exchange among elites, 
which maintained: 1) rule of law for elites; 2) support for perpetually lived elite 
organizations; and 3) centralized and consolidated control of violence (North et al. 
2009a).  Yet, Malaysia has moved away from the “doorstep conditions” as rule of law 
for elites has slipped away, most clearly evidenced by the treatment of Anwar Ibrahim, 
and as the state has again diversified violent means to local elites through RELA.     
Anwar Ibrahim, the deputy prime minister and finance minister of Malaysia 
from 1993 to 1998, was one of Prime Minister Mahathir’s protégés.  During Ibrahim’s 
                                                
10 See North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a, 2009b) for a deeper explanation of the distinction between 
fragile, basic, and mature limited access orders. 
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rise, he was part of the elite pact that guaranteed self-enforcing stability in Malaysia.  
Following the Asian Financial Crisis, Ibrahim became an internal critic of the regime 
and developed popular support for his opposition.  As he moved himself outside of the 
elite pact, the mechanisms of the mature LAO in Malaysia organized against Ibrahim.  
“Malaysia’s potent party-state organizations were … deployed to ensure that the 
opposition would have no chance of removing Mahathir from office through 
Malaysia’s [LAO] institutions” (Slater 2003, 95-96).  Lee Kuan Yew, who carefully 
maintained a mature LAO in Singapore, insightfully commented on the maintenance 
of Malaysia’s elite pact when he stated, “I am not saying Anwar Ibrahim has not got a 
following.  What I am saying is that there are institutional checks and balances and 
systems that will not allow civil order to be upset” (Ranawana and Oorjitham 1998).  
Checks and balances do not exist only in democracies; mature LAOs contain strong 
institutional mechanisms to maintain self-enforcing elite pacts. 
Despite moving away from the OAO doorstep, Malaysia remains a mature 
LAO because of its self-enforcing institutions that maintain the country’s elite pact.  
The actions of the British as an external actor to provide credible commitments to the 
government and opposition during the Malayan Emergency enabled the development 
of an elite pact that set Malaysia on this self-enforcing path.  The British did not try to 
create a democracy, but rather a stable society that would support Britain’s economic 
and national security interests.  This stable society developed into a mature LAO.  
Additionally, the diversification of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities set 
the conditions for the government and opposition to develop their own credible 
commitments that endured after Britain’s departure and Malayan independence.  As 
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the elite pact solidified through reduced violence and power sharing, it was possible 
for the Malayan government to recentralize violent means.  The recentralization of the 
security apparatus helped maintain the elite pact in Malaysia’s mature LAO in the late 
1990s.  “The Malaysian police’s institutionalized loyalty … helped ensure its 
coherence and effectiveness in suppressing both the elite defection and popular dissent 
that … arose when [Ibrahim] was … dismissed” (Slater 2003, 95).  The 
recentralization of power, along with expanding the base of elites in the dominant 
coalition through public and private institutions, contributed to Malaya moving from a 
basic to mature LAO. 
The lessons from Malaya have been misinterpreted, and, as a result, their 
impact on current policy formation has been somewhat misguided.  The conventional 
Malaya narrative lacks an understanding of the underlying causal logic of overcoming 
elite credible commitment problems that led to the defeat of the communists and 
establishment of stability.  Current COIN doctrine has adopted the conventional 
lessons from Malaya, potentially misdirecting policy development and implementation 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Army’s COIN manual discusses the retraining of the 
Malayan police force, stating, “Manpower is not enough [in combating insurgency]; 
well-trained and well-disciplined [host-nation] forces are required.  The Malayan 
example also illustrates the central role that police play in counterinsurgency 
operations” (Department of the Army 2006, 6-21-6-22).  The lesson from this 
statement implies that trained host-nation forces must stand up before the external 
actor’s COIN forces can stand down.  Yet, the COIN manual ignores the role of the 
Home Guards, the manual teaches centralization of force, when the real lesson is that 
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initially decentralizing violent means may set the conditions for stability and future 
centralization of force. 
 
6.3.2.  Implications of Self-Enforcing Stability Established in Iraq between 2006-2008 
While the British helped establish enduring, self-enforcing stability in Malaya, 
the endurance of the U.S.-led effort to stabilize Iraq is tenuous.  The goal of rapid 
centralization in Iraq is likely to fail because the institutional structures being built do 
not match the social order.  The transition of the SOI to the Iraqi government and the 
disengagement of the external actor have just begun, so it is too soon to say if the 
agreement is self-enforcing without the external actor.  But, it is possible to 
extrapolate possible outcomes.  If the Iraqi government quickly emplaces a 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for the SOI members 
(Kilcullen 2007) or if the coalition keeps pushing the GoI to transition 20% of the SOI 
into the Iraqi Army and Police and move the other 80% into public or private jobs 
(Weinstein 2008), the potential for destabilization is high.  While the Weberian-based 
conventional wisdom argues for centralizing force and disarming different factions, 
the “Awakening” has shown that the oligopolization of force between elites actually 
reduces violence under the current conditions.   
It will take time before Iraq moves from a fragile natural state to a mature 
natural state in which centralization can occur.  An examination of the earlier efforts 
by the Iraqi government and MNF-I to disarm the Sunni tribes showed that violence 
increased during that time, and that the Sunnis rationally resisted the government’s 
efforts.  The model in Figure 3.2 showed that to get to a self-enforcing agreement, it 
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will now be up to the Sunnis and Iraqi government to recognize the benefits that each 
side has gained from the elite pact that developed out of the “Awakening” and the 
“Surge”.  As both sides have begun building trust and showing that they all currently 
have incentives to defend the pact, the government and opposition should work to 
maintain the pact in its current form.   
If the pact is changed, this will change the internal balance of interests, which 
would likely lead to a collapse of the stability mechanism.  For example, the Iraqi 
government recently arrested Anbar tribal leaders for insurgent activity they had 
committed prior to the “Awakening,” despite the fact that amnesty for past activity is 
part of the pact between the government and opposition (Rasheed and Sly 2009).  If 
violations such as this continue, the stability gained from the pact will not be self-
enforcing.  Further, the inability to form a government within eight months of the 
March 2010 Iraqi elections poses a threat to self-enforcing stability in Iraq.  If the 
Iraqis fail to form a new government based on the existing elite pact, this will 
undermine the progress made in developing credibility mechanisms between the Shi’a 
and Sunnis.  The failure to form a new government can partially be attributed to the 
loss of U.S. credibility following the signing of the Strategic Agreed Framework and 
Status of Forces Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq in 2007 and 2008, respectively, 
which set specific restriction on and withdraw deadlines for U.S. involvement in Iraq.    
This dissertation’s main research question—“what is the appropriate social 
order external actors should help host nations attain in order for successful state-
building to take place, and what incentives can external actors provide to get host 
nations on this path?”—is important because policy choice answers have been 
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wanting.  Within the international community, a prevailing belief exists that it is 
possible for external actors to build other states.  Some argue that state-building and 
democratization in Iraq have failed because of U.S. unilateralism.  However, this 
criticism does not address how external actors need to have appropriate expectations 
for the type of social order that failed states can actually attain.  The critics also 
generally focus on winning the “hearts and minds” of the population, which is a 
strategy that focuses on the wrong actors.   
By focusing primarily on the populace instead of elites, policy makers provide 
inappropriate incentives to solve conflict.  Again, the population is not irrelevant to the 
effort to create stability, but the initial focus must be on solving the credible 
commitment problem between elites.  The direct importance of the population 
increases after solving this credible commitment problem, because expansion of the 
limited access order towards an open access order requires addressing the concerns of 
the broader population.  So, focusing on the population before solving the credible 
commitment problem leads to pacts with the wrong focal points between incorrect 
actors, preventing these stability agreements from becoming self-enforcing with the 
help of the external actor.  The supporters of multilateral and “hearts and minds” 
strategies have difficulty explaining or predicting the conditions needed for successful 
external actor involvement, and do not provide answers to the above question.  With 
the likelihood of the continued challenge of weak and failed states leading to more 
external actor interventions, it is important to understand the circumstances under 
which external actor involvement can help, hurt, or have no effect in other countries’ 
state-building processes.   
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6.4.  Paths for Future Research 
 The insights gained from the alternative narratives of the Malayan Emergency 
and Iraq stabilization in this dissertation provided initial answers to this dissertation’s 
main research question and validation of the theory of self-enforcing stability.  Yet, 
more research will provide further testing of the theory and greater insight into the role 
of external actors during state-building in other countries.  This section describes 
several different paths for future research that will further develop and test the logic of 
the elite-centric theory presented in this dissertation.  These recommended paths 
include examining the impact of the external actor’s nature on state-building, 
developing a typology of state-building outcomes based on multiple equilibria that 
may form between elites, and exploring how external actors identify internal elites. 
 
6.4.1.  Exploring How the Nature of the External Actor Matters 
 The models in this dissertation are necessarily simplified representations of 
theories that describe state-building processes.  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the 
use of simplified, extended-form games allows for the exploration and testing of the 
primary logic underlying the conventional population-centric theory and the proposed 
elite-centric theory.  While numerous variables exist in the real-world that impact 
state-building processes, trying to incorporate all, or many, of those variables would 
render the model useless for explaining or testing the logic of the theories.  For this 
dissertation, the scope conditions limited the exploration of the nature of the external 
actor to simply having benign or strategic intent.  This section presents potential 
extensions of the theory presented in Chapter 3. 
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 Two important factors to consider when determining the nature of the external 
actor are the capacity and the preferences of the external actor.  Capacity is important, 
because as described in Chapter 3, “more is better” when it helps the external actor 
prove its ability to credibly commit to the government and the opposition that the 
external actor will enforce the elite pact.  But, different types of actors inherently have 
different capacities to provide the resources or take actions to prove their credibility 
(e.g., money, personnel, equipment, time, conducting elections, developing 
institutions, and making formal statements of intent). 
 Further, varying types of external actors may value preferences differently that 
will impact the credibility of the external actor.  Variances in preferences are related to 
the external actor’s commitment level.  Is the external actor really committed to 
helping the government and opposition achieve stability for the long haul?  Does the 
external actor actually prefer one side to the other?  If so, will the external actor really 
punish transgressions by its preferred group?  The initial intentions of external actors 
may be the same, such as stability in the host-nation, but their state-building efforts 
may end up with different outcomes based on resources available and the commitment 
level of different types of external actors. 
One extension of the model, then, is to consider comparative statics relating to 
external actor capacity and preferences.  Doing so will allow the models to provide 
more insights into the strategic role of external actors in state-building and the 
potential outcomes of the state-building process based on the external actor type.  
Some possible comparative statics to incorporate to vary the external actor’s capacity 
and preferences are: type of intervention (unilateral or multilateral), deployable force 
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strength, national GDP, GDP-to-debt ratios, regime-type, size of defense industry, 
rules of engagement, and intervention history.   
A second extension is to allow the type of intervention to vary.  The type of 
intervention will impact the decision-making and implementation ability of the 
external actor.  Unilateral actors should have greater credibility than multilateral 
external actors, especially IGOs, since there are less veto points and reduced collective 
action problems for the external actor.  The number and readiness of deployable 
security forces and civilian bureaucratic personnel is an indication of the state-building 
capacity of the external actor.  The national GDP and GDP-to-debt ratio are indicators 
of the financial resources available to the external actor to pay for the deployment of 
personnel and to provide foreign assistance to the host nation.  The regime-type 
identifies possible time limitations that may exist for the external actor as democracies 
face more acute audience costs than non-democracies for decisions to intervene 
internationally (Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007).  The size of the defense industry of the 
external actor impacts the ability of the external actor to equip security forces in the 
host nation.  Rules of engagement serve as indicators of the credibility of the external 
actor.  Highly restrictive rules of engagement indicate that the external actor is less 
likely to police transgressions and enforce the pact made by the host nation elites.  
Finally, the external actor’s history of interventions in other states establishes a 
reputation about the credibility of the external actor’s commitment to the state-
building process, as well as the external actor’s capacity for such activities.  Refining 
and formalizing these and other possible comparative statics is one path for future 
research. 
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One possible avenue for future research is to, based on variations in these 
comparative statics, develop a typology of external actors that will strengthen the 
leverage of the models presented in this dissertation to improve policy analysis before 
external actors undertake state-building interventions.  Based on the possible 
comparative statics described above, five possible external actor types emerge (see 
Table 6.1).  Future research can explore this proposed typology more systematically, 
and potentially reclassify these or identify other external actor types.  The first major 
category to separate the capacity and preferences of external actors in this proposed 
typology is state-led or international governmental organization (IGO)-led state-
building efforts.  The proposed typology then further distinguishes the external actors 
based on the resources available to the external actor and the flexibility the external 
actor has in utilizing those resources.   
Type Capacity Preferences/Credibility 
Great Power (State) High Credible 
Regional Power (State) Mixed Mixed 
Weak Power (State) Low Not Credible 
Global IGO Mixed Partially Credible 
Regional IGO Mixed Mixed 
Table 6.1.  Nature of External Actor Typology 
The typology categorizes the different external actors based on their capacity 
and the credibility.  An external actor will have high, mixed, or low capacity.  And, the 
external actor will be credible, partially credible, or not credible.  Mixed indicates that 
the capacity or credibility varies depending on specific actors within the group.  For 
example, the European Union and the African Union have different capacities and 
credibility levels as Regional IGOs.  Future research will test these hypothesized 
categorizations, and identify outlier cases. 
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6.4.2.  Developing a Typology of State-building Outcomes  
 As with the development of a typology of the nature of external actors 
involved in state-building, further formalization of the theory of self-enforcing 
stability can lead to the development of a typology of state-building outcomes.  This 
typology will help identify why and when some state-building efforts will probably 
succeed, while others will probably fail.  Deriving comparative statics will allow for 
deeper analysis of the theory of self-enforcing stability by focusing on the interests 
and preferences of the different actors involved in the process (government, 
opposition, and external actor) rather than just the external actor’s committed 
resources.    
This future research may explain why multiple equilibria arise under different 
conditions.  This dissertation has followed a rational-choice perspective, and one of its 
findings is that, for an external actor to contribute to successful state-building, the 
conditions have to exist for the external actor to serve as the guarantor of a pact 
between the government and opposition.  The external actor must be able to make a 
credible commitment to both sides that neither side can make on its own regardless of 
either’s intention.  If this condition does not exist, external actors will fail to contribute 
to successful state-building processes.  The development of a state-building typology 
based on variations in comparative statics about the intent and preferences of the 
different actors will help identify when the conditions exist for an external actor to 
probably succeed, as well as the commitment level necessary to achieve success. 
The strength of the theoretical framework provided in this dissertation is its 
versatility.  The derivation of comparative statics will provide a means for building 
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greater leverage into the theory and its models.  This dissertation identified two types 
of state-building process that involve external actors: the “Podesta-Model” and the 
“Post-(Neo)Colonial Model”.  Chapters 4 and 5 provide single case studies to test each 
of these models, respectively.  Further research should include more cases to test the 
underlying theory and potential outcomes.  Other potential cases to research that may 
illuminate the theory and help clarify the “Podesta-Model” include Bosnia-
Herzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo, and the NATO-led Afghanistan mission.  Each of 
these cases includes a different type of external actor as described in Section 6.4.1. 
above, so the research may find that different outcomes occur in this model based on 
the nature of the external actor.  Additionally, through further formalization and 
examination of these cases, it may be possible to adjust the model to better understand 
how the external actor can disengage and further the development of self-enforcing 
stability between the internal actors. 
The “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model” captured the effort of one-type of strategic 
external actor trying to disengage while leaving in place self-enforcing stability in the 
host-nation.  The rules and assumptions of this model treated the external actor and 
government as having the same interests as the colonizer tries to transition authority to 
internal actors before independence.  The population became the third actor in this 
model.  Examining other colonial transitions will help further develop this model by 
exploring successes and failures in leaving behind self-enforcing stability after 
colonial rule.  Possible cases include the British Raj, Kenya, and Algeria.  The model 
may also apply to modern state-building efforts that possibly resemble neo-
colonialism. 
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 While examining additional “Podesta-Model” cases, future research should 
also test those cases against the “Post-(Neo)Colonial Model”.  The model in Chapter 3 
discussed an external actor’s choice to maintain a colony or decolonize, but the 
lessons from the Malayan application of the model in Chapter 5 may apply under other 
circumstances.  To avoid becoming a neo-colonizer, the Podesta-type external actor 
must keep transitioning authority to the internal actors as the ultimate goal.  In the 
post-Cold War era, neo-trusteeship (Fearon and Laitin 2004) and shared sovereignty 
(Krasner 2004) have become potential forms of neo-colonialism, so it is necessary to 
examine how external actors remain credible in these circumstances and can facilitate 
self-enforcing elite pacts in the host-nation.   
The apparent early successes of external actor interventions to help establish 
self-enforcing stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor have soured in recent 
years.  The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, established to oversee 
the Dayton Peace Accords, remains the supreme authority in Bosnia despite the goal 
of closing the OHR and transitioning sovereignty in 2008 (OHR 2010).  The external 
actor, as neo-trustee, has helped keep the peace in Bosnia, but has yet to achieve a 
self-enforcing equilibrium between the government and opposition that is likely to 
endure after the external actor departs.  The international community focused on 
establishing a liberal democracy with mass participation and centralizing violence 
upon assumption of the OHR ("The Dayton Peace Accords"  1995; Clinton 1995; 
Carpenter 2000) rather than trying to build a limited access order and controlling the 
diversification of violent means and rent-seeking to establish an elite pact.  The 
international community also pushed for quick elections and the establishment of 
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democracy and centralized force in East Timor ("Agreement Between the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor"  1999; United 
Nations 2002; United Naitons 2005).  Yet, East Timor faced a coup in 2006 (O'Brien 
2006; BBC News 2010b), as well as another in 2008 with simultaneous assassination 
attempts on the president and prime minister (Ansley 2008; MacKinnon 2008).  
Applying both elite-centric models in this dissertation to these cases may help explain 
why despite enormous external actor involvement, Bosnia and East Timor have failed 
to achieve self-enforcing stability. 
Adjusting the rules and assumptions of the theoretical framework in this 
dissertation will make it possible to understand different types of cases within the 
context of a unified theory.  One additional type occurs by shifting the external actor 
from a Podesta-type who defends all sides of the pact against the transgressor to a 
non-Podesta-type who fails to defend the pact.  This set of rules and assumptions may 
fall in line with the belief that U.N. forces “run when others shoot”.  Possible cases for 
examining this “U.N.- Model” include Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica.  Comparing 
this “U.N.-Model” with the other model-types may provide additional insight into the 
appropriate resources—credible commitment mechanisms—that external actors can 
provide under varying conditions, and if the external actor’s credible commitment 
really does matter for establishing stability in failed or fragile states. 
While the “Podesta” and “U.N.” types assume benign or noble intent by the 
external actor, the theoretical framework also allows for changing that assumption and 
making the external actor another strategic player in the game, as in the “Post-
(Neo)Colonial Model”.  Under this paradigm, another type of state-building process 
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may take place.  During the Cold War, the two superpowers intervened in the internal 
affairs of many states, but did not necessarily care about establishing stable peace in 
failed or fragile states.  Under a “Cold War Model,” the external actor may provide its 
resources to get one side to win or to foment violence and actually create instability in 
the society.  Some cases to explore include Nicaragua where the U.S. supported the 
opposition, El Salvador where the U.S. supported the government, and Afghanistan 
where the Soviets supported the government while the U.S. supported the opposition.  
The above possible paths for future research display the richness of the framework 
provided in this dissertation.  More broadly though, this framework provides a 
possible methodology for studying policy problems that involve the rules governing 
how external actors should act with respect to other states. 
 
6.4.3.  Identifying Who Are the Internal “Elites” 
 Another path for future research is exploring how to identify who the elites are 
within the host nation.  To the external actor’s agents on the ground, it is often 
challenging to identify the elites in a foreign land.  Most soldiers and civilians 
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan have interacted with sheiks, tribal elders, imams, 
councilmen, and governors.  So, how is it possible for aliens to another society or 
culture to differentiate the few elites from the thousands of people with important 
sounding titles who are seeking to exploit the naïveté of the external actor’s agents for 
personal gain?  The cliché of “take me to your leader” often becomes reality for elite 
identification. 
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Adding more actors to the models in this dissertation would weaken the 
parsimony of the theory, reducing its leverage.  To overcome this, it is possible to 
explore different types of actors within each category and their impact on the state-
building outcome—as described with the nature of external actors in Section 6.4.1.  It 
may be useful to develop typologies of different government and opposition elites that 
exist.  Besides these typologies, it is important for external actors to understand how 
elites are identified in foreign cultures. 
One method to understand this identification problem is by surveying on-the-
ground participants in recent state-building efforts.  A starting point would be to 
survey Army commanders and State Department personnel who have had direct 
interaction with Iraqis at the local, provincial, and national level to determine how 
they identified the elites with whom to work.  The survey would help provide insight 
into how identification actually takes place and how personnel correct 
misidentification.  Some questions the survey would seek to answer are: How did 
these personnel define elites?  Were the personnel told which Iraqis to work with, or 
did they have to identify the elites themselves?  What procedures did they use to 
identify an elite?  What procedures did the personnel use to validate that a person was 
an elite after identifying the person as such?  What did these personnel do once they 
determined an individual turned out not to be an elite?   
Surveying company and battalion commanders, as well as State Department 
personnel operating in local field offices will help explain how external actors 
identified elites at the local level.  Surveying brigade and division commanders, as 
well as Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leaders will provide insight into 
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identifying elites at the provincial or regional level.  And, surveying corps and force 
commanders, as well as country team members will generate an understanding of how 
to identify national elites.  Surveying commanders and personnel at these three levels 
will identify if the process of identifying elites is similar or different based on the level 
of analysis.  Further, surveying military commanders and State officials who operated 
in Iraq at different times will show if elites become “sticky”.  After the initial 
identification of elites, do personnel reexamine the identification of an elite by the 
previous personnel or do they just continue following previously established 
relationships?  Is the initial identification of elites the most important time period?  If 
so, is there a systematic way for external actors to identify the true elites at the start of 
state-building efforts?   
While this section has recommended initially surveying military commanders 
and State Department officials who served in Iraq, the survey could be conducted with 
military commanders and foreign affairs officials who have taken part in other state-
building efforts.  Some of these other efforts include: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Afghanistan.  And, surveying personnel from multiple efforts may provide greater 
insight into the development of the typology of state-building outcomes described in 
Section 6.4.2. 
 
6.5.  Conclusion 
The theory of self-enforcing stability presented in this dissertation contributes 
to our understanding of the role of external actors in helping to stabilize or destabilize 
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failed or fragile states.  The results of the case analysis in this dissertation and the 
proposed future research should have an impact on future policy deliberations and 
decisions related to state-building efforts.  Particularly useful are the findings that 
external actors can promote self-enforcing stability by focusing on 1) helping the 
development of limited access orders rather than democracies in host nations, 2) 
promoting the ologopolization of force rather than following the Weberian belief in 
monopolization of force, 3) the external actors helping solve commitment problems, 
and 4) shifting from a population- to an elite-centric focus until after solving the 
credible commitment problems.  
 Policymakers have followed the prescriptions of the population-centric lessons 
learned from the conventional wisdom about the Malayan Emergency and the Iraq 
“Surge” in Afghanistan.  Yet, this dissertation has shown that the incorrect lessons 
were learned from Malaya and Iraq, which may explain why NATO is unlikely to set 
the conditions for self-enforcing stability in Afghanistan despite the latest “Surge” in 
that country.  Putting the population-centric rhetoric about the strategy in Afghanistan 
aside, NATO forces have increased conventional operations (Gall 2010) and have 
made major efforts to cut a deal with the Taliban (Cooper and Shanker 2010).  NATO 
has even secured passage for and secretly flown Taliban leaders in from the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border to Kabul for peace negotiations (Filkins 2010b; Shanker 
et al. 2010).   
The talks with the Taliban leadership indicate that NATO leadership 
understands the importance of developing elite pacts.  But, the question remains, 
whom is NATO helping form an elite pact between?  Is the pact between NATO and 
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the Taliban, or is the NATO helping establish one between the government in Kabul 
and the Taliban?  While the assumption is that the U.S. is helping broker a peace deal 
between the government (Kabul) and the opposition (the Taliban), it is not clear that 
the two parties are interested in an elite pact, and that NATO may be just negotiating 
with the Taliban for NATO’s own exit from Afghanistan.  In addition to NATO 
negotiations between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), Iran has 
maintained ties with both the Taliban and the GoA.  
Although Iran may have supported the Taliban with military equipment and 
expertise early on (Bruno and Beehner 2009; Setrakian 2009), Iran likely supported 
the Taliban as a counter to the U.S. more than as a counter to the Afghan government.  
Iran never recognized the Taliban regime when they controlled power in Kabul 
(Kaplan 2009) and the two states actually had tense relations at the time (Burke 1998; 
Rashid 1999; 2000 [2010], 74-75), so it would not be surprising if Iran continued to 
support Karzai over the Taliban after NATO’s departure.  Recently, the Iranian regime 
has become a major behind the scenes backer of the Karzai government (Filkins 
2010a).  Further, with tensions increasing between the Afghanistan and U.S. 
governments (Filkins and Rubin 2010; Ajami 2010), as well as the withdrawal 
deadlines made public by NATO members (Obama 2009; Murphy 2010; Traynor 
2010), it is not even clear that the primary external actor can provide the credible 
commitment mechanisms necessary for the government and opposition to agree to an 
elite pact.  With this view of elite relations in Afghanistan, the ability of the external 
actor to help establish a limited access order between the government and opposition 
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and to solve the credible commitment problems between the government and 
opposition is limited.  
 So, of the four conditions necessary to achieve self-enforcing stability 
presented in this dissertation, the external actor has marginally met one of the criteria.  
While following a de-jure population-centric strategy, NATO has implemented a de-
facto elite-centric policy in Afghanistan.  The other three criteria for possibly 
achieving self-enforcing stability have not been met in Afghanistan.  First, despite the 
outreach to elites, NATO has failed, to date, to provide credible commitments to both 
the government and opposition that would allow the two internal actors to form an 
elite pact.  Second, the absence of an elite pact, along with NATO’s focus on 
democratic institutional development and anti-corruption efforts, has prevented the 
external actor from facilitating the formation of a limited access order.  Finally, NATO 
has emphasized creating a Weberian monopolization of force under the control of the 
central government.  NATO sees developing the Afghan Security Forces, especially 
the Afghan National Army, as a key element of its exit strategy (Simpson 2010).  Yet, 
it is unlikely that the Afghan Army will be combat ready to take over from NATO 
forces upon their withdrawal (Chivers 2010; Motlagh 2010), and the loyalty of the 
Afghan Security Forces to the central government is equally questionable (BBC News 
2010a; International Crisis Group 2010).  While the British supported the 
decentralization of violent means through the Home Guard in Malaya and the U.S. 
encouraged the “Awakening Movements” in Iraq, NATO has yet to do the same in 
Afghanistan.  This approach is counter to this dissertation’s finding that initially 
oligopolizing violent means helps establish stability by creating balance of power.  
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 Amongst recent policy recommendations being made for what the U.S. should 
do in Afghanistan, decentralization has started to come to the fore.  The latest issue of 
Foreign Affairs has an article that argues for the need to decentralize democracy in 
Afghanistan.  Biddle et al. (2010) contend that this will facilitate power sharing 
between competing factions in Afghanistan and help restore confidence amongst the 
Afghan people who distrust central rule emanating from Kabul.  While Biddle et al. 
cling to the use of the word democracy in describing their effort to broker an elite pact 
through decentralization that would balance power between competing elites, their 
recommendation is similar to the federalism proposal made by then-Senator Biden and 
Leslie Gelb (2007) for Iraq.  
These recommendations start to overcome the problems of conventional COIN 
theory discussed in Chapter 2 and NATO’s current Afghan policy focus on 
centralization and institutionalization.  Particularly important is the recognition of the 
need to decentralize rent-seeking opportunities.  Yet, while the recommendation 
mentions the importance of local elites, the advice still fails to recognize the 
underlying credible commitment problems between internal elites and how the 
external actor’s assistance in oligipolizing force can help overcome that challenge.  
The recommenders still argue for the need to centralize the control of violent means, 
missing an important way to overcome the commitment problem.  The theory of self-
enforcing stability presented in this dissertation identified four components that may 
provide the greatest chance for developing enduring stability in Afghanistan, as well 
as during other state-building efforts in states torn by internal conflict: 1) follow an 
elite-centric strategy; 2) external actors must provide mechanisms to overcome 
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credible commitment problems between internal elites; 3) oligopolize violent means 
and rent-seeking; and 4) focus on establishing limited access orders rather than 
democracies. 
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